Full Judgment
S.B. Sinha, CJ.
1. The only contention raised in this writ petition is that the petitioner having been acquitted in the criminal charges, could not have been punished in thedepartmental proceedings and, in any event, having regard to the judgment passed by the criminal Court, the quantum of punishment must be held to be disproportionate to the charges of misconduct levelled against him.
2. There is no dispute that the petitioner was proceeded against simultaneously both in the criminal trial as also in the departmental proceedings. In the departmental proceedings; except refusing to cross-examine one witness on the ground that his defence would be disclosed, the petitioner took part in the departmental proceedings without any demur whatsoever and cross-examined all other witnesses. He has not sought even for stay of the departmental proceedings on the ground that he would be prejudiced in the criminal trial if he is supposed to take part in the departmental proceedings.
3. The question, which arises for consideration, is whether at this stage the petitioner can be permitted to raise the aforementioned contentions.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner himself has placed reliance upon a decision of the Apex Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., : (1999)ILLJ 1094 SC , wherein the law has been laid down in the following terms:
'13. As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer to in this case, and the various pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously referred, to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceeding can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas.Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in those proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge, has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without being a variance'.
5. There cannot thus be any dispute whatsoever that both the criminal charges and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously.
6. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a learned single Judge of this Court in K. Raghurambabu v. RPF, SCR, 2000(1) ALT 131.
7. It is further well settled that even in a case where the criminal trial ends in acquittal in favour of the delinquent employee, there does not exist any embargo on the part of the disciplinary authority in initiating disciplinary proceedings on the self same charges. As noticed herein before, in Paul Anthony's case (supra), the Supreme Court itself has categorically held that it is possible that a person can be found guilty of commission of misconduct despite his acquittal in the criminal trial. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, would urge that as in the instant case the criminal trial and the departmental proceedings are based on the same set of facts and theevidence adduced before the criminal Court and the disciplinary authorities being the same without any variance, exception to the aforementioned rule would be attracted. The learned Counsel, however, could not produce any material whatsoever in support of the aforementioned contention before this Court. Even the judgment of the criminal case has not been produced.
8. The submission of the learned Counsel to the effect that despite the fact that the departmental proceedings were completed before the conclusion of the criminal trial, but having regard to the fact that the judgment in the criminal case was rendered before any order of punishment was passed against the petitioner, it was obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to take the same into consideration, cannot also be accepted keeping in view the decision of the Apex Court in M. Paul Anthony (supra).
9. Even this aspect of the matter, in our considered opinion, cannot be gone into inasmuch as the disciplinary authority is required to pass an appropriate order on the basis of the materials on record. The petitioner's case has not only been considered by the disciplinary authority, but also by the appellate and the revisional authorities. The petitioner might have raised the aforementioned contention before the higher authorities also. It is not the case of the petitioner that his case did not receive proper consideration even at the hands of the appellate and the revisional authorities.
10. In this situation, it is not possible for this Court to subscribe to the aforementioned view of the learned Counsel. As regards the quantum of punishment, it is sufficient to refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Om Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SCW 4361, wherein it has been held that in a case of this naturethe High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with the quantum of punishment only when the doctrine of Wednusbury Principle of unreasonableness is attracted. Such is not the position in the instant case, nor any such contention has been raised.
11. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.