In Re: Kotta Narayan and ors.

.....the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye...........is in my opinion a discretion vested in the magistrate if he is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, to commit the accused to sessions after the examination of the witnesses produced by the prosecution, not necessarily all the witnesses relied upon by the prosecution. this order in my opinion cannot stand. the sessions judge however rejected the application for the grant of bail on the ground that the matter had been sent up to the high court.2. the learned counsel for the petitioners argues that this is a case where both the parties were having a free fight and it has not been determined as to who were the aggressors and in case of this kind the court ought to exercise its discretion in favour of granting the bail. it is unnecessary to refer to the authorities cited by him because each case stands on its own facts and circumstances. the sessions judge while considering the bail applications has opined that at that stage he was not in a position to grant bail. he has also stated that the matter relating to the quashing of the committal order was being sent up to the high court for final orders.3. i am of the opinion that the accused could move the sessions court and renew their applications for grant of bail at any stage of the trial if they so choose. these applications are therefore dismissed.4. the case will now go to the sessions court for trial.