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Raja Dei Vs. Umed Singh

Raja Dei vs Umed Singh

Type Court Judgment Court Allahabad Decided Jan 08, 1912
~5 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/447400

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Citation
Court
Allahabad
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Property;Civil

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Hindu law - Hindu widow--Suit by remote reversioner to set aside alienation by widow--Immediate reversioner a female having a life estate only--Acceleration of estate. - CANTONMENTS ACT[C.A. No. 41/2006]. Section 346 & Cantonment Fund (Servants Rules, 1937, Rules 13, 14 & 15: [H.L. Gokhale, Ag. CJ, P.V. Hardas, Nare...

Key legal issue
Property;Civil

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Raja Dei

Respondent

Umed Singh

Legal References

Reported In
(1912)ILR34All207

Excerpt

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........62. i am of opinion that a remote reversioner presumptively .entitled to the full ownership of the property can maintain such a suit as this, where the immediate reversioner is a female who will take, if anything, a limited or 'life-estate only. the existence of raja dei, then, in my opinion, offers no bar to the maintenance of the present suit. nor in my opinion is the maintenance of the suit barred by the fact that kan singh was at the date of the institution of the suit the next reversioner presumptively entitled to the full ownership of the property. in rani anund koer v. court of wards (1884) i.l.r. 6 all. 428 their lordships of the privy council said:if the nearest reversionary heir refuses without sufficient cause to institute proceedings or if he has precluded himself by his own act or conduct from suing or has colluded with the widow or concurred in the act alleged to be wrongful, the next presumptive reversioners would be entitled to sue. 4. these remarks clearly cover the present case where the nearest reversionary heir was a female who supports the alienation in question, and the nearest reversionary heir presumptively entitled to the full ownership of the property was the person in whose favour the transfer complained of was made. in my opinion the courts below were right in holding that the respondent; umed singh, was competent to maintain this suit. it has not been suggested that they did not exercise a wise discretion in making a declaration in his favour. i would observe in conclusion that no question of acceleration of estates arises here, for kan singh, the donee, was not the next reversioner. i would dismiss the ( appeal with costs.karamat husain, j.5. i agree with my learned colleague in the order proposed by him.6. order of the court is that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Full Judgment

Chamier, J.

1. Nagina Singh died many years ago, leaving a widow, Musammat Waziri, a daughter, Musammat Raja Dei, and a daughter's son, Kan. Singh. In June, 1909, Musammat 'Waziri, who was in possession of the estate of her- husband, made a gift of it to Kan Singh. The plaintiffs at once brought this suit for a declaration that the gift was not binding upon them. The plaintiffs other than the present respondent, Umed Singh, are more distantly related to Nagina Singh than Umed Singh is. The courts below have agreed in making a declaration as prayed in favour of Umed Singh. Kan Singh died while the suit was pending in the court of first instance. The appeal to the lower appellate court was filed by Musammat Raja Dei, and it is she who has filed this second appeal. In this Court it is contended that at the date of the institution of this suit, Umed Singh was not the nearest reversionary heir of Nagina Singh, and therefore the suit was not maintainable. Indeed, it is contended that even Kan Singh, supposing he had not been the donee of the property, could not have maintained a suit for a declaration inasmuch as the next reversioner was his mother, Raja Dei.

2. There is, of course, no doubt that the nearest reversioner, who is the presumptive heir, though he may have only a contingent interest, may sue for a declaration that a transfer by a female heir in possession of the property of the last full owner does not bind the estate. Upon the question whether a remote reversioner may maintain such a suit when the immediate reversioner is or rather will be the holder of a life-estate only, as where the immediate reversioner is a Hindu female, there is some conflict of authority in this Court. In Madari v. Malki (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 428. Straight and Broodhust, JJ., held that such a suit could not be maintained unless the immediate reversioner was shown to be in collusion with the heir in possession, but in Balgobind v. Ram Kumar (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 481 Oldfield and Mahmood, JJ. held that such a suit could be -maintained.

3. In Ishwar Narain v. Janki (1893) I.L.R. 15 All. 182. Tyrrell and Blair, JJ. refused to follow the decision in the latter case and adopted the view taken in the former case. In the case of Hanuman Pandit v. Jota Kunwar Weekly Notes 1908 p. 207 my learned colleague, after referring to several decisions of this and other courts, said that he preferred the decision in Balgobind v. Ram Kumar and the same view was taken in Dirgbijai Singh v. Jagannath Singh F.A. No. 210 of 1910 which is the latest case in this Court. The balance of authority in the Calcutta High Court is clearly in favour of the view taken in Balgobind v. Ram Kumar and the Madras High Court have held in several cases that such a suit can be maintained by a remote reversioner when the immediate reversioner is a female entitled to a life-estate only. I have myself in several cases in Oudh followed the view taken by Oldfield and Mahmood, JJ., in Balgobind v. Ram Kumar by the Madras' High Court and by many Judges in the Calcutta High Court, and lam content to adopt the arguments contained in the judgment of Mahmood, J., and in the judgment of Brett and Mookerjee, JJ., in the latest case in the Calcutta High Court, Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha (1904) I.L.R. 32 Calc. 62. I am of opinion that a remote reversioner presumptively .entitled to the full ownership of the property can maintain such a suit as this, where the immediate reversioner is a female who will take, if anything, a limited or 'life-estate only. The existence of Raja Dei, then, in my opinion, offers no bar to the maintenance of the present suit. Nor in my opinion is the maintenance of the suit barred by the fact that Kan Singh was at the date of the institution of the suit the next reversioner presumptively entitled to the full ownership of the property. In Rani Anund Koer v. Court of Wards (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 428 their Lordships of the Privy Council said:

If the nearest reversionary heir refuses without sufficient cause to institute proceedings or if he has precluded himself by his own act or conduct from suing or has colluded with the widow or concurred in the act alleged to be wrongful, the next presumptive reversioners would be entitled to sue.

4. These remarks clearly cover the present case where the nearest reversionary heir was a female who supports the alienation in question, and the nearest reversionary heir presumptively entitled to the full ownership of the property was the person in whose favour the transfer complained of was made. In my opinion the courts below were right in holding that the respondent; Umed Singh, was competent to maintain this suit. It has not been suggested that they did not exercise a wise discretion in making a declaration in his favour. I would observe in conclusion that no question of acceleration of estates arises here, for Kan Singh, the donee, was not the next reversioner. I would dismiss the ( appeal with costs.

Karamat Husain, J.

5. I agree with my learned colleague in the order proposed by him.

6. Order of the Court is that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

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