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The State of Karnataka Vs. Gangiah

The State of Karnataka vs Gangiah

Type Court Judgment Court Karnataka Decided Jul 11, 1978
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/378082

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Citation
Court
Karnataka High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- CONSTITUTION OF INDIA -- Article 226 & 227: [H.N. Nagamohan Das, J] Writ Petition filed by the trade union and an employee questioning the competency of the direction issued by the Member of the National Commission for SC & ST to reinstate the fourth respondent, a Senior Manager Locus Standi of the petitioners ...

Key legal issue
Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

The State of Karnataka

Respondent

Gangiah

Legal References

Reported In
1979CriLJ732

Excerpt

.....the same is only an incidental. the first petitioner being the trade union representing the majority of employees of the third respondent company and the second petitioner being an employee are entitled to maintain a writ petition questioning the competency of second respondent to issue the impugned direction. article 338 ; [h.n. nagamohan das,j] constitution of national commission for schedule castes and schedule tribes - power of the commission to set aside a concluded enquiry and an order of penalty held, the second respondent being the member of the first respondent commission is not empowered to set aside a concluded inquiry and the order of penalty and the order of appellate authority under article 338 of the constitution of india. on facts, held, the second respondent directed the third respondent to conduct a fresh inquiry, to treat fourth respondent as deemed to have been continued in service and to pay him the salary and other allowances, by this impugned direction the second respondent virtually set asides the inquiry report, order of penalty and the order of appellate authority. therefore, the impugned direction issued by the second respondent is without power and authority. - therefore, when a notification under section 21 of the aforementioned act is issued by the state government, it only means that the executive magistrate mentioned in the notification will as well have the power to try the cases under the aforementioned act......read with section 18 of the bonded labour system (abolition) ordinance, 1975.3. it is proper to narrate here itself that though the said ordinance was promulgated on 25-10-1975, the same was passed into an act by 9-2-1976 as act no. 19 of 1976. sub-section (3) of section 1 of the act called as the bonded labour system (abolition) act, 1976 provides that the act shall be deemed to have come into force on 25-10-1975 itself, i.e. the date on which the ordinance had come into force. therefore, it would have been proper on the part of the police to have mentioned in the relevant columns of the charge sheet not the ordinance but the provisions of the act, which are the same.4. section 21 of the aforementioned act empowers a state government to confer the powers of a judicial magistrate of the first class or the second class on an executive magistrate for the trial of offences under the aforementioned act. it also provides that upon such conferment of power, such executive magistrate should be deemed for the purpose of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 to be a judicial magistrate first class or the second class, as the case may be and also that an offence aforementioned under the act may be gone into by a summary trial by the magistrate. punishment for the offence under section 16 of the act extends to three years and also with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees. that shows that the case under the said provision is a warrant case within the meaning of the criminal procedure code.5. the state government has issued a notification under section 21 of the aforementioned act on 30-3-1976 conferring the powers of the judicial magistrate first class on all district magistrates. it is hence, clear that from the date of the notification all district magistrates came to be empowered with the powers of trying such cases.6. the aforementioned act does not lay down anything regarding taking away the powers of the judicial magistrate and conferring the same exclusively on.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

M.S. Nesargi, J.

1. This petition is directed against the order of discharge dated 27-6-1977 passed by the Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kunigal in C. C. No. 79 of 1976 discharging the respondent-accused (who has remained absent though served with the notice of this Revision Petition) of the offence under Section 16 read with Section 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Ordinance, 1975.

2. The Kunigal Police filed a charge sheet against the respondent on 2-2-1976 alleging that the respondent had committed an offence under Section 16 read with Section 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Ordinance, 1975.

3. It is proper to narrate here itself that though the said Ordinance was promulgated on 25-10-1975, the same was passed into an Act by 9-2-1976 as Act No. 19 of 1976. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act called as the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 provides that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on 25-10-1975 itself, i.e. the date on which the Ordinance had come into force. Therefore, it would have been proper on the part of the police to have mentioned in the relevant columns of the charge sheet not the Ordinance but the provisions of the Act, which are the same.

4. Section 21 of the aforementioned Act empowers a State Government to confer the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or the Second Class on an Executive Magistrate for the trial of offences under the aforementioned Act. It also provides that upon such conferment of power, such Executive Magistrate should be deemed for the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to be a Judicial Magistrate First Class or the Second Class, as the case may be and also that an offence aforementioned under the Act may be gone into by a summary trial by the Magistrate. Punishment for the offence under Section 16 of the Act extends to three years and also with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees. That shows that the case under the said provision is a warrant case within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code.

5. The State Government has issued a notification under Section 21 of the aforementioned Act on 30-3-1976 conferring the powers of the Judicial Magistrate First Class on all District Magistrates. It is hence, clear that from the date of the notification all District Magistrates came to be empowered with the powers of trying such cases.

6. The aforementioned Act does not lay down anything regarding taking away the powers of the Judicial Magistrate and conferring the same exclusively on Executive Magistrate. Therefore, when a notification under Section 21 of the aforementioned Act is issued by the State Government, it only means that the Executive Magistrate mentioned in the notification will as well have the power to try the cases under the aforementioned Act.

Hence, both the Executive Magistrate mentioned in the notification and the Judicial Magistrate mentioned in the Code of Criminal Procedure will have powers to try the cases. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was not right in holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the case and as such, the respondent was entitled to be discharged.

7. In the result, the order dated 27-6-1977 passed by the Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kunigal, in C. C. No. 79 of 1976 is set aside. The Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case according to law.

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