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Chikkaveeregowda Vs. Devegowda

Chikkaveeregowda vs Devegowda

Type Court Judgment Court Karnataka Decided Jun 14, 1974
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/375013

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Citation
Court
Karnataka High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Civil Revn. Petn. No. 735 of 1974
Subject
Civil

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- LABOUR & SERVICES. Dismissal from service: [Subhash B. Adi, J] Order passed by appellate authority instead of disciplinary authority validity - Held, No doubt, under the Standing Orders the order of dismissal has to be passed only by Project Engineer or an officer of equal cadre. Object of holding enquiry before...

Key legal issue
Civil
Acts & sections
Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Order 14, Rule 5; Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Chikkaveeregowda

Advocate B.V. Deshpande and ;T.J. Chouta, Advs.

Respondent

Devegowda

Advocate S. Shivaramiah, Adv. for Kesvy and Co.

Legal References

Acts
Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Order 14, Rule 5; Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974
Reported In
AIR1975Kant145; ILR1974KAR1403; 1974(2)KarLJ373

Excerpt

- labour & services. dismissal from service: [subhash b. adi, j] order passed by appellate authority instead of disciplinary authority validity - held, no doubt, under the standing orders the order of dismissal has to be passed only by project engineer or an officer of equal cadre. object of holding enquiry before the punishment is imposed is that, the employee gets fair chance to defend his case and should not be punished without enquiry. appeal is provided to give further opportunity to the employee to question the order of dismissal if it is erroneous. in this case, as far as the enquiry is concerned no error is pointed out and the respondent/employee had an opportunity to defend his case. the enquiry officer has found that the charge is proved. what ought to have been considered by the disciplinary authority has been considered by the appellate authority. it is not a case, that, the respondent/employee has no further appeal or right to file petition, the respondent/employee has filed the petition before the managing director who is reviewing authority. this means the respondent/employee had not only had the opportunity before the enquiry officer but also before the chief engineer by way of reply to second show cause notice and thereafter before the reviewing authority. assuming that the decision of the authorities is erroneous, still the respondent being workman had right to raise dispute on the question of fairness of the enquiry and also on the question of perversity, victimization and unfair labour practice. in view of this, it cannot be said that the passing of order of punishment by the appellate authority has prejudiced the respondent. no doubt if an authority is conferred with a power to exercise, it has to be exercised by that authority. but exercising by that authority. but exercising power by a higher authority who has got an appellate jurisdiction, it cannot be said that, it is without jurisdiction. it is only in cases where the power is sought to..........he argued that such power would beavailable to a court to delete any such issuein proper cases.4. on a careful examination of the question, i am not persuaded to agree with the contention of sri chouta. in babar's case : air1970 guj148 the facts were different from the case on hand. in the said case there is no doubt that the decision was more or less analogous to the one obtaining in the instant case, so far as some of the facts were concerned. in that case it is observed as follows:--'having framed the issue it is not open to the court to say that it was not necessary to frame the issue merely because the court had passed a decree in another civil suit no. 43 of 1963. the learned judge (referring to the lower court) deleted the issue on the ground that the party had applied to the mamlatdar. 'these are not good grounds.'in the context of the above circumstances the learned judge observed:'once an issue is framed which cannot be tried by the civil court it must be decided by the tenancy court. it was obligatory on the part of the court to refer the issue to the tenancy court.'it is therefore clear that the latter enunciation must be understood in the context of the facts referred to in the passage reproduced earlier. in the instant case, the question raised by sri chouta has, in my opinion, reference more to the jurisdiction exercisable by a court under the appropriate provisions of civil procedure code than any other. it is, however, clear that the court has got ample power to delete any issue framed by it at any time before the judgment is actually rendered. in the instant case, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, an issue relative to tenancy would not at all arise, having regard to the ratio of the decision in tara bai's case, in a suit for permanent injunction only. sri chouta more or less sought to distinguish this decision on the ground that when a tenant sues for permanent injunction on the strength of lawful possession,.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

1. This petition under Section 115 C. P. C. is by the plaintiff in original Suit No, 246 of 1969 on the file of the Munsiff, Srirangapatna. He is aggrieved by an order made by the learned Munsiff on 18-3-1974 whereby, he deleted an issue which had been framed earlier, relative to the tenancy pleaded by the parties.

2. On behalf of the petitioner-plaintiff it had been contended before the learned Munsiff that when once the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1 of 1974 came into force, the issue of tenancy raised therein could not be tried by him at all. Further, he had no power to delete that issue either. The learned Munsiff relying on the decision of this Court in Tara Bai v. Krishna Pandurang Powar (1972) 1 Mysore LJ 216 = (AIR 1972 Mys 214) came to the conclusion that such an issue would not at all arise in a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter. Therefore, he directed the deletion of that issue overruling the objection urged on behalf of the revision petitioner.

3. On behalf of the petitioner, SriT.J. Chouta, the learned counsel, placingreliance on a learned single Judge's decisionof the Gujarat High Court in Babar SomlaKamli v. Ganpat Narayan Mohite. : AIR1970 Guj148 , contended that when once anissue regarding tenancy came to be framedand when the Court had jurisdiction toframe such an issue, it was not open to deletethat issue after the jurisdiction it had earlier,had been taken away by the amendment tothe Land Reforms Act. On behalf of therespondent Sri S. Shivaramaiah, the learnedcounsel, relied principally on the decision ofthis Court in Tara Bais case, (1972) 1 Mys, LJ216 = (AIR 1972 Mys 214) and contendedthat even in the first instance such an issuehad been unnecessarily raised. He furthercontended that the jurisdiction to frame anissue stems from the provisions of the CivilProcedure Code and not by any provisioncontained in the Land Reforms Act. In thatview, he argued that such power would beavailable to a Court to delete any such issuein proper cases.

4. On a careful examination of the question, I am not persuaded to agree with the contention of Sri Chouta. In Babar's case : AIR1970 Guj148 the facts were different from the case on hand. In the said case there is no doubt that the decision was more or less analogous to the one obtaining in the instant case, so far as some of the facts were concerned. In that case it is observed as follows:--

'Having framed the issue it is not open to the Court to say that it was not necessary to frame the issue merely because the court had passed a decree in another Civil Suit No. 43 of 1963. The learned Judge (referring to the lower Court) deleted the issue on the ground that the party had applied to the Mamlatdar. 'These are not good grounds.'

In the context of the above circumstances the learned Judge observed:

'Once an issue is framed which cannot be tried by the Civil Court it must be decided by the Tenancy Court. It was obligatory on the part of the Court to refer the issue to the Tenancy Court.'

It is therefore clear that the latter enunciation must be understood in the context of the facts referred to in the passage reproduced earlier. In the instant case, the question raised by Sri Chouta has, in my opinion, reference more to the jurisdiction exercisable by a Court under the appropriate provisions of Civil Procedure Code than any other. It is, however, clear that the Court has got ample power to delete any issue framed by it at any time before the judgment is actually rendered. In the instant case, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, an issue relative to tenancy would not at all arise, having regard to the ratio of the decision in Tara Bai's case, in a suit for permanent injunction only. Sri Chouta more or less sought to distinguish this decision on the ground that when a tenant sues for permanent injunction on the strength of lawful possession, traceable to his title as a tenant, and such tenancy is denied, such an issue might arise in conceivable cases, one such case being the present, and any determination thereof has relevance to the ultimate determination of the question of lawful possession. In this view, any conclusion as regards such tenancy would at times operate as presumptive proof of such lawful possession. Whatever may be the merits of this submission, I am bound by the decision of the division bench of this Court in Tara Bai's case. For all these reasons, I do not feel persuaded to interfere with the order impugned.

5. Civil Revision Petition therefore is dismissed. No costs.

6. Revision dismissed.

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