Pulluru Vajramma Vs. More Agaiah

.....the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye...........to receive the document as a promissory note it should be remembered that it had already been received is evidence and forms part of the record. i do not think that the lower court is right in refusing to recognise the document as a promissory note section 4 of the negotiable instruments act prescribes the following requirements for a promissory note:(1) it must be a written document,(2) the maker must have signed it.(3) there must be an unconditional promise to pay and(4) the promise must be to pay certain sum of money to a certain person, called the payee, or to his order. it is not the lower court's objection that the other requirements are not satisfied in this case. its only objection is based on the absence of the words 'or his order.' the document apparently satisfied all the requirements and the intention of the parties is clear from the recitals. when the intention of the parties is clear from the document and all the substantial ingredients of a promissory are present there shall not be any to treat it as promissory note simply because one expression is absent. that is the view taken by a division bench of this court in p. ramatu. reddy v. k. rukminiamma (1968) 1 andh wr 221). the madras high court in chokkalingam chettiar v. palaniappa chettiar (air 1935 mad 23 corresponding to ilfi 58 mad261) expressed a similar view the full bench decision on which the lower court relied viz., in the matter of kuppuswami chettiar (supra) held that the mere omission of the expression 'to the order of would not affect the document in the least, if otherwise, it fulfills the definition of a promissory note, and that actually, a promissory note need not contain that expression and that it is sufficient if there is unconditional undertaking to pay a certain sum of money to a certain person. these requirements are present in the document the lower court misunderstood the decision of the full bench of the madras high court.3. in the result, the order of.....