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In Re: M. Sambayya

Type Court Judgment Court Andhra Pradesh Decided Nov 28, 1957
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/425033

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Citation
Court
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that w...

Key legal issue
Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

In Re: M. Sambayya

Legal References

Reported In
1958CriLJ729

Excerpt

.....the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye...........the executive officer.there is considerable force in this contention. under section 7 of the madras prevention of adulteration act (act iii of 1918), the local executive officer was empowered to enter any place where articles of food were being manufactured or exposed for sale and inspect the same and seize any utensil or vessel used for the manufacturing, preparing or for storing such article.but that act was superseded by a central enactment, the prevention of pood adulteration act (act xxxvii of 1954) which came into force on 1-6-1955. under this act, the state government is authorised to appoint certain persons designated as pood inspectors to carry out the purposes of the act. under section 10, food inspectors are empowered to take samples of any article of food from any person selling such article or from any person in the course of conveying, delivering or preparing to deliver such article to a purchaser or consignee, and from a consignee after delivery of any such article to him, and to send such sample for analysis to the public analyst for the local area within which such sample was taken.food inspectors are also empowered to enter and inspect any place where any article of food is manufactured, stored or exposed for sale and take samples of such articles of food for analysis. section 25(1) which is of importance for purposes of this case runs thus:if, immediately before the commencement of this act, there is in force in any state to which this act extends any law corresponding to this act, that corresponding law shall upon such, commencement stand repealed.4.. sub-section (2) is in the following terms:notwithstanding the repeal by this act of any corresponding law all rules, regulations and bye-laws relating to the prevention of adulteration of food, made under such corresponding law and in force immediately before the commencement of this act, shall, except where and so far as they are inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this act,.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

Basi Reddy, J.

1. The petitioner has been convicted of an offence under Section 353, Indian Penal Code and has been directed to be released under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act on his executing a bond for Rs. 500/- with two sureties each for a like sum, to be of good behaviour and to keep the peace for a period of two years.

2. The charge against the petitioner was that he had used criminal force and obstructed the Executive Officer of Giddalur Panchayat Board while the said Officer was inspecting the petitioner's shop at Giddalur on 29-9-1955. The Executive Officer is said to have entered the petitioner's shop and demanded from the petitioner, who is an oil merchant, a sample of the oil for the purpose of ascertaining whether the petitioner had committed an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The petitioner refused to do so on the ground that the Executive Officer had no authority to seize the oil and he is further stated to have pushed the Executive Officer aside.

3. It is contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that inasmuch as the Executive Officer of the Fanchayat Board had no power to enter the petitioner's shop and seize the oil in question for the purpose of determining whether it was adulterated, the Executive Officer cannot be said, to have been acting in the discharge of his lawful duties and, therefore, the petitioner was well within his rights in refusing to give a sample of the oil to the Executive Officer.

There is considerable force in this contention. under Section 7 of the Madras Prevention of Adulteration Act (Act III of 1918), the local Executive Officer was empowered to enter any place where articles of food were being manufactured or exposed for sale and inspect the same and seize any utensil or vessel used for the manufacturing, preparing or for storing such article.

But that Act was superseded by a Central enactment, the Prevention of Pood Adulteration Act (Act XXXVII of 1954) which came into force on 1-6-1955. Under this Act, the State Government is authorised to appoint certain persons designated as Pood Inspectors to carry out the purposes of the Act. under Section 10, Food Inspectors are empowered to take samples of any article of food from any person selling such article or from any person in the course Of conveying, delivering or preparing to deliver such article to a purchaser or consignee, and from a consignee after delivery of any such article to him, and to send such sample for analysis to the public analyst for the local area within which such sample was taken.

Food Inspectors are also empowered to enter and inspect any place where any article of food is manufactured, stored or exposed for sale and take samples of such articles of food for analysis. Section 25(1) which is of importance for purposes of this case runs thus:

If, immediately before the commencement of this act, there is in force in any State to which this Act extends any law corresponding to this Act, that corresponding law shall upon such, commencement stand repealed.

4.. Sub-section (2) is in the following terms:

Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of any corresponding law all rules, regulations and bye-laws relating to the prevention of adulteration of food, made under such corresponding law and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall, except where and so far as they are inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this Act, continue in force until altered, amended or repealed by rules made under this Act.

Therefore, Section 7 of Madras Act Hi of 1918 stood repealed the moment the Central Act XXXVII of 1954 came into force. Consequently the local Executive Officers, who were exercising powers by virtue of Section 7 of the Madras Act, ceased to have such powers. Under the Central Act, Food Inspectors alone can exercise those powers. It is conceded by the learned Public Prosecutor that the saving clause contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Central Act has no application to this case.

5. It follows that the conviction of the petitioner for using criminal force to a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, is bad in law and must be quashed. The revision petition is accordingly allowed.

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