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Md. Abdul Waheb and ors. Vs. Society for Self Employed Training and ors.

Md. Abdul Waheb and ors. vs Society for Self Employed Training and ors.

Type Court Judgment Court Andhra Pradesh Decided Nov 16, 1987
~11 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/433935

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Citation
Court
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Insurance;Motor Vehicles

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- ALL INDIA SERVICES ACT, 1951.Sections 8 & 11 & A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules, 1961, Rule 5: [V.V.S. Rao, G. Yethirajulu & G. Bhavani Prasad, JJ] Refusal by Landlord to receive rent - Deposit of rent in Court - Held, A tenant has the option to take recourse to Section 8 in case of refusal ...

Key legal issue
Insurance;Motor Vehicles

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Md. Abdul Waheb and ors.

Respondent

Society for Self Employed Training and ors.

Legal References

Reported In
I(1988)ACC307

Excerpt

.....(1) to (3) of rule 5. the notice to person entitled to rent and proper maintenance of accounts of such deposits under sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 5 are solely dependent on compliance with sub-rule (3) by the tenant. the payment or deposit of rent under section 11 read with sub-rule (6) of rule 5 arises only in respect of a tenant who did not take recourse to section 8 or section 9 before an application for eviction has been made against him in respect of any rent in arrears by date of that application, whereas in respect of rent that becomes subsequently due since date of application for eviction, the tenant is bound to pay or deposit regularly until termination of proceedings in order to enable him to contest the application. any violation of section 11(1) to (3) and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 makes the tenant liable for the adverse consequences under sub-section (4) of section 11. thus, the provisions of section 11 and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 are intended only to ensure the payment and deposit of rent including arrears during pendency and till termination of proceedings for eviction. the forfeiture of right of tenant to contest in case of default is to protect the rights and interests of landlord pending such an application for eviction, but not to confer any right on tenant to plead that all defaults committed by him prior to application for eviction can never be considered wilful, if he were to deposit all arrears of rent due within fifteen days under rule 5(6) read with sub-section (1) of section 11. the object and effect of section 11 and sub-rules (1) to (5) to rule 5, the former being for protection of landlord during pendency of eviction proceedings and the later being for protection of tenant to avoid any liability for eviction on ground of wilful default. consequently, while taking recourse to section 8 by tenant is optional, once that option is exercised, compliance with sub-rules (1) to (5) of rule 5 becomes mandatory in the sense that any non-compliance..........ownership of the vehicle was vested in the commissioner and that he is liable to pay the damages in excess what is payable by the insurance company.7. point no. 3: --the more important question is as to who are the 'legal representatives' of the deceased under section 110 a of the motor vehicles act. this has a bearing on the selection of the multiplier. if the parents alone are the legal representatives, a multiplier suitable to the age of the parents has to selected. if persons younger to the deceased are also 'legal representatives', such as the wife and children, a multiplier suitable to the age of the deceased has to be selected as stated in a.p.s.r t.c. v. rama-natail 1987 (2) a.l.t. 5.6.8. in the present case, the claimants are, the father and mother of the deceased who are aged 65 and 45 years, respectively, as also the brother aged 20 years and sister aged 19 years. the deceased at the time of the accident, was employed in allwyin company and was getting rs. 750/- per month. he had passed m.a. and also other examinations in shorthand and typing. the deceased has a prospect of a good career. the father is a retired assistant registrar from the osmania university. having regard to the provisions of section 110-a of the motor vehicles act, the claim is maintainable at the instance of the 'legal representatives' of the deceased.9. the question as to who are entitled to claim compensation under the motor vehicles act has been recently considered by the supreme court in g.s.r. t. corpn., ahmedabad v. ramanbhai, a.i.r. 1987 s.c. 1691. the supreme court was dealing with the case of a claim made by the brothers of the deceased. it was argued there that under the provisions of the fatal accidents act, 1855 brothers were not entitled to claim the 'dependency' under section 1-a the said act though if they are legal representatives they could lay a claim to the 'loss to the estate' under section 2 of the act. the supreme court construed the provisions under section.....

Full Judgment

Jagannadha Rao, J.

1. The question arises in this appeal as to the meaning of the words 'legal representatives' in Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

2. The appeal is preferred by the legal representatives of the deceased under the Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation. The accident occurred on 16-2-1981 when the deceased was crushed under the wheels of the vehicle belonging to the SETWIN. The claim is by the parents, brother and sister of the deceased in a sum of Rs. 50,000/-. The Court below dismissed the petition on the ground that the negligence of the driver of the vehicle was not established. Alternatively, it gave a finding that if the petition were to be allowed, the claimants would be entitled to Rs. 23,000/-.

3. In this appeal preferred by the legal representatives of the deceased, it is contended by Sri S. Hanumaiah that the finding of the lower Court on the question of negligence is erroneous. It is further argued that the SETWIN is liable for the damages. It is further argued that having regard to the fact that the deceased was governed by Muhammadan Law, the parents, brother and sister of the deceased are also entitled to claim the 'dependency.' The points that arise in the case are:

(1) Whether the driver of the vehicle was negligent and the deceased was not negligent ?

(2) Whether the SETWIN is liable ?

(3) What is the meaning of the words 'legal representatives' in Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act

4. Point No. 1: It is pointed out that the deceased was getting into the bus at the koti junction in Hyderabad city at 8-20 a.m. and that the driver of the vehicle informed the deceased that he should get into the bus from the door on the back side. The case of the appellants is that after the deceased proceeded to get into the door of the vehicle on the back side, (he driver suddenly increased the speed and that therefore, negligence could not be attributed to the deceased.

5. We have the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 who were passengers in the bus and who were also examined by the police. The presence of these two persons in the bus cannot be disputed. P.W. 2 is an employee working in the Andhra Pradesh State Construction Corporation, while P.W. 3 is a journalist who was also travelling in the same vehicle Their evidence is that when the deceased tried to get into the bus from the front door, the driver of the vehicle requested him to get down and get into the vehicle from the door on the back side. They further deposed that immediately after the deceased got down from the front side, the driver suddenly increased the speed, and that the decsased was crushed under the rear wheels of the vehicle. In my view, the Tribunal was wrong in attributing negligence to the deceased I do not find any grounds to disbelieve the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3, who are respectable persons and who were examined by the police also, and their presence in the vehicle cannot be disputed. The deceased might have been wrong in trying to get into the bus from the front side, but once the driver asked him to get down and requested him to get in from the back side, thereafter the driver of the vehicle acted rashly and negligently in suddenly increasing the speed that resultant in the crushing the deceased under the wheels of the vehicle. Once the passenger got down from the front door of the vehicle and stopped on the road, it was the obligation of the driver of the vehicle to see that the vehicle was not driven at such speed as to crush any person on the road. The driver was fully conscious of the fact that the deceased would follow up his request or advice and would try to get through the back-door and that the deceased would therefore, be very much nearer to the vehicle. If the deceased was a normal pedestrian on the road, he would have tried to avoid the accident, but in this case he had no chance of avoiding the accident. It was at the request of the driver of the vehicle that the deceased got down from the front side and proceeded to get into the bus on the back side. In my view, the driver acted rashly and negligently when he suddenly increased the speed. I, therefore, reverse the findina of the Tribunal and hold that the accident occurred on account of the negligence of the driver of the vehicle. Point No. 1 is decided accordingly.

6. Point No 2 .'--Coming to the liability of the owner of the vehicle, the claimants have impleaded the Society for Self Employment Training in Twin Cities (SETW1N) which is managing the vehicles, while the Commissioner for Self Employment Scheme, is impleaded as the 4th respondent. The Commissioner now figures as the 3rd respondent in this appeal. In a judgment rendered in W.P. No. 54 of 1982 on 25-6-1982, this Court had to consider the ownership of the vehicles which were being run by the SET-WIN. It was held that the SETWIN is registered under the Societies Registration Act and it gives training to the unemployed youth, that so far as the ownership of the vehicle is concerned, it vested in the Commissioner for Self Employment Scheme represented by the Secretary to Government Finance and Planning, Andhra Pradesh and that this is clear from G O. Ms. 68 dated 17-10-1979 issued by the Finance and Planning Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. It may be noted that the Commissioner was represented by the counsel in the lower court but is not represented by counsel here. Having regard to the above said judgment of this Court and the G O., I hold that the ownership of the vehicle was vested in the Commissioner and that he is liable to pay the damages in excess what is payable by the Insurance Company.

7. Point No. 3: --The more important question is as to who are the 'legal representatives' of the deceased Under Section 110 A of the Motor Vehicles Act. This has a bearing on the selection of the multiplier. If the parents alone are the legal representatives, a multiplier suitable to the age of the parents has to selected. If persons younger to the deceased are also 'legal representatives', such as the wife and children, a multiplier suitable to the age of the deceased has to be selected as stated in A.P.S.R T.C. v. Rama-natail 1987 (2) A.L.T. 5.6.

8. In the present case, the claimants are, the father and mother of the deceased who are aged 65 and 45 years, respectively, as also the brother aged 20 years and sister aged 19 years. The deceased at the time of the accident, was employed in Allwyin Company and was getting Rs. 750/- per month. He had passed M.A. and also other examinations in Shorthand and Typing. The deceased has a prospect of a good career. The father is a retired Assistant Registrar from the Osmania University. Having regard to the provisions of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claim is maintainable at the instance of the 'legal representatives' of the deceased.

9. The question as to who are entitled to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act has been recently considered by the Supreme Court in G.S.R. T. Corpn., Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1691. The Supreme Court was dealing with the case of a claim made by the brothers of the deceased. It was argued there that under the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 brothers were not entitled to claim the 'dependency' Under Section 1-A the said Act though if they are legal representatives they could lay a claim to the 'loss to the estate' Under Section 2 of the Act. The Supreme Court construed the provisions Under Section 110 A and held that the word 'legal representative' used in the said section could not be confined to the categories mentioned is Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act while claiming damages to the 'dependency'. They observed that the words 'legal representatives' in Section 110-A have to be construed in a wider manner and cannot be confined to the spouse, parents and children of the deceased.

10. Sri S.V S.R. Somayajulu, learned Counsel for the Insurance Company has argued that the legal representatives can claim only the compensation payable to the estate, viz., whatever is payable towards loss of expectation of life, pain and suffering and loss of amenities or such other amounts as may be payable to the estate. It is argued that the claim cannot be made by the brothers of the deceased so far as the loss to the dependency is concerned.

11. In my opinion, this submission cannot be accepted. So far as the claim to the estate is concerned, Under Section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act there can be no difficulty in allowing the claim to be made by the legal representatives of the deceased according to the personal law applicable to the deceased. But so far as the claim to the dependency is concerned, serious questions have arisen in various courts. Same High Courts have taken the view that only persons who are listed in Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act can claim the same. It was held that while the dependency can be claimed only by those listed in Section 1-A, the legal representatives can claim the estate if the damages are to the estate. The Supreme Court however, thought that so far as the claim to the 'dependency' is concerned, all the 'legal representatives' of the deceased should be allowed to claim them and that the same should not be confined to the spouse, parents and children of the deceased as stated in Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. In the case before their Lordships, the brother was the claimant and obviously the parents were not living. As the parents were Hindus, the brothers would not have been the legal representatives and the mother would have been the only legal representative as a class I heir under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In the absence of the parents in that case, the brother was certainly a legal representative under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Therefore, the brother was held entitled to claim the compensation to the dependency. Of course, it cannot be said that in every case the brother and sisters will be entitled as legal representatives. It is only in cases where the brothers and sisters are the legal representatives, as held by the Supreme Court in the above case,--that they can claim the dependency. Such a contingency will arise in the case of Hindus, only where the mother is not alive on the date of the death of the deceased.

12. Further, the contribution of the deceased being to the dependents it is obvious that the claim should be only by such of the legal representatives of the deceased who were dependent on the deceased and who were receiving such contribution or were expected to receive such contribution in the future years The dependency should be limited to the legal representatives who were dependant. That is one of the reasons why the married sisters are taken out of the purview of the claimants to the dependency, they being no longer dependent on the deceased at the time of his death.

13. The present case relating to a Muslim family, and the legal representatives in the case would be not only the mother but also the brother and sister but in different shares.

14. In this case it is therefore not possible to apply a multiplier that is suitable only to the parents of the deceased. The brother and sister of the deceased have also a claim till such time as they would have been dependent on the deceased Even if I assume that the mother is the claimant she being aged 45 years, the multiplier 10-45 will be applicable, according to my judgment in Bhagwan Das v. Mohd. Arif 1987 (2) A.L.T. 137. Even if I assume a contribution of Rs. 250/- p a. to the mother, the annual contribution would come to Rs. 3,000/- and a sum of Rs. 30,000/- would become payable to the dependency. In the present case, damages are also payable to the estate. Having regard to all these circumstances and the claims of the brother and sister of the deceased till such time as their dependency would cease, 1 am inclined to award a total amount of Rs. 40,000/-. This sum includes the amount payable to all the legal representatives and also the award that should be made towards the estate.

15. The appeal is accordingly allowed, and a sum of Rs. 40,000/-is awarded with interest at 12% from the date of the filing of the petition. Out of the said amount, the parents will get Rs. 25,000/- and the brother and sister Rs. 7,500/- each with interest as mentioned above. The liability of the Insurance Company will, however, be confined to Rs. 5,000/- with interest as mentioned above. No costs.

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