Emperor Vs. Khiali

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........made any statement in the court of the committing magistrate and added that he took no part in the dacoity. on this the learned sessions judge directed the committing magistrate to record evidence and to commit khiali to sessions on a charge under section 396, indian penal code, and added the words 'pardon offered to khiali is declared to be forfeited.' the pleas taken in revision are that the learned sessions judge had no jurisdiction to withdraw the conditional pardon, that there was no ground for the trial of the applicant under section 396, indian penal code, and that he could not be prosecuted for any offence other than that of giving false evidence. in support of the first plea i was referred to the case of queen empress v. ramasami (1900) i.l.r. 24 mad. 321. in that case the learned judges, following a calcutta decision in q.e. v. manick chandra sarkar (1897) i.l.r. 24 calc. 492, held that the proper authority to withdraw a pardon is the authority which granted it. but in the very same case the learned judges, who were asked to quash the commitment on the ground that it was an illegal commitment, refused to do so and directed the sessions judge to proceed with the trial according to law. whatever weight is to be attached to this judgement, the same high court in kullan v. emperor (1908) i.l.r. 32 mad. 173 held that under section 339, criminal procedure code, there is no necessity for withdrawal, and withdrawal has no effect. in this particular case the pardon in question had been tendered by the committing magistrate. the person to whom it had been tendered had at the trial before the sessions judge retracted the evidence previously given by him, and the district magistrate, who was not the person who had tendered the pardon, purported to withdraw the pardon, and the appellant was subsequently tried and convicted of dacoity, the offence of which a pardon had been tendered. i agree with the view taken by the learned judges who decided the case of kullan v......