Bai Ujam Vs. Bai Rukhmani

limitation act (ix of 1908), section 15-decree-stay of execution-period of stay to lie excluded in counting the period of application for execution.;on an application for execution made on the 6th august 1908 an order was passed on the 30th november 1908 directing execution to proceed as to a part of the decree. the judgment-debtor appealed against the order ; and in appeal, the execution of the decree was stayed from 9th january to the 15th february 1909. on the 12th august 19u, a second application for execution was made. the lower court dismissed it on the ground that it was barred by limitation. on second appeal:-;that the second application was within time, for in computing the period of limitation the applicant was entitled to exclude, under section 15 of the limitation act, 1908, the period during which the execution of the decree was stayed. - - 15, sub-section (1), of the limitation act the appellant is clearly entitled to have this time excluded in computing the period of limitation in this case. we think that it is perfectly immaterial for the purposes of the present point as to whether the order of the 30th of november 1908 related only to a part of the decree. if the period during which the execution of the ,decree had been stayed is excluded, the present application is clearly within time......it is not necessary to deal with all the grounds urged in support of the appeal, as it is possible to decide the, appeal on one ground only. it is an admitted fact in the case that the present defendant and the surety appealed against the order made by the court of first instance on the 30th november 1908 directing execution to proceed as to a part of the decree, and in that appeal they obtained an order for staying the execution of the decree which remained in force from the 20th january to the 18th february 1909. it is contended on behalf of the appellant that under section 15 of the limitation act this period ought to be deducted from the period of limitation, and that, if that period is deducted, the present application is in time. we think that this contention ought to be allowed. under .s. 15, sub-section (1), of the limitation act the appellant is clearly entitled to have this time excluded in computing the period of limitation in this case. the lower appellate court, while dealing with this point, thought that as the order of the 30th november 1908 related only to the recovery of costs, that deduction of time ought not to be made. we think that it is perfectly immaterial for the purposes of the present point as to whether the order of the 30th of november 1908 related only to a part of the decree. if the period during which the execution of the , decree had been stayed is excluded, the present application is clearly within time.2. we hold, therefore, that the application is in time. the order of the lower appellate court is reversed and the case remanded for disposal according to law.3. all costs to be costs in the application.