Full Judgment
S.S. Nijjar, J.
1. The Respondent in this case was discharged by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate by his order dated 5th December, 1998. Against this order the State filed Criminal Revision Application No. 120 of 1996. This was dismissed for default by this Court on 29th September, 1996. Thereafter Application No. 355 of 1997 was filed for restoration of the Criminal Revision. In this application, however, it was mentioned that there was 51 days delay in taking out. the said application. Therefore, prayer was made for condonation of delay. This application has been taken out on the ground that in the earlier application it was mentioned that there was only 51 days delay when in fact there was 96 days delay. In paragraph 3 it is mentioned as follows :-
The Applicant states that at the relevant time, due to heavy burden of work, the Application for restoration could not be filed within the statutory period. The Applicant states that the delay caused of 96 days in filing the Application for restoration, was neither intentional nor due to the laches and the interest of justice, the same may kindly be condoned.
2. Counsel for the State submits that the accused-respondent has been wrongly discharged by the Magistrate. After considering the prima facie merits of the case, the revision filed by the State has been admitted. Counsel appearing for the Respondent, however, submits that by dismissal of the application, valuable rights have accrued in favour of the respondent. He further submits that these valuable rights cannot be adversely affected by the present application filed by the State for condonation of delay. He further submits that there is no reason whatsoever to condone the delay. He submits that for condonation of delay the State ought to give cogent, reasons. Merely stating that due to heavy burden of work the application for restoration could not be filed, is not sufficient. In support of this submission, Counsel relies on a judgment of this Court reported in Laxinan N. Diuekar v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998 Bom176 after examining the issue on the basis of principle as well as precedent, a Single Judge of this Court (Lodha, J.) has held that the Court cannot on its whims jump to the conclusion on generality that the Government cannot be thrown out at the threshold taking general view of the matter that considering the function of the Government, and its bureaucracy that the delay was caused due to inaction by the Government Officer without adverting to the facts and cause shown. The learned Judge further holds that each case has to be considered on its own facts. However, on general, vague and ambiguous averments that the appellant is the State and because of the rush of the administrative work and other pre- occupations the appeal could not be filed within time by no stretch could be accepted as sufficient cause. The Court: ought to bear in mind that a very valuable right is secured to the successful litigant on expiration of limitation and this right should not be casually disturbed and that applicant is not entitled to condonation of delay as a matte] of right. The applicant before it can seek condonation of delay and invoke discretion of the Court must show that there was no negligence, inaction or want of bona fides on his part. These observations have been made by the learned Judge after taking into consideration the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. and : [1988]3SCR198 . The reason put forward for condonation of delay in the case which was under consideration before Lodha, J. was identical to the reason put forward herein. This apart, the cavalier manner in which the applications have been filed before the Court is amply demonstrated by the facts of this ease. The previous application stated that there was delay of 51 days and nobody had eared to chock even the length of the delay. Subsequently the present application has been filed stating that it has now come to the knowledge of the State that there was in fact 96 days delay. The application for condonation of delay does not even mention the subject-matter of the case in which Respondent, has been discharged. It is not even stated that on merits the State is hopeful of success. With such kind of pleadings the Court would have to arbitrarily exercise its discretion to condone the delay. I find no merit in the application. The same is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged.