In Re: Bokkasam Krishnayya

.....the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye...........do so because under the new criminal procedure code as amended, an application for special leave to appeal must be filed first in such cases under section 417, sub-section (3). it may be noted that these revision cases were filed after the expiry of 60 daya from the date of the order which is the period limited by sub-section (4) to section 417 for the presentation of an application for the grant of special leave. mr. sarma contends that there is discrimination between the state and the 'complainant (1) in insisting upon the latter obtaining special leave to appeal before presenting an appeal while there is no such limitation upon the state's right of appeal and (2) in limiting the period of limitation for such presentation to 60 days under sub-section 4, while the public prosecutor acting under sub-section (1) of the same section has a period of three months by virtue of article 157, limitation act. he says that this is opposed to the provisions of the article 14 of the constitution, 1 see no force in this contention. i cannot for a moment entertain the objection that article 14 precludes the state being treated by the legislature on a footing different from an individual citizen. this difference is in my opinion, based upon grounds of high policy. i cannot see my way to accept the contention that the provisions of section 417 contravene the constitutional protection of equality under article 14.2. that being so, these criminal revision cases at the time they were filed, could have been presented to this court, as such because at that time no right of appeal was available to the complainant as section 439, sub-section (5) did-not apply; and the period for filing an application for special leave having expired in both the cases, no such application can now be filed under section 417(3). in these circumstances, these criminal revision cases will be posted tomorrow for orders as to admission.