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Polyprint Private Limited and ors. Vs. Canara Bank, Per Manager and anr.

Polyprint Private Limited and ors. vs Canara Bank, Per Manager and anr.

Type Court Judgment Court Andhra Pradesh Decided Jul 30, 1996
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/443530

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Citation
Court
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
C.C.C. Appeal No. 103 of 1986
Subject
Civil

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- CANTONMENTS ACT[C.A. No. 41/2006]. Section 346 & Cantonment Fund (Servants Rules, 1937, Rules 13, 14 & 15: [H.L. Gokhale, Ag. CJ, P.V. Hardas, Naresh H. Patil, R.M. Borde & R.M. Savant, JJ] Jurisdiction of School Tribunal Constituted under Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation...

Key legal issue
Civil
Acts & sections
Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 - Sections 63 to 66; Andhra Pradesh Advocates' Fee Rules, 1990

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Polyprint Private Limited and ors.

Advocate Y. Sivarama Sastry, ;Y. Venkata Sastry and ;Y.N. Lohita, Advs.

Respondent

Canara Bank, Per Manager and anr.

Legal References

Acts
Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 - Sections 63 to 66; Andhra Pradesh Advocates' Fee Rules, 1990
Reported In
1997(3)ALT432

Excerpt

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........appeal against the preliminary decree in a mortgage suit, having satisfied with the decree and a compromise entered into between the parties--appellants and the plaintiff-bank --, seek permission of this court to withdraw the appeal. in view of the facts stated with regard to the discharge of loan amount pursuant to the compromise entered into between the parties, we dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. however, we make no order as to costs.2. at this stage mr. y. sivarama sastry, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that inasmuch as the appeal is being withdrawn pursuant to the compromise, the court fees payable by the plaintiff in institution of the suit was also remitted and that the suit debt having been discharged to the extent of their liability pursuant to the compromise, equity warrants the refund of the court fee paid in this appeal. in support of his submission he relied upon a decision of this court in m. dasarath v. k. omprakash 1994 (1) an.w.r. 109 wherein the division bench, dealing with the similar question, applying the equitable principles directed the refund of court fees, following earlier division bench decision of this court in m/s. p&h; vaswani (p) ltd., v. g.s. murthy 1969 (1) aplj 113 (sn).3. having heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, we also apply the principles incidental to the facts of the case as the request for refund of court fee falls outside the provisions of sections 63 to 66 of the a.p. court fees and suits valuation act. there is the power inherent in this law court as a court of record, which is not only a court of law but also a court of justice and equity to see and weigh in each case as to whether the court fee is liable to be refunded or not. such inherent power has to be exercised having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and only in the cases where there is equity in favour of the appellant withdrawing the appeal. in the instant case, having regard to the facts and.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

B. Subhashan Reddy, J.

1. Mr. Y. Sivarama Sastry, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the appellants, who had filed this appeal against the preliminary decree in a mortgage suit, having satisfied with the decree and a compromise entered into between the parties--appellants and the plaintiff-bank --, seek permission of this Court to withdraw the appeal. In view of the facts stated with regard to the discharge of loan amount pursuant to the compromise entered into between the parties, we dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. However, we make no order as to costs.

2. At this stage Mr. Y. Sivarama Sastry, learned Counsel for the appellants, submits that inasmuch as the appeal is being withdrawn pursuant to the compromise, the Court fees payable by the plaintiff in institution of the suit was also remitted and that the suit debt having been discharged to the extent of their liability pursuant to the compromise, equity warrants the refund of the Court Fee paid in this appeal. In support of his submission he relied upon a decision of this Court in M. Dasarath v. K. Omprakash 1994 (1) An.W.R. 109 wherein the Division Bench, dealing with the similar question, applying the equitable principles directed the refund of Court Fees, following earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in M/s. P&H; Vaswani (P) Ltd., v. G.S. Murthy 1969 (1) APLJ 113 (SN).

3. Having heard the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellants, we also apply the principles incidental to the facts of the case as the request for refund of Court Fee falls outside the provisions of Sections 63 to 66 of the A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. There is the power inherent in this law Court as a Court of Record, which is not only a Court of law but also a Court of justice and equity to see and weigh in each case as to whether the Court fee is liable to be refunded or not. Such inherent power has to be exercised having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and only in the cases where there is equity in favour of the appellant withdrawing the appeal. In the instant case, having regard to the facts and circumstances, we find the equity in favour of the appellants and as such the Court fee paid in this appeal shall be refunded to the appellants by the Registry. We may also make it clear that the refund of this Court Fees will not be deprived of the fees payable to the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff-Bank. The plaintiff-Bank has to pay his fees in accordance with their understanding and in accordance with the provisions of the A.P. Advocates' Fee Rules, 1990.

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