N. Sunaja Vs. Katragadda Suresh

.....that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing..........called absent, set exparte, petition allowed.2. the contention of the learned counsel for revision petitioner is that since the revision petitioner is residing in u.s.a., her mother who was present in the trial court on the date of hearing had in fact filed the counter affidavit sworn to by the revision petitioner, but the trial court even without considering the counter affidavit and even without affording an opportunity of making a representation to the mother of the revision petitioner, set the revision petitioner exparte, as she was called absent and allowed the petition.3. it is well known that judicial orders are expected to be speaking orders. it is also well known that merely because the respondent chose to remain exparte there is no presumption that the cause pleaded in the proceeding by the petitioner is true. so, merely because the respondent in a proceeding is set exparte, it does not per se mean that the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed. so, even in cases where the opposite side i.e. respondent remains ex parte, the court is under an obligation to verify the facts, and in case it feels that the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought, it has to give reasons for its conclusion as to why it is granting the relief sought to the petitioner.4. since the order under revision does not contain reasons for the court holding that the petitioner before it (i.e. respondent in this c.r.p.) is entitled to the relief sought, it cannot but be termed as a mute order. a mute judicial order is unsustainable, when it comes up for scrutiny by an appellate or revisional court.5. hence, the order under revision is set aside and the case is remitted to the trial court for fresh disposal according to law, after taking into consideration the counter affidavit filed by the revision petitioner i.e. respondent in i.a.no. 439 of 2002 before it. since the revision petitioner is said to be in u.s.a., the trial court shall permit the mother of the revision.....