Skip to content
How to use Judgment tools
  1. Click Tools to open PDF, Print, Tag, Note, Favourite, and CiteSignal.
  2. Use Brief & Ask in the toolbar for the AI Brief and case chat.
  3. Jump to sections with the pills below the help bar.

Mt. Chhabia Vs. Ram Charan

Mt. Chhabia vs Ram Charan

Type Court Judgment Court Allahabad Decided Sep 07, 1942
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/447640

For advocates & juniors · 7-day free trial

Brief this judgment before chambers

Stop skimming 50 pages - get an 18-section AI Brief on this case, ask scoped follow-ups, and find related precedents with Semantic Search. Full trial, no card required.

  • 18-section brief - facts, issues, ratio, relief
  • Ask this case - answers cite the judgment
  • Semantic search - find precedents by meaning
  • Research drawer - sections, cites, related cases

No card required · credentials emailed · Log in if you already have an account

Citation
Court
Allahabad
Decided On
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- CANTONMENTS ACT[C.A. No. 41/2006]. Section 346 & Cantonment Fund (Servants Rules, 1937, Rules 13, 14 & 15: [H.L. Gokhale, Ag. CJ, P.V. Hardas, Naresh H. Patil, R.M. Borde & R.M. Savant, JJ] Jurisdiction of School Tribunal Constituted under Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation...

Key legal issue
Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Mt. Chhabia

Respondent

Ram Charan

Legal References

Reported In
AIR1943All7

Excerpt

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........signed by only one magistrate, i may say that the learned magistrate who made the reference did not ask for any explanation . from the bench of magistrates. the person who was put into possession has to-day filed an affidavit that as a matter of fact enough magistrates were present to form a quorum at the time the order was passed.3. on the second point there is authority for the proposition that it is not absolutely necessary to issue notice before passing an order under section 522, criminal p. c., and, on the facts of this particular case, it does not appear that any substantial injustice had been done because it is obvious that the person who was ejected could not have put up any reasonable plea that she was entitled to remain in possession. she did allege that she had no knowledge of the civil court proceedings but that would not help her unless she went to the civil court and got the order passed against her set aside.4. on the third point, learned counsel on behalf of the woman who was ejected has referred to the cases in churaman v. ram lal ('03) 25 all. 341 and narain singh v. panna lal ('40) 27 a.i.r. 1940 lah. 460. on the other side reference has been made to the case in maruthayee v. appavu pillai ('23) 10 a.i.r. 1923 mad. 237. it seems to me that it is not possible to say with any certainty that the order passed by the bench of magistrates was a wrong order. in the lahore case the question only was whether the criminal force to which reference is made in section 522 would include force used to an inanimate object and the finding was that it would not. in the allahabad case there are several possible questions which were not raised nor decided. it seems to me, in the first place, very doubtful whether it can necessarily be said that every criminal trespasser dispossesses the person who is entitled to be in possession of the property. it is open to argument that it is not necessarily at the time when the criminal trespasser goes upon the property.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

Allsop, J.

1. This is a reference by the learned Additional District Magistrate of Allahabad. He recommends that this Court should set aside an order passed under Section 522, Criminal P. C., by a Bench of Magistrates. He gives three grounds, namely, (1) that the order is signed by only one Magistrate and that there is nothing to show whether any other Magistrate was present at the time when the order was passed, (2) that the order was passed without notice to the person who was dispossessed, and (3) that no order could be passed under Section 522, Criminal P. C., because the offence of which the person against whom the order was passed had been convicted did not involve the use of criminal force or intimidation. There can be no doubt that the order of the Bench of Honorary Magistrates was eminently just and reasonable. The person against whom it was passed had been ejected by a civil Court Amin from a house and her furniture and belongings had been taken by the Amin out of the house and placed outside. It has been found that the person who was put in possession of the house then locked the house up and went away. He did not come to the house for a couple of days and in the meanwhile the woman who was ejected got into the house again and when he returned abused him and threatened him and would not let him in.

2. On the first point that the order was signed by only one Magistrate, I may say that the learned Magistrate who made the reference did not ask for any explanation . from the Bench of Magistrates. The person who was put into possession has to-day filed an affidavit that as a matter of fact enough Magistrates were present to form a quorum at the time the order was passed.

3. On the second point there is authority for the proposition that it is not absolutely necessary to issue notice before passing an order under Section 522, Criminal P. C., and, on the facts of this particular case, it does not appear that any substantial injustice had been done because it is obvious that the person who was ejected could not have put up any reasonable plea that she was entitled to remain in possession. She did allege that she had no knowledge of the civil Court proceedings but that would not help her unless she went to the civil Court and got the order passed against her set aside.

4. On the third point, learned Counsel on behalf of the woman who was ejected has referred to the cases in Churaman v. Ram Lal ('03) 25 All. 341 and Narain Singh v. Panna Lal ('40) 27 A.I.R. 1940 Lah. 460. On the other side reference has been made to the case in Maruthayee v. Appavu Pillai ('23) 10 A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 237. It seems to me that it is not possible to say with any certainty that the order passed by the Bench of Magistrates was a wrong order. In the Lahore case the question only was whether the criminal force to which reference is made in Section 522 would include force used to an inanimate object and the finding was that it would not. In the Allahabad case there are several possible questions which were not raised nor decided. It seems to me, in the first place, very doubtful whether it can necessarily be said that every criminal trespasser dispossesses the person who is entitled to be in possession of the property. It is open to argument that it is not necessarily at the time when the criminal trespasser goes upon the property that dispossession takes place. It may perhaps be said that it sometimes takes place at the time when he prevents the rightful possessor from coming upon the property. It must be remembered that criminal trespass is not confined only to the mere entering upon property but it also includes remaining on the property. The learned Magistrates heard all the evidence in the case and though they did not convict the woman under Section 500, Penal Code, they may have thought that she was guilty of some force or intimidation when she prevented the other party from returning to the house. I am not satisfied that the order is necessarily illegal and as it is in substance a just order, I see no reason to interfere. The reference is rejected.

Continue Your Research


AI Briefs · Semantic Search · Save & annotate judgments

Start your 7-day free trial