Full Judgment
Doddakale Gowda, J.
1. Both tenant and owner, have challenged the order of Rent and Accommodation Controller, City area, Bangalore passed under Section 21-A of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') to the extent they are aggrieved.
2. Three contentions urged by Sri U.L. Narayana Rao, Learned Counsel for petitioner, in first case, to invalidate impugned order are-(i) no action could have been taken under Section 21-A of the Act in view of pendency of proceedings under Section 21 ; (ii) not preceded by a notice as contemplated under proviso to Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21-A of the Act ; and (iii) in the absence of pro-vision similar to Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21-A no action could have been taken under Sub-section (2) of Section 21-A of the Act.
3. Undisputedly, petitioner in first case is the tenant of premises and petitioner in second case is the owner. Order of eviction passed under Clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Act is the subject matter in C.R.P. No. 90 of 1984 on the file of this Court. During pendency of this proceeding, on an application filed by owner, second respondent has initiated proceedings under Section 21-A of the Act.
4. Circumstance which has impelled owner to initiate proceeding under Section 12-A of the Act is that tenant has acquired premises bearing No. 20. HIG in Aghrahar Dasarahally Extension, Bangalore vide Annexure-1. Fact of acquisition of an house through the Karnataka Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as the 'Board') is not controverted. But what is contended by Learned Counsel for petitioner is that house allotted by Board is not suitable, in the sense, lacks garage, compound and such other essential facilities, -etc., hence, no action can be taken under this provision.
5. Non-obstinate clause contained in Section 21-A itself indicates that notwithstanding other provisions in the Act i.e., Section 21 of the Act, authority can take action under this Section. The pendency of proceedings in C.R.P. No. 90 of 1984 is no bar for initiation of proceeding under Section 21-A of the Act
6. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21-A of the Act enjoins a person owning property not to remain or continue in possession of an allotted premises. Clause (b) enables such owner to get his tenant evicted after issue of notice of not less than four months as contemplated under proviso of this clause. Clause (c) provides for summary inquiry. As premises allotted to petitioner by Board is not in possession of a tenant neither Clause (b) nor proviso gets attracted.
As per Sub-section (2) of Section 21-A of the Act, a person who acquires or constructs on and after 20th day of August 1976 cannot continue to remain in an allotted premises. The distinction between Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 21-A is that Clause (a) covers cases where an allottee owns a premises, be it on the date of allotment or otherwise, and Sub-section (2) brings within its clutches rest of the instances of acquisition such as through lease or mortgage with possession etc., including construction of a building as owner on and after 20th day of August 1976. It is true, Sub-section (2) is not followed up by a clause similar to Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Sub-section 21-A. Object of insertion, of this Section is explained by a Division Bench of this Court in Srinivasa Vakil v. State of Karnataka, : AIR1980 Kant44 . Inapt placing of Clause (c) or Sub-section (2) cannot be construed in such a way so as to deviate the object. Section should be read as a whole and intendment must be given effect to, though there is no repetition of clause like (c) after Sub-section (2). Machinery provided under Sub-section (1) of Section 21A can conveniently be adopted to give effect to Sub-section (2) of Section 21-A or supplanted by rules of natural justice. Undisputedly, petitioner has been heard and an enquiry has been held before passing impugned order. Hence, contention that in the absence of clause similar to Clause (c) after Sub-section (2) comprehending acquisitions of the type referred to therein no eviction could have been ordered is devoid of merit.
7. Lastly, it is contended that without determining suitability of house acquired by petitioner no order could have been made under this section. When an owner, invokes Clause (p) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act for eviction, suitability is one of the criteria required to be determined by the Authority. In the absence of reference to suitability in the Section similar to Section 21(1)(p), Controller was not under an obligation to determine its suitability or otherwise before passing impugned order. In this context, it is relevant to notice the observation of a Division Bench of this Court in Srinivasa Vakil's case, : AIR1980 Kant44 which reads thus:
'It is true that in requiring a person who is in occupation or possession of a house as a tenant on allotment by the Controller, to vacate such house, if he has a house of his own in the same city or village, the section does not take into consideration whether the house owned by such person is suitable for his own residence having regard to the size of his family, his occupation or profession and his status and the like. But he is not compelled to shift to his own house. It is open to him to take another house on lease under a contract. Therefore, Section 21-A cannot be termed as arbitrary for that reason.'
(Underlining is of mine)
Hence, I find no merit in Writ Petition No. 16344 of 1986 and same is liable to be dismissed.
8. Grievance of petitioner in Writ Petition No. 13468 of 1986 i.e., the owner, is that Rent Controller should not have granted any time to tenant to vacate. Contention of Sri Narayana, Learned Counsel for owner, is that Legislature itself has provided sufficient time in Sub-section (1) and Subsection (2) and Rent Controller could not have or should not have given time exceeding the period prescribed therein. Section 21 cannot be construed in such a way so as to whittle down powers of Court to extend time or grant time to tenant, to comply with the order. In this view, I find no merit in Writ Petition No. 13468 of 1986 and same is also liable to be dismissed as devoid of merit.
9. For the reasons stated above, I make the following order:
(i) Writ Petitions are dismissed;
(ii) Rule discharged; and
(iii) tenant is given six months time to vacate and deliver vacant possession of premises.