.....the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor.
section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye......k. bhaskaran, c.j.1. this writ petition is for quashing the notice dated june 24, 1986, issued by the respondent, the assistant controller of estate duty b-ward, hyderabad, purported to have been issued under section 59 of the estate duty act, 1953, (34 of 1953). in its material portion, the notice reads as follows : 'whereas i have reason to believe that property chargeable to estate duty has (a) escaped assessment, and (b) been underassessed. you are requested to deliver to me not later than july 24, 1986, an account of all property in respect of which estate duty is payable. ' 2. we are told that objections to the notice had already been filed by the petitioner before the respondent and that no orders thereafter had been passed by the respondent pursuant to the notice. the apprehension expressed by counsel for the petitioners is that the notice having been issued in spite of the provisions contained in section 36 of the estate duty act, 1953, the respondent might pass an assessment order which might be prejudicial to the petitioners, and it would be even without jurisdiction. 3. we have absolutely no reason to believe that the respondent would pass any order without perusing the objections filed by the petitioner or without noticing the relevant provisions of the act, particularly section 36(3) (sic) of the estate duty act. the respondent would dispose of the matter after carefully considering the objections filed and taking due notice of the relevant provisions of law, particularly of section 36(3) (sic) of the estate duty act. the writ petition is disposed of in the above terms.