M. Ramesh Vs. Vankadara Sunil Kumar

M. Ramesh vs Vankadara Sunil Kumar

Disposition Petition dismissed Court Andhra Pradesh Decided Jul 11, 2005

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/445318
Court: Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judge: C.Y. Somayajulu, J.
Decided On: Jul 11, 2005
Case Number: Criminal Petition No. 3917 of 2004
Subject: Banking;Criminal
Disposition: Petition dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- CANTONMENTS ACT[C.A. No. 41/2006]. Section 346 & Cantonment Fund (Servants Rules, 1937, Rules 13, 14 & 15: [H.L. Gokhale, Ag. CJ, P.V. Hardas, Naresh H. Patil, R.M. Borde & R.M. Savant, JJ] Jurisdiction of School Tribunal Constituted under Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation...

Key legal issue: Banking;Criminal
Outcome / disposition: Petition dismissed
Acts & sections: Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138; General Clauses Act - Sections 27; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (CrCP) - Sections 482

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

M. Ramesh

Advocate P. Veera Reddy, Adv.

Respondent

Vankadara Sunil Kumar

Advocate K. Rathangapani Reddy, Adv.

Legal References

Acts: Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138; General Clauses Act - Sections 27; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (CrCP) - Sections 482
Reported In: 2005(2)ALD(Cri)442; IV(2006)BC84

Excerpt

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........defence of the accused. here, i feel it necessary to mention that in the cause title to this petition, petitioner is described as 'm. ramesh, s/o radha krishnan, aged about 45 years, proprietor of ceema cotton traders, c/o sri seethalakshmi ginning factory, opp. suklavarapatti, petiyakulam road, theni -626531, tamil nadu state'. so, prima facie, the contention of the petitioner that he is not the proprietor of 'ceema cotton traders' cannot be accepted. as stated earlier, the question of ownership and authorizing to issue cheque can only be decided after trial.5. the next contention of the learned counsel for petitioner that inasmuch as petitioner did not receive the statutory notice, the complaint is not maintainable, cannot be accepted, because the allegation in the complaint shows that the statutory notice was returned unclaimed. in view of the ratio in k. bhaskaran v. sankaran vaidhyan balan iii : 1999 crilj4606 read with section 27 of the general clauses act, question whether the address mentioned on the returned envelope is that of the petitioner or not is a matter of evidence.6. the averments in the complaint show that on the same day on which first respondent sent the statutory notice by registered post, he sent a notice under certificate of posting also to the petitioner and produced that certificate as document no. 5 along with the complaint. notice sent under certificate of posting also would be valid statutory notice, since section 138 of the act does not mandate that the notice under that section has to be sent only by registered post. therefore, in view of the presumption that a letter addressed to the correct address of the addressee would be deemed to have been received by the addressee, the contention that there is no valid statutory notice, prima facie cannot be accepted, since the question whether the address mentioned in the certificate of posting is the correct address of the petitioner or not can be decided only after trial.7. in the above.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

C.Y. Somayajulu, J.

1. Alleging that cheque dated 11.1.2003 for Rs. 2 lakhs drawn on Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Limited, issued by the petitioner on behalf of Ceema Cotton Traders, in his favour, was returned on the ground of 'insufficient funds' and that in spite of his issuing statutory notice on 5.8.2003, informing the petitioner about the dishonour of the cheque with a demand for payment, petitioner failed to pay the amount, first respondent filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (the Act) against the petitioner which was registered as C.C. No. 460 of 2003. This petition is filed to quash the said complaint.

2. The main contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the father of the petitioner, but not the petitioner, is the proprietor of Ceema Cotton Traders, on whose behalf the cheque was drawn and so petitioner cannot be made liable under Section 138 of the Act.

3. The specific case of first respondent, in the complaint, is that petitioner drew the bounced cheque in his favour. That cheque, as per the averments in the complaint, was returned on the ground of 'insufficient funds', but not on the ground that the signature of the drawer does not tally with the specimen signatures of the account holder. So, prima facie, petitioner has to be taken to be owner of the Ceema Cotton Traders.

4. Question whether father of the petitioner or the petitioner is the proprietor of 'Ceema Cotton Traders' need not be considered for deciding the petition, because while considering a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C., this Court has to consider the averments in the complaint only, but not the defence of the accused. Here, I feel it necessary to mention that in the cause title to this petition, petitioner is described as 'M. Ramesh, s/o Radha Krishnan, aged about 45 years, Proprietor of Ceema Cotton Traders, c/o Sri Seethalakshmi Ginning Factory, Opp. Suklavarapatti, Petiyakulam Road, Theni -626531, Tamil Nadu State'. So, prima facie, the contention of the petitioner that he is not the proprietor of 'Ceema Cotton Traders' cannot be accepted. As stated earlier, the question of ownership and authorizing to issue cheque can only be decided after trial.

5. The next contention of the learned Counsel for petitioner that inasmuch as petitioner did not receive the statutory notice, the complaint is not maintainable, cannot be accepted, because the allegation in the complaint shows that the statutory notice was returned unclaimed. In view of the ratio in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan III : 1999 CriLJ4606 read with Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, question whether the address mentioned on the returned envelope is that of the petitioner or not is a matter of evidence.

6. The averments in the complaint show that on the same day on which first respondent sent the statutory notice by registered post, he sent a notice under certificate of posting also to the petitioner and produced that certificate as document No. 5 along with the complaint. Notice sent under certificate of posting also would be valid statutory notice, since Section 138 of the Act does not mandate that the notice under that section has to be sent only by registered post. Therefore, in view of the presumption that a letter addressed to the correct address of the addressee would be deemed to have been received by the addressee, the contention that there is no valid statutory notice, prima facie cannot be accepted, since the question whether the address mentioned in the certificate of posting is the correct address of the petitioner or not can be decided only after trial.

7. In the above circumstances, I find no grounds to quash the complaint and hence the petition is dismissed.

Same Court & Year Andhra Pradesh · 2005 Same Parties M. Ramesh vs Vankadara Sunil Kumar Same Subject Banking;Criminal Same Judge C.Y. Somayajulu, J. Acts & Sections Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138; General Clau...

Banking;Criminal