Full Judgment
M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. We have heard the learned Additional SPP., The office objections are overruled. The principal submission of the learned Addl. SPP, is that, even if the deceased Kalaiselvi consumed sleeping tablets and died at her parents place, that the accused is still liable because it was he who drove her to suicide. The submission is that, the reason why the wife had to leave the matrimonial home was because of cruelty and that despite the evidence that she visited the place several times, the husband was still treating her in the same fashion and heavy reliance is placed on the fact that on the day prior to her death she has visited her husband's house and spent sometime with him and came back weeping. The submission is that, this continuous chain of cruelty which was dowry related, as is the evidence of the parents, would render the accused liable for her death under Section 304-B, IPC.
2. We have carefully re-examined the record because wherever there is an allegation of a dowry death, the Court is required to take a very serious view of the case. At the same time, the Court is required to be circumspect because every death or every suicide of a young wife does not necessarily mean that the husband or the relatives on the other side are ipso-facto guilty. Unfortunately, in every such case a prosecution follows and it is left to the Court to examine the evidence and discriminate between those of the cases where the charges are warranted and those where the charges are unsubstantiated.
3. In the present case it is undoubtedly true that there are some differences between the husband and wife but the record indicates that it was the deceased wife who finally took the decision to leave the matrimonial home. The reasons for this discord have not come out as cogently and conclusively as they should have and we find in totality, that it would be rather hazardous to even hold that the cruelty was dowry related because the death has taken place five years after the marriage and two children were born in between. We have also re-examined the case to ascertain as to whether the accused could be held guilty Under Section 498-A, IPC, but we again find that there is no clear cut evidence on record as to what the real problem between the husband and wife was, which could have been anything from incompatibility to disagreement or something more serious. The evidence in this regard is inconclusive. In the absence of clear-cut evidence indicating dowry related cruelty of sufficient gravity which has a definite nexus to the suicide which really are the legal ingredients whereby the prosecution has to establish that it was the grave misconduct of the accused husband that virtually drove the wife over the brink and triggered of the suicide, a conviction under Section 304-B, IPC, is not permissible. The passing references to dowry in this case are insufficient to sustain the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act in the a absence again of clear-cut evidence.
Having carefully assessed the submissions canvassed by the learned Additional SPP, and having done a thorough review of the record, we find that this is not a case in which the order of acquittal is liable to be disturbed. The appeal accordingly fails on merits and stands dismissed.