Pratti Rajamma Vs. Pratti Chintaiah

Pratti Rajamma vs Pratti Chintaiah

Type Court Judgment Court Andhra Pradesh Decided Mar 03, 1972

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/432167
Court: Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judge: Madhava Reddy, J.
Decided On: Mar 03, 1972
Subject: Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ - Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained ...

Key legal issue: Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Pratti Rajamma

Respondent

Pratti Chintaiah

Legal References

Reported In: 1973CriLJ1489

Excerpt

.....that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing..........to that effect when his client is sued for defamation or when his reply notice to that effect is allowed to be produced in court. the communication between sri n. venkataratnam and the respondent having been put in the form of a notice was no longer a confidential communication. section 126 of the evidence act prohibits a pleader from disclosing any communication made to him in the course of and for the purpose of his employment as such pleader. disclosure implies that which was not already made known to others. if the communication by the client to the advocate is put in the form of a notice and that notice is produced in court, it forms the basis of a complaint for defamation under section 500, indian penal code. if what is communicated by the client to the advocate is what is put in the notice, then there is already a disclosure, and when such an advocate is called upon to give evidence, he is not disclosing any fact for the first time but is only substantiating what is already disclosed. section 126 therefore does not stand in the way of summoning the advocate for this purpose.4. the revision petition is therefore allowed; summons, as prayed for, shall be issued to sri n. venkataratnam advocate, guntur, who gave the reply notice on behalf of the respondent. reference is answered accordingly.

Full Judgment

ORDER

Madhava Reddi, J.

1. In my view, this reference must be accepted and summons must be issued to Sri N. Venkataratnam, Advocate at Guntur, who issued the reply notice on the instructions of the respondent herein.

2. The petitioner is the daughter-in-law of the respondent. After the death of her husband, certain disputes arose between herself and the respondent with re-gard to the possession of a house. She got a lawyer's notice issued to the respondent through her advocate, one Mr. K. Raja Rao, to which the respondent caused a reply notice to be issued through Sri N. Venkataratnam, an advocate at Guntur, in which certain statements alleged to be defamatory were made. The petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent alleging an offence under Section 500, Indian Penal Code which was registered as C.C. No. 664 of 1969 on the file of the III Additional Munsif-Magis-trate, Guntur. After examining two witnesses in support of her case, the petitioner requested summons to be issued to Sri N. Venkataratnam who gave reply notice containing defamatory statements. The learned Magistrate has rejected that petition. On revision, the learned II Additional Sessions Judge has recommended to the High Court for setting aside that order.

3. Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act no doubt, prohibits any pleader from disclosing any communication made to- him by his client in the course of and for the purpose of his employment as such pleader without the express consent of the client. In the instant case, what was communicated by the respondent to Sri N. Venkataratnam the pleader, was put in the form of a reply notice and it is evidently to prove this notice that he is being summoned. The lawyer has already, with the consent of the respondent who is the accused in the case, communicated the information given to him in the reply notice, and it is only for the purpose of proving that notice that he is being summoned and not to disclose any private or confidential communication between him and the respondent. In Palaniappa Chettiar v. Emperor, 1935 Mad WN 460 it was held by the Madras High Court that Section 126 is not infringed if an advocate who asks a defamatory question on the information of his client deposes to that effect when his client is sued for defamation or when his reply notice to that effect is allowed to be produced in Court. The communication between Sri N. Venkataratnam and the respondent having been put in the form of a notice was no longer a confidential communication. Section 126 of the Evidence Act prohibits a pleader from disclosing any communication made to him in the course of and for the purpose of his employment as such pleader. Disclosure implies that which was not already made known to others. If the communication by the client to the advocate is put in the form of a notice and that notice is produced in Court, it forms the basis of a complaint for defamation under Section 500, Indian Penal Code. If what is communicated by the client to the advocate is what is put in the notice, then there is already a disclosure, and when such an advocate is called upon to give evidence, he is not disclosing any fact for the first time but is only substantiating what is already disclosed. Section 126 therefore does not stand in the way of summoning the advocate for this purpose.

4. The revision petition is therefore allowed; summons, as prayed for, shall be issued to Sri N. Venkataratnam advocate, Guntur, who gave the reply notice on behalf of the respondent. Reference is answered accordingly.

Same Court & Year Andhra Pradesh · 1972 Same Parties Pratti Rajamma vs Pratti Chintaiah Same Subject Criminal Same Judge Madhava Reddy, J.

Criminal