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In Re: Talupula Narayanaswamy

Disposition Revision dismissed Court Andhra Pradesh Decided Jul 27, 1961
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/432769

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Citation
Court
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Tax Revision Case No. 51 of 1961
Subject
Sales Tax
Disposition
Revision dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- ALL INDIA SERVICES ACT, 1951.Sections 8 & 11 & A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules, 1961, Rule 5: [V.V.S. Rao, G. Yethirajulu & G. Bhavani Prasad, JJ] Refusal by Landlord to receive rent - Deposit of rent in Court - Held, A tenant has the option to take recourse to Section 8 in case of refusal ...

Key legal issue
Sales Tax
Outcome / disposition
Revision dismissed

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

In Re: Talupula Narayanaswamy

Advocate N. Rajeswara Rao and ; M.S.R. Sastry, Advs.

Legal References

Reported In
[1962]13STC595(AP)

Excerpt

.....to person entitled to rent and proper maintenance of accounts of such deposits under sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 5 are solely dependent on compliance with sub-rule (3) by the tenant. the payment or deposit of rent under section 11 read with sub-rule (6) of rule 5 arises only in respect of a tenant who did not take recourse to section 8 or section 9 before an application for eviction has been made against him in respect of any rent in arrears by date of that application, whereas in respect of rent that becomes subsequently due since date of application for eviction, the tenant is bound to pay or deposit regularly until termination of proceedings in order to enable him to contest the application. any violation of section 11(1) to (3) and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 makes the tenant liable for the adverse consequences under sub-section (4) of section 11. thus, the provisions of section 11 and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 are intended only to ensure the payment and deposit of rent including arrears during pendency and till termination of proceedings for eviction. the forfeiture of right of tenant to contest in case of default is to protect the rights and interests of landlord pending such an application for eviction, but not to confer any right on tenant to plead that all defaults committed by him prior to application for eviction can never be considered wilful, if he were to deposit all arrears of rent due within fifteen days under rule 5(6) read with sub-section (1) of section 11. the object and effect of section 11 and sub-rules (1) to (5) to rule 5, the former being for protection of landlord during pendency of eviction proceedings and the later being for protection of tenant to avoid any liability for eviction on ground of wilful default. consequently, while taking recourse to section 8 by tenant is optional, once that option is exercised, compliance with sub-rules (1) to (5) of rule 5 becomes mandatory in the sense that any non-compliance with prescribed procedure will..........of the assessment year and not from the commencement thereof. it is not disputed that the assessment could be made at any time within the end of that year.3. it was next urged by sri rajeswara rao that rule 17 is beyond the rule-making power of the state government derived from section 19(2) (f) of the act. section 19, in so far as it is material for the present enquiry, reads:(1) the state government may make rules to carry out the purposes of this act.(2) in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for-* * *(f) the assessment to tax under this act of any turnover which has escaped assessment, and the period within which such assessment may be made, not exceeding three years.4. the point sought to be made by sri rajeswara rao was that this clause enables the government to make a rule providing for limitation of three years from the beginning of the assessment year and not from the end of that year. this argument is founded on the language of the clause 'the period within which such assessment may be made.' the learned counsel urges that this expression connotes 'the commencement of the assessment year' and not 'the end of the assessment year'. we do not think that we can accede to this proposition. this rule clearly indicates that the period will be three years from the time when the assessment could have been made. indisputably, the assessment could be made before 31st march, 1955, for the assessment year 1954-55. if that were so, it is futile to contend that limitation starts from the beginning of the assessment year itself. we are not convinced that rule 17 is in any way repugnant to section 19(2)(f) of the madras general sales tax act, 1939. as such, it cannot be said that the rule is in excess of the rule-making power of the government. this contention fails.5. no other point is argued before us. in the result, the tax revision case is dismissed.

Full Judgment

Chandra Reddy, C.J.

1. The only point raised in this tax revision case is as to the starting period of limitation of three years prescribed by Rule 17 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939. It is contended by Sri Rajeswara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the period of three years should be computed from the beginning of the assessment year and not from the end of that year. The answer to this contention turns upon the interpretation of Rule 17, which is as under:

(I) If for any reason the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer or licensee has escaped assessment to the tax in any year or if the licence fee has escaped levy in any year, the assessing authority or licensing authority, as the case may be, subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (1-A), may, at any time within three years next succeeding that to which the tax or licence fee relates, determine to the best of his judgment the turnover which has escaped assessment and assess the tax payable on such turnover or levy the licence fee, after issuing a notice to the dealer or licensee and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary.* * *

2. It is manifest from the language of this rule that limitation commences only from the end of the assessment year and not from the commencement thereof. It is not disputed that the assessment could be made at any time within the end of that year.

3. It was next urged by Sri Rajeswara Rao that Rule 17 is beyond the rule-making power of the State Government derived from Section 19(2) (f) of the Act. Section 19, in so far as it is material for the present enquiry, reads:

(1) The State Government may make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for-

* * *(f) the assessment to tax under this Act of any turnover which has escaped assessment, and the period within which such assessment may be made, not exceeding three years.

4. The point sought to be made by Sri Rajeswara Rao was that this clause enables the Government to make a rule providing for limitation of three years from the beginning of the assessment year and not from the end of that year. This argument is founded on the language of the clause 'the period within which such assessment may be made.' The learned counsel urges that this expression connotes 'the commencement of the assessment year' and not 'the end of the assessment year'. We do not think that we can accede to this proposition. This rule clearly indicates that the period will be three years from the time when the assessment could have been made. Indisputably, the assessment could be made before 31st March, 1955, for the assessment year 1954-55. If that were so, it is futile to contend that limitation starts from the beginning of the assessment year itself. We are not convinced that Rule 17 is in any way repugnant to Section 19(2)(f) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939. As such, it cannot be said that the rule is in excess of the rule-making power of the Government. This contention fails.

5. No other point is argued before us. In the result, the tax revision case is dismissed.

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