.....the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor.
section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye......order1. this is a revision petition against the order of the chief city magistrate holding that the case under the arms act could be tried & that 8 403 sub-b (4), indian cr p.c., corresponding to section 204, hyderabad cr. p. 0. was no bar. the relevant facts are that the accused was prosecuted for an attempt to commit suicide with a revolver. that case was decided & the accused convicted. the present prosecution is under the-arms act for unlawful possession of the said revolver. mr. chobe, the learned advocate for the accused contends that if the attempt to commit suicide was with the same revolver about which the present offence has been launched it will be barred under section 403, indian cr. p.c. cited above. we do not agree with this contention. the test to determine whether the said section would be a bar or not is to see whether the subsequent offence is the same as the previous offence. it is clear that the possession of the revolver without a licence is a distinct offence in itself under the arms act- it hag nothing to do with the attempt to commit suicide which is a separate offence under the penal code. in emperor v. munnoo a. i. b. (20) 198a oudh 470, it was held that conviction in respect of possession of stolen revolver under sections 411 & 414, penal code, is no bar to conviction under section 19(f), arms..this revision petition therefore fails & is dismissed.