S.N. Sharma and ors. Vs. the State, Represented by Public Prosecutor

.....that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing.....ordervenkateswara rao, j.1. the only question that has to be answered in this case is as to whether a revision entertained under section 435, criminal p.c. could be dismissed for default.2. in a prosecution under the mines act, certain statements said to have been recorded by the joint director of mines who was the complainant in the case, were sought to be put into court through p.w. 1. this was objected to on behalf of the petitioners, who were accused in that case. this objection was however overruled by the additional district magistrate, executive, and the statements were received in evidence. aggrieved by this order, the accused preferred a revision to the sessions judge, visakhapatnam. having admitted the petition, the learned sessions judge rejected it on 18-7-1969 on the ground that there was no representation for the petitioners. it is to question the correctness of this order that the present revision has been preferred.3. having taken the revision on file and called for records of the proceedings before the additional district munsif, it was the duty of the learned sessions judge to examine those records for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order sought to be challenged before him regardless of the presence or otherwise of the petitioners when the matter was called on for hearing in his court and he had no jurisdiction to reject the revision petition, when once it was admitted, for default. reference may be made in this context to g.v. sadasivarao v. the special officer 1969 (2) aplj 241, in which it was pointed out by mirza, j., that it is the duty of a court, even if none of the parties is present and once the revision is admitted to decide the case on merits i must, therefore, agree with the petitioners that the order of the court below rejecting the revision petition for default is unsustainable.4. in the result, the petition is allowed and the matter is remitted to the court below for being.....