Full Judgment
M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. I have heard the learned advocates on both sides. Even though the appellant had applied for bringing on record the legal heirs of the deceased owner, I have dispensed with that requirement because the matter was heard for sometime and it is necessary for me to record the reasons for it. The learned Counsel, who represents the insurance company, pointed out to the Court that when the matter was conducted before the Tribunal the claimants had given the name of Md. Thahar as the owner of the vehicle and he states that on checking the records, the insurance company could not trace any such person as an insured client of the company. The insurance company had taken up the contention that it is not liable for this reason. The Tribunal proceeded with the matter and still held the insurance company liable which is why M.F.A. No. 65 of 1988 was preferred by the insurance company, the principal ground being that the company was wrongly held liable on the ground that the said Thahar was an insured. The matter got complicated because the insurance company has produced the copy of the policy before the High Court and it transpired that one S. Puttaswamy was in fact the owner of the vehicle in question. It also transpires that the vehicle was insured with this insurance company by Puttaswamy, which is why the claimants' learned advocate in his appeal for enhancement applied for bringing Puttaswamy on record. Puttaswamy had died in the meanwhile and the application is for bringing his legal heirs on record. I have dispensed with the requirement of bringing the legal heirs on record because this is an appeal pending since the year 1988, the claimant widow was sufficiently aged when the claim was originally filed and if we are to continue with the usual legal procedures many more years will elapse before appeal is heard. If the policy in question was in existence, the liability of the insurance company would come in.
2. The learned Counsel who represents the insurance company pointed out that the vehicle had been transferred to the said Thahar which was why the police and the claimant show him as the owner. In this background, what is submitted is that the disclaimer by the insurance company of the liability would be fully justified in so far as Puttaswamy had transferred the vehicle to Thahar without informing the insurance company and getting the policy transferred, in which case the insurance company would not be liable to cover Thahar, neither would it be liable to cover Puttaswamy because he has transferred the vehicle. Though the argument is absolutely correct in law, I am not prepared to accept it only for one reason that we do not have anything on record to establish that the vehicle had been transferred. The counsel who represents the insurance company submitted that the matter should be remanded so that the insurance company could bring on record whatever material was possible in support of the fact that the vehicle had been transferred. To my mind, at this late stage the interest of justice would require that the rule of finality should apply and that there should be no further remands or protraction of the litigation. An additional reason for it is because the insurance company would virtually have to look for whatever material is possible to support the contention of transfer and at this late stage any documentary evidence forthcoming appears to be absolutely remote. Again, though the plea for permission to produce the material may be justified in law, the only reason why I am rejecting it is because it would be an infructuous operation.
3. Having regard to this decision, I have heard the two learned advocates in detail on the question of quantum. The Tribunal proceeded on the footing that the deceased who was an Arabic teacher was earning Rs. 300/- per month and after deducting Rs. 100/- for personal expenses, the multiplier of 7 has been applied. The appellants' learned advocate pointed out to me that the deceased was an Arabic scholar and that one would not be able to produce any documentary evidence in support of the quantum earned from the tuitions, but that the Court should take judicial notice of what would have been the reasonable tuition fee and accept that figure. Secondly, he submitted that the wife has given evidence wherein she has pointed out that he was charging Rs. 100 per child and was teaching about 15 to 16 students. To my mind, it would be impossible to accept that his earnings would have been only Rs. 300/- per month. There is no reason on the other hand for me to disbelieve the evidence of the wife even assuming that she has tried to pitch her case a little higher than necessary. The respondents' learned Counsel did point out to me that we are concerned with the year 1984, at which time economic conditions were very different and that the present standards ought not to be applied to this old case. I would still hold that the income of the deceased would not have been less than Rs. 1,000/- per month and even if one were to deduct about Rs. 250/- for personal expenses, one is left with the figure of Rs. 750/- per month. Having regard to the age of the deceased, the multiplier that has been applied is correct. This would necessarily involve a compensation of Rs. 63,000/- under this head. Adding the conventional heads, the aggregate compensation would, therefore, be enhanced to Rs. 76,000/-.
4. The insurance company shall deposit the balance amount with the Tribunal, less whatever has been paid earlier, along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of application until date of realisation, within an outer limit of 12 weeks from today. Since the first claimant wife is dead, the amount shall be divided equally between claimant Nos. 2 and 3 who are the sons of the deceased. The Tribunal shall disburse the amount to the claimants on receipt of the same.
5. Having regard to the aforesaid decision, M.F.A. No. 379 of 1988 succeeds. M.F.A. No. 65 of 1988 fails. Both appeals stand disposed of. No order as to costs.