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Vidyaprasarak Samaj and anr. Vs. State of Goa and ors.

Vidyaprasarak Samaj and anr. vs State of Goa and ors.

Type Court Judgment Court Mumbai Decided Sep 10, 1991
~5 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/359323

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Citation
Court
Mumbai High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Writ Petition No. 130 of 1990
Subject
Constitution

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Order rejecting permission to start secondary school - Non-speaking order - Quashed - Direction to pass fresh order after hearing concerned parties given - Administrative law - Natural justice.;The order dated 4.6.1990 was liable to be quashed. Before such an order is pass...

Key legal issue
Constitution
Acts & sections
Constitution of India - Article 226

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Vidyaprasarak Samaj and anr.

Advocate V.B. Nadkarni, S.A. and ;A.C. Navelkar, Adv.

Respondent

State of Goa and ors.

Advocate J. Dias, A.G. and ; S. Albuquerque, Addl. Government for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and ; J.P. D' Souza, Adv. for respondent No. 4

Legal References

Acts
Constitution of India - Article 226
Reported In
1992(1)BomCR705; (1991)93BOMLR971

Excerpt

.....desai & d.b. bhosale, jj] arrest of accused - held, a police officer or a person empowered to arrest may arrest a person without intervention of the court subject to the limitations specified under the provisions of the code. the provisions of section 41 of the code provides for arrest by a police officer without an order from a magistrate and without a warrant. a distinct and different power under section 44 of the code empowers the magistrate to arrest or order any person to arrest the offender. under section 44 of the code, that power is vested in the court of the magistrate when an offence is committed in his presence. if the legislature has taken care of providing such specific power under section 44 of the code, then there could be no reason for such a power not to be specified under the provisions of chapter xii of the code. in terms of section 41, a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant or order from the magistrate for any or all of the conditions specified in that provision. language of this provision clearly suggested that the police officer can arrest a person without an order from the magistrate. thus, there appears to be no reason why on the strength of section 156(3) of the code, any restriction should be read into the power specifically granted by the legislature to the police officer. of course, freedom of investigation is the essence of these provisions but in order to suppress the mischief it is sufficiently indicated under different provisions of the code that the arresting officer should exercise his power or discretion judiciously and should be free of motive. some kind of inbuilt safeguard is available to the accused in the cases where the magistrate directs investigation under section 156 (3) of the code by taking recourse to the provisions of section 438 of the code by approaching the court of session or the high court for such relief. thus, during the course of investigation of a criminal case, an accused is not ..........physical facilities which the school possess. therefore, it is regretted that the permission sought to open std. viii during 1986-87 is hereby refused so as to avoid unhealthy competition'.there are naturally areas of controversy in relation to the facts existing or detected subsequently, in justification of the impugned order (exhibit 'b')3. we noticed two disturbing features in the issue of the order. one is the fact that it is issued in a cyclostyled form. this can be evidence of non-application of mind in given circumstances. employment of such cyclostyled forms have been critically commented upon by judicial decisions as for example in travancore-rayon's case.4. the second, and perhaps more important, feature is about the denial of an opportunity to the petitioners to put forward its contentions before the impugned order was passed. doubtless, under exhibit `a', the petitioners had earned a substantive right which barred the entry of another school within a 5 km. distance, on the basis of the findings contained therein. the order is certainly amenable to variation the strong expressions contained in exhibit `a' notwithstanding. however, such a variation, would involve adverse consequences as well as the petitioners are concerned. it is now trite law that before such an order is passed, the party affected is afforded an opportunity to explain his stand. that is the mandate of law read into the statutory provisions empowering a statutory authority to act, and thereby affect, the rights of parties. this has admittedly not been done. for these reasons the impugned order is liable to be quashed. we do so.5. the quashing of the impugned order, has necessarily to be followed by a fresh order passed after hearing of the affected parties, and considering the contentions of those parties. it requires no emphasis to state that such an order should be a speaking order and not a laconic and casual one. the findings supported by material and data should be the foundation.....

Full Judgment

K. Sukumaran, J.

1. This writ petition challenges the order dated 4-6-1990 (Exhibit `B') passed by the second respondent Director of Education permitting the fourth respondent to open a new Standard VIII Class from 1990 onwards. Incidental reliefs also have been sought for. On 14-6-1990 rule was issued, with a direction for expedition. Ultimately it came up for final arguments on 22-8-1991. In the light of the arguments advanced at the Bar, we had our reservations about the supportive materials justifying the impugned order. A further affidavit was directed, by our order dated 22-8-1991, to assist the Court to advert to and evaluate the materials so called for. The affidavit has accordingly been filed. The petitioners filed a rejoinder. Arguments were continued on 9-9-1991.

2. It is unnecessary to refer to the details of the contentions in view of the course we propose to adopt. We may, however, indicate even for that purpose, an earlier order (Exhibit `A') dated 9-7-1986 passed by the Director, which declined the request for opening a new school as made by the very same fourth respondent herein. The first paragraph can be usefully extracted:---

'With reference to the above cited letters. I am directed to inform you that the case was re-examined by the Government from all angels and it is decided by the Government that there is no need of one more secondary school starting with Std. VIII in Morjim village, as the existing full-fledged secondary school namely Vidyprasarak High School within a distance of 1 km. is capable of absorbing any number of students in any class for the past 5 years at least on account of sufficient physical facilities which the school possess. Therefore, it is regretted that the permission sought to open Std. VIII during 1986-87 is hereby refused so as to avoid unhealthy competition'.

There are naturally areas of controversy in relation to the facts existing or detected subsequently, in justification of the impugned order (Exhibit 'B')

3. We noticed two disturbing features in the issue of the order. One is the fact that it is issued in a cyclostyled form. This can be evidence of non-application of mind in given circumstances. Employment of such cyclostyled forms have been critically commented upon by judicial decisions as for example in Travancore-Rayon's case.

4. The second, and perhaps more important, feature is about the denial of an opportunity to the petitioners to put forward its contentions before the impugned order was passed. Doubtless, under Exhibit `A', the petitioners had earned a substantive right which barred the entry of another school within a 5 km. distance, on the basis of the findings contained therein. The order is certainly amenable to variation the strong expressions contained in Exhibit `A' notwithstanding. However, such a variation, would involve adverse consequences as well as the petitioners are concerned. It is now trite law that before such an order is passed, the party affected is afforded an opportunity to explain his stand. That is the mandate of law read into the statutory provisions empowering a statutory authority to act, and thereby affect, the rights of parties. This has admittedly not been done. For these reasons the impugned order is liable to be quashed. We do so.

5. The quashing of the impugned order, has necessarily to be followed by a fresh order passed after hearing of the affected parties, and considering the contentions of those parties. It requires no emphasis to state that such an order should be a speaking order and not a laconic and casual one. The findings supported by material and data should be the foundation for the fresh order to be passed by the second respondent. We issue a direction to pass such an order within an outer period of time of three months. The aggrieved party will certainly have the liberty resort to appropriate proceedings for the vindication of its grievances.

6. We have refrained from making any observations on the merits of the case. This includes the claim of the fourth respondent that in this case, it is not a matter where a new school is set up by that respondent. The factual details particularly in relation to the concept of over crowding also remains to be evaluated. The parties will have a full and fair opportunity to present every argument, and to buttress, every contention which they seek to establish, in the fresh proceedings before the second respondent.

7. The learned Advocate General as also the Counsel for the respondents submitted that the quashing of the order shall not dislocate the studies of the studies of the students already admitted. We find the request supremely reasonable. The pursuit of the studies of the students during the academic year could continue unhampered by the quashing of Exhibit `B' Order. The further continuance of the Standards in the school, and consequently the studies of the students would depend upon the further order to be passed by the second respondent in the light of the directions given by us above.

8. The writ petition is disposed of with the above observations and directions. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs.

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