Ganesha Vs. Emperor

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as.....1. the appellant ganesha had been convicted under section 302, i.p.c., by the learned sessions judge of jhansi of murdering his sister-in-law by striking her on the head with a lump of limestone called potni matti. the facts are clear. there was no previous enmity between the two and the accused clearly had no intention of killing her. a dispute arose over a pumpkin between the accused's wife and the deceased. the deceased 'wanted to take away the whole pumpkin whereas accused's wife only wanted to let her take half. the accused come up while the dispute was going on and broke half the pumpkin. the deceased began to abuse him whereupon the accused picked up the lump of limestone and struck her on the head with it. the result was that her skull was fractured and she died in consequence of the injury. it is perfectly clear that the accused acted on the impulse of the moment and had no intention either of killing the deceased or of fracturing her skull. the case does not come under either of the four clauses of section 300, i.p.c. at the same time, as the. lump of potni matti weighed three pounds it must be taken that he knew that there was a probability of a fatal injury being inflicted. the learned sessions judge considered himself bound by the ruling in emperor v. umrao a.i.r. 1923 all. 355 to convict the accused of murder. the circumstances of that ruling are entirely different and it is not applicable to the present case. we alter the conviction to one under section 304, i.p.c., and reduce the sentence to one of two years' rigorous imprisonment. we consider that a light sentence will meet the requirements of the case.