Full Judgment
Venkatachala, J.
1. Orders made by some of the Land Tribunals constituted under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (here in after referred to as 'the Principal Act, 1961 (here in after referred to as 'the Principal Act'), have been impugned in these Writ Petitions.
2. The order impugned in W.P.F.R. 18102/85 (W.P. 19766/85) (LR) is the one made under Section 48-C of the Principal Act, while the order impugned in W.P.FR. 18065/85 (W.P. 19771/85) (LR) is another, made under Section 67 of that Act. The other orders impugned in the remaining Writ Petitions are those, made under Section 48A of the said Act.
3. The Registry of this Court has refused to register the said Writ Petitions. That refusal of the Registry is based on its view that a remedy by way of appeal against each of the impugned orders, when has been made available to a party aggrieved thereby, under the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985 (here in after referred to as 'the Ordinance'), which has come into force on December 6, 1985, that remedy should be regarded as a threshold bar to a person who seeks to invoke the discretionary Writ Jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to obtain relief respecting such order. Learned Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners, who regarded the objection so raised by the Registry, as one devoid of substance, have sought the placing of the above Writ Petitions before Court for orders, in the matter. It is this situation, that has caused the Registry to place the above Writ Petitions before Court, for deciding upon, what the Registry has called as 'question of maintainability of Writ Petitions.'
4. Sri M. Gopalakrishna Shetty, Learned Counsel, who led the arguments in the matter, urged at the outset, that the question relating to maintainability or otherwise of a Writ Petition presented to this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution against an order of a Land Tribunal passed under the Principal Act on the ground of non-exhaustion of a statutory remedy of appeal, respecting such order, if any, which had become available under the Ordinance, could not have been made a ground of objection by the Registry for refusing to register such a Writ Petition in that a decision in that regard could be taken only by a Court exercising the Writ Jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution. Further, he urged that the question of non-maintainability of the present Writ Petitions on the ground of non-exhaustion of a statutory remedy of appeal becoming available under the Ordinance against the impugned orders, could never arise, in that, as a matter of fact, no remedy by way of appeal against the impugned order had become available under the Ordinance. Learned Counsel appearing for Petitioners in some of the Writ Petitions as also Sri L. M. Panduranga Swamy, HCGP, appearing for the State, supported the arguments of Shri Gopalakrishna Shetty.
5. It is true as pointed out by Learned Counsel that the Registry of this Court should not have refused registration of the Writ Petition, in which orders of Land Tribunals passed under the Principal Act had been impugned, on the ground of non-exhaustion of a statutory remedy of appeal, even if such remedy was available. It is so, for the reason that the refusal of discretionary relief sought respecting an order of a Tribunal under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by a Court, on the ground of non-exhaustion of an alternative statutory remedy of appeal available therefor, is a master which has to necessarily depend upon the discretionary jurisdiction exercisable by such Court. However, having regard to the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners, as also the State, that the question of non-maintainability of the present Writ Petitions impugning the orders of Land Tribunals made under the Principal Act, on the ground that a statutory remedy by way of appeal against them had become available under the Ordinance, does not arise, in that in fact, no remedy by way of appeal had been provided under the Ordinance respecting such orders, I consider it proper and appropriate to decide upon the question whether a remedy by way of appeal against any of the orders of the type impugned in the Writ Petitions is provided for under the Ordinance and proceed accordingly.
6. The orders impugned in the present Writ Petitions being undisputedly those passed under Section 48A, 48C and 67 of the Principal Act before coming into force of the Ordinance on December 6, 1985, the precise question that arises for decision is whether a remedy by way of an appeal against any of such orders had become available under the Ordinance.
7. Before the coming into force of the Ordinance on. December 6, 1985, no remedy by way of appeal was available under the Principal Act respecting orders made by a Land Tribunal under Sections 38, 48A, 48C and 67 of the Principal Act. But with the coming into force of the Ordinance remedy by way of appeal respecting certain orders made by a Land Tribunal under Section 38, 48A and 67 of the principal Act has been available, in that while Section 116A inserted into principal Act by Section 6 of the Ordinance empowers the State Government to constitute a Land Reforms Appellate Authority, Sub-section (1A) inserted into Section 118 of the Principal Act by Section 7 of the Ordinance, second proviso inserted into Section 122 of the Principal Act by Section 11 of the Ordinance and Section 14 of the Ordinance confer on a Land Reforms Appellate Authority, newly constituted, the power of entertaining appeals respecting certain orders passed by Land Tribunals under Sections 38, 48A or 67 of the Principal Act.
Sub-section (1A) of Section 118 of the Principal Act, second proviso to Section 122 of the Principal Act and Section 14 of the Ordinance referred to above read :
Sub-section (1A) of Section 118 ;
' Save as otherwise provided in this Act, from every decision or order passed by the Tribunal (excluding an interim order or an order passed on an interlocutary application) under Section 38, 48A or 67, after the commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985, an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Authority; and the Appellate Authority shall send a copy of every order passed by it to the Tahsildar and the parties concerned.'
Second proviso to Section 122 :
'Provided further that the Appellate Authority shall admit an appeal against the order passed by the Tribunal under Section 38, 48A or 67 before the date of the commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985, if, on the said date, a Writ Petition preferred against such order or an appeal preferred against the order passed in such Writ Petition is pending in any Court.'
Section 14 of the Ordinance :
'The High Court may, if it deems fit, transfer to the Appellate Authority having Jurisdiction, a Writ petition preferred to it against the orders passed by the Tribunal under Sections 38, 48A or 67 or any appeal preferred against the orders passed in such Writ Petitions, and pending before it immediately before the date of commencement of Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985. On such transfer the Writ Petition or Writ appeal shall be deemed to be an appeal filed before the Appellate Authority and the petitioner may be permitted to amend such Appeal in such manner as he may deem fit.'
8. Orders impugned in the present Writ Petitions though are made under Sections 48A, 48C and 67 of the Principal Act before the commencement of the Ordinance on December 6, 1985, appeals against them cannot be admitted by the Land Reforms Appellate Authority under the second provisio to Section 122 of the principal Act as stands amended by Section 11 of the Ordinance; as none of them is a subject matter of either a Writ Petition or a Writ Appeal as required therein.
9. So also, orders impugned in the present Writ Petitions though are the orders made under Sections 48A, 48C and 67 of the Principal Act, they not being subject matters of Writ Petitions or Writ Appeals, appeals against them being admitted by Land Reforms Appellate Authority on transfer by the High Court as provided for under Section 14 of the Ordinance, cannot arise.
10. What requires to be examined, therefore, is whether appeals against the orders under Sections 48A, 48C or 67 of the Land Tribunals impugned in the present Writ Petitions passed before the coming into force of the Ordinance on December 6, 1985, lie to a Land Reforms Appellate Authority, under Sub-section (1A) of Section 118 of the Principal Act, as stands amended by Section 7 of the Ordinance.
Sub-section (1A) above, in so for as is material for deciding the question thus arising for consideration, reads :
'.....from every decision or order, passed by the Tribunal (........) under Sections 38, 48A or 67, after the commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms [Amendment] Ordinance, 1985, an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Authority....'
Registry of this Court appears to have raised the ground of objection relating to non maintainability of a Writ Petition respecting an order passed under Section 38, 48A or 67 construing the above sub-section as enabling a party aggrieved by such order to file an appeal against such order after the commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985 notwithstanding the fact tha such an order had been passed before the commencement of that Ordinance. I find it difficult to subscribe to the construction so placed on the sub-section by the Registry. It is a well established rule of construction of a Statute that one shall not imply anything in it which is inconsistent with the words expressly used therein. It is also a well settled rule of construction of a Statute that the language employed in an enacting part of such Statute if is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it. When the words 'after the commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985' used in the enacting part of Subsection (1A) are seen in the context in which they appear, it becomes obvious that they refer to the time of passing of a decision or order by a Tribunal and not to the time of presenting an appeal against such decision or order. The plain language employed in Sub section (1A), if construed literally and grammatically, it could mean only that an appeal shall lie to an Appellate Authority from every decision or order passed by the Tribunal under Sections 38, 48A or 67 after the commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance 1985. Further, as the enacting words in the sub-section Which are clear and explicit, admit the only construction placed thereupon by me, the need to imply something inconsistent with them does not arise.
11. Further, the words in Sub-section (1A) above, 'after the commencement of Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985,' could only be regarded as referring to the time at which a decision or order is passed by the Tribunal, becomes clear, when words 'before the commencement of Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985' in the second proviso to Section 122 of the Principal Act, as stands amended by Section 11 of the Ordinance, are seen to refer only to the time at which an order is passed by the Tribunal and not to the time at which an appeal has to be filed against such order.
12. Further, the enacting Section 3 of the Ordinance also lends assistance to the construction 1 have placed on Subsection (1A) above. It is so for the reason that under Section 3 of the Ordinance, status of finality given to an order under Section 48A of the Principal Act, by Sub-section (6) thereof, becomes unavailable only to orders made subsequent to the coming into force of the ordinance. From this, it follows that Sub-section (1A) above, brought into existence by Section 7 of the Ordinance does not intend to provide for an appeal against an order made by a Tribunal under Section 48A of the Principal Act prior to coming into force of the Ordinance.
13. It may be mentioned here that the 'comma' used in Sub-section (1A) above, after the words 'from every decision or order passed by the Tribunal (........) under Section....................or 67' cannot have the effect of making the words 'after the commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985,' refer to an appeal to be laid to an Appellate Authority, appearing thereafter, inasmuch as the Ordinance does not aim in achieving such object. On the contrary, the provisions of the Ordinance adverted before, if are seen, they give a clear indication that the Ordinance has not purposely provided for appeals respecting orders of Tribunals made before the coming into force of the Ordinance and not pending in Writ Courts with a view to avoid the possibility of the litigants seeking to reopen the orders of the Tribunals, which have become final and conclusive.
14. For the foregoing reasons, I am not left in doubt that under Sub-section (1A) referred to above, no appeal can lie respecting a decision or order passed by a Land Tribunal under Section 38, 48A or 67 of the Principal Act, before the commencement of the Ordinance.
15. The question which remains for decision is whether an appeal under Sub-section (1A) referred to above lies to the Land Reforms Appellate Authority against an interim order made by a Land Tribunal in a proceeding before it under Section 48C of the Principal Act.
16. From a perusal of Sub-section (1A) above, it becomes clear that no appeal lies thereunder against an interim order or an order made on an interlocutory application by a Tribunal in a proceeding before it, inasmuch as it contains an unequivocal declaration that an interim order or an order on interlocutory application made by the Tribunal is excluded from becoming the subject matter of an appeal provided thereunder. When every interim order or an order made on an interlocutory application cannot thus become the subject matter of an appeal under Sub-section (1A) above, order made under Section 48C of the Principal Act being either an interim order or an order made on an interlocutory application, it cannot also become the subject matter of an appeal provided for under that Sub-section (1A).
17. To sum up, my conclusions are : (1) no order passed by a Land Tribunal under Sections 38, 48A or 67 before the commencement of Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment). Ordinance, 1985 can become the subject matter of an appeal under Sub-section (1A) of Section 118 of the Principal Act as stands amended by Section 7 of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985 ; and (2) no appeal under Sub-section, (1A) above lies against an interim order or an order on an interlocutory application passed by the Tribunal in a proceeding before it under the Principal Act whether such order was made before or after the commencement of the Ordinance.
18. In the present Writ Petitions except in W. P. F. R. 18102/85 (WP 19766/85) the orders impugned are those made either under Section 48A or 67 of the Principal Act before the coming into force of the Ordinance. These Writ Petitions cannot be held to be non-maintainable on the ground of a remedy by way of appeal against each of the orders impugned therein being available under Sub-section (1A) of Section 118 of the Principal Act, for the reasons stated hereinbefore. The Registry is, therefore, directed to register them as Writ Petitions and post them for preliminary hearing. In so far as WP FR 18102/85, (WP 19766/85), the order impugned therein being an interlocutory order made by the Tribunal under Section 48-C of the Act, against which no appeal is provided for under Sub-section (1A) above referred, question of its non-maintainability on the ground of a remedy by way of an appeal being available, does not arise. Therefore, the Registry is directed to register this Writ Petition as well and post it for preliminary hearing.
19. In the result, the objection relating to maintainability of each of the above Writ Petitions raised by the Registry is overruled, and the Registry is directed to register each of the Writ Petitions and post them before Court for preliminary hearing.