Ashok and anr. Vs. Vanamala and anr.

.....the authorities. this brochure or admission notification issued by the state or other competent authority cannot be altered at a subsequent stage particularly once the process of admission has begun. there is hardly any exception to this accepted rule of law. section 10: [swatanter kumar, c.j., a.p. deshpande & smt. nishita mhatre,jj] admission to professional colleges - technical courses - approval to additional seats or to start new course - cut off dates held, the settled principle of law is that merit of the applicant is the primary criteria which would determine his rank as well as the college where he would be entitled to admission. this rule should not be frustrated as it will tantamount to entirely upsetting the object of admissions based on merit oriented method and would cast cloud on the fairness and transparency of the method of admission. one of the ways in which merit can be defeated is allowing increase in the intake strength or commencement if new colleges beyond cut-off date and admissions beyond the last date specified in the notification/calendar issued by the concerned authorities. this can be illustrated by giving an example. college a which is running a professional course like engineering or mba etc. has an intake capacity of 60 seats which has duly been notified in the information brochure. however, after the cut-off date, approval is granted by the aicte and thereafter, the process is taken up by the state and the intake capacity of the college is increased by 30 more seats. these seats would obviously, not be notified in the information brochure and the candidate who are meritorious and for whom college a; be the college of reference could not get seats or give preference as the seats were limited. none had the proper knowledge about the increase in intake of seats though at a much subsequent stage and may be even after the last date of admission is over either by themselves or under the order of the court even it is put on the..........that in the revisional jurisdiction, an order of acquittal cannot be converted into one of conviction. it is further well settled that it is not open to the revisional court to reappreciate the evidence on record and take its own view even though the view taken by the learned trial court is a reasonable and possible view. in fact, in the appeal against acquittal itself this restriction is observed by the appellate court.2. in the case of bansi lal and ors. v. laxman singh : 1986 crilj1603 , the supreme court has observed that it is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the high court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. it is further observed that from the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. the mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the high court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a retrial of the accused.3. perusal of the judgment of the learned sessions judge shows that he has reappreciated the evidence on record and since in his view the view taken by the learned trial court is wrong, he has directed retrial of the accused. in view of the limited scope of his revisional jurisdiction, the impugned order is clearly illegal and erroneous and is liable to be set aside.4. it may incidentally be seen that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and withdrawn cases against each other. however, since the offence under section 498-a of the i.p.c. is not compoundable the instant case could not be settled.in the result, the instant revision is allowed. the impugned judgment of the learned sessions judge, akola, is set aside and that of the learned trial court is restored.