K. Sifhora Vs. District Educational Officer Kurnool District, Kurnool and Other

.....that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing.....orders.b. sinha, cj 1. the question, which arises in this writ petition, is as to whether hindi sikshak course of karnataka state can be said to be equivalent to b.ed., or pandit training course recognised by the government of andhra pradesh.2. the petitioner herein along with other applicants filed an application before the learned tribunal, inter alia, for a direction upon the respondents to issue the hall tickets to them so as to enable them to participate in dsc, 2000 and select them as suitable candidates for the said posts. the said application was dismissed in limine having regard to the earlier judgment of the tribunal passed in oa no.4808 of 2000 on 28-9-2000.3. the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that a bare perusal of the aforementioned judgment would clearly show that the learned tribunal has erred in holding that it is the sole prerogative of the government as regards the equivalence of the certificates. the learned counsel would contend that the state cannot be said to have absolute power in this regard and exercise of such power must be based on materials.4. the learned tribunal in the aforementioned case, inter alia, held that the standard of such course is low compared to the standard of course of this state. such a finding was arrived at on the basis of the averments made by the state in the counter-affidavit filed therein.5. it is not for the tribunal or for the high court to sit in appeal over the decision of the expert committee, which looks into such matters. no person having a particular degree or diploma or certificate granted by one state can claim that the same may be recognised as equivalent to another degree or diploma or certificate of another state. the court in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the constitution of india would not, normally, interfere with such a decision of the state inasmuch as, as indicated hereinbefore, such a decision isarrived at by the authority having expertise in.....