Pardas Singh and anr. Vs. Dwarka Singh and anr.

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as.....1. the point raised in this appeal is concluded by a great weight of authority. the right of redemption, it has been held, is not lost until the order absolute for foreclosure is made. in other words, that the mortgagor can redeem the mortgaged property before the decree is made absolute. this was decided in the case of poresh nath mojumdar v. ramjadu mojumdar 16 c. 246; audhia v. baldeo pershad singh 21 c. 818 at p. 824; ramesh v. ram krishna 27 c. 705; narayana reddi v. papaya 22 m. 133; nabati v. mitter ken 20 a. 446 and salig ram v. muradan 25 a. 231. the learned vakil for the appellant, however, relies upon the case of ram lal v. tulsha kunwar 19 a. 180, which is certainly in favour of the view presented by him. that case, however, was not followed by one of the learned judges who took part in the decision and it has never, so far as we are aware, been followed in any court. we dismiss the appeal.