.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as.....robert stuart, c.j., pearson, turner and oldfield, jj.1. it appears that mr. currie as collector allowed a reduction of the yearly revenue, subject, it may be presumed, to the sanction of government. in 1278 fasli sanction was refused, and a demand was made on the respondent, the lambardar, who however did not pay the arrears due until 1281 fasli. meanwhile he retained in his hands the profits of 1278 fasli, 1279 fasli, and 1280 fasli, and not improbably for the purpose of meeting the government demand if pressed. in the suit out of which this appeal arises, the appellants, the patnidars, sue the lambardar for their profits of the years 1278, 1279, and 1280; and he pleads that, out of the sums collected in these years and remaining in his hands, he has paid the arrears of revenue above-mentioned; and the question which principally calls for decision in this appeal is whether he is or is not entitled to be allowed this payment. we are of opinion that he is. the lambardar is, in this village, the agent of the co-sharers to make collections, and after payment of the revenue to divide the profits. an arrear of revenue was due to government, and to discharge this arrear ho was entitled to have recourse to the collections for the years 1278 fasli, 1279 fasli, and 1280 fasli, remaining in his hands undivided. there is nothing in the revenue law which restricts a lambardar or other co-sharer, who may make collections, to discharge arrears of government revenue out of the collections of the particular year in which the arrear may accrue. it would be at least inconvenient to hold that, having in his hands profits to meet the government demand, the respondent, instead of applying these profits to the discharge of the demand, should be driven to have resort to a suit against each co-sharer.spankie, j.2. i adhere to the opinion expressed in my judgment of the 8th june 1875. nothing that i have heard leads me to think that my view is incorrect.