Veerabhadraiah Vs. Muddamma

Veerabhadraiah vs Muddamma

Type Court Judgment Court Karnataka Decided Mar 18, 1974

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/375294
Court: Karnataka High Court
Judge: Malimath, J.
Decided On: Mar 18, 1974
Case Number: Second Appeal No. 396 of 1974
Subject: Civil

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Sections 152 & 153: [N.K.Patil, J] Amendment of judgment/Decree Held, The application is filed as provided under the relevant provisions of the CPC if there is a mistake or wrongly typed or there is any mistake in writing or typing and an error arising out of the occurring from an accidental slip or omission is ...

Key legal issue: Civil
Acts & sections: Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Order 41, Rule 31

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Veerabhadraiah

Advocate P. Krishnappa, Adv.

Respondent

Muddamma

Legal References

Acts: Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Order 41, Rule 31
Reported In: ILR1974KAR794; 1974(2)KarLJ187

Excerpt

- sections 152 & 153: [n.k.patil, j] amendment of judgment/decree held, the application is filed as provided under the relevant provisions of the cpc if there is a mistake or wrongly typed or there is any mistake in writing or typing and an error arising out of the occurring from an accidental slip or omission is an error due to careless mistake or omission unintentionally made. but in the present case, detailed order has been passed by the trial court for rejecting the compromise petition as petitioner has failed to comply the orders of the court and the said suit has been dismissed in view of not adducing or leading any evidence. therefore, the court of the considered view that, in this type of litigation, there should be a finality in the matter, since the matter is pending adjudication from 1985 and petitioner having sufficient time has not chosen to file necessary application under the relevant provisions to set aside the order dated 24.7.1989 and after the lapse of nearly one and half decades, has chosen to file the petition and the same has been rightly rejected by the trial court. therefore, on merits also, petitioner has not made out any good grounds to interfere in the order passed by the trial court. -- limitation act, 1963.[c.a. no. 36/1963]. section 5: condonation of delay delay of 36 days in filing the revision petition held, mere making bald statements in the affidavit, without assigning cogent reasons is not a ground to condone the delay. on facts, held, except making a bald statement that the petitioner was suffering from viral fever due to heavy rains in mumbai and the doctor had advised him bed rest, the petitioner has not produced any medical certificate to that effect. the explanation offered by petitioner for condonation of delay does not inspire the confidence of the court and much credibility cannot be given to the same. delay not condoned. - this is precisely what the civil judge has recorded in his judgment......made a statement to the court that the matter may be taken as heard and that the court may proceed to judgment on perusing the grounds of appeal. this is precisely what the civil judge has recorded in his judgment. it is clear from these admitted facts that the counsel appearing for the appellant did not submit any argument in support of the appeal, when the same came up for hearing before the learned civil judge. it is, no doubt, true that the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted to the court that the court may proceed to judgment on perusing the grounds of appeal. this submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is not a substitute for the arguments in support of the appeal. it is the duty of the appellant or his counsel, who is aggrieved by the decree passed by the court below, to advance reasons by way of arguments, before the appellate court, to convince it that the conclusions arrived at by the court below are wrong for the reasons advanced by him. if no arguments at all are advanced, and no reasons are given by the appellant's counsel in support of the appeal, the court is not under an obligation to look into the grounds of appeal, and to decide the case on merits and in accordance with order 41, rule 31, c. p. c. in such circumstances, the court can proceed to dismiss the appeal for default. the judgment of the lower appellate court, in the circumstances, must be regarded as having the effect of dismissal of the appeal filed by the appellant for default, as no arguments at all were advanced on behalf of the appellant, before the lower appellate court. the supreme court in thakur sukhpal singh v. thakur kalyan singh, : [1963]2scr733 has laid dawn that the appellate court is not bound to decide an appeal on merits on the basis of the material on record when the appellant appears at the hearing but does not address the court, and that the appellate court under such circumstances can dismiss the appeal for default. the.....

Full Judgment

1. I have heard Sri P. Krishnappa, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in support of the admission of the appeal. The learned counsel submitted that the judgment of the Prl. Civil Judge at Tumkur passed in R. A. 59 of 1971 is not a judgment in accordance with law, inasmuch as it does not conform with Order 41, Rule 31, C. P. C. It was urged that though no arguments were advanced on behalf of the appellant in the lower appellate Court, the Court was bound to look into the grounds of appeal, and to record a judgment. The judgment of the Court below is a brief one and reads as follows:

'HSRS states that the matter may be taken as heard and that the Court may proceed to judgment on perusing the grounds of appeal. Perused the grounds of appeal and from the submission made, it is patently clear that the appellant has no arguments to advance in support of the grounds urged in the appeal. Hence in my view no grounds are substantiated and there is no merit in the appeal. Hence appeal dismissed.

Sd. D. P. Hiremath,

Prl. Civil Judge, 6-7-73.'

The appellant was represented by counsel, whose initials are noted in the judgment as HSRS. It is not disputed that when the case was posted for hearing on the 6th July, 19Y3, the appellant's counsel HSRS was present in court, and he made a statement to the Court that the matter may be taken as heard and that the Court may proceed to judgment on perusing the grounds of appeal. This is precisely what the Civil Judge has recorded in his judgment. It is clear from these admitted facts that the counsel appearing for the appellant did not submit any argument in support of the appeal, when the same came up for hearing before the learned Civil Judge. It is, no doubt, true that the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted to the Court that the Court may proceed to judgment on perusing the grounds of appeal. This submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is not a substitute for the arguments in support of the appeal. It is the duty of the appellant or his counsel, who is aggrieved by the decree passed by the Court below, to advance reasons by way of arguments, before the appellate Court, to convince it that the conclusions arrived at by the Court below are wrong for the reasons advanced by him. If no arguments at all are advanced, and no reasons are given by the appellant's counsel in support of the appeal, the Court is not under an obligation to look into the grounds of appeal, and to decide the case on merits and in accordance with Order 41, Rule 31, C. P. C. in such circumstances, the Court can proceed to dismiss the appeal for default. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court, in the circumstances, must be regarded as having the effect of dismissal of the appeal filed by the appellant for default, as no arguments at all were advanced on behalf of the appellant, before the lower Appellate Court. The Supreme Court in Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh, : [1963]2SCR733 has laid dawn that the Appellate Court is not bound to decide an appeal on merits on the basis of the material on record when the appellant appears at the hearing but does not address the Court, and that the Appellate Court under such circumstances can dismiss the appeal for default. The Supreme Court has further observed as follows:

'It is the duty of the appellant to show that the judgment under appeal is erroneous for certain reasons and it is only after the appellant has shown this that the appellate Court would call upon the respondent to reply to the contention. It is only then that the judgment of the Appellate Court can fully contain all the various matters mentioned in Rule 31, Order 41. If the appellant submits nothing for its consideration, the Appellate Court can decide the appeal without any reference to any proceedings of the Courts below and, in doing so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged anything which would tend to show that the judgment and decree under appeal were wrong.'

2. In view of this authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court. it is impossible to accept the contention of Sri Krishnappa, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that as the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is not in accordance with Order 41, Rule 31 of the C.P.C., this appeal merits admission.

3. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is dismissed.

4. Appeal dismissed.

Same Court & Year Karnataka · 1974 Same Parties Veerabhadraiah vs Muddamma Same Subject Civil Same Judge Malimath, J. Acts & Sections Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Order 41, Rule 31

Civil