In Re: Baba Yeshwant Desai

criminal procedure code (act v of 1898), sections 437, 200, 119-power to order re-inquiry-district magistrate-re-inquiry of a person discharged by subordinate magistrate-proceedings under chap. viii-accused person- discharged-interpretation. ;a district magistrate has jurisdiction under section 437 of the code of criminal procedure, 1895, to order a fresh inquiry into the case of a person 'discharged' by a subordinate magistrate under section 119 of the code. ;the expression 'any accused person,' as used in section 437, is not confined to a person against whom a 'complaint' has been made under section 200; but includes as well a person proceeded against under chap. viii of the code. ;the word 'discharged' is not defined in the code and there is no valid ground for departing in respect of it from the rule of construction that where in a statute the same word is used in different sections it ought to be interpreted in the same sense throughout unless the context in any particular section plainly requires that it should be understood in a different sense. ;queen-empress v. mutasaddi lal (1898) i. l.r. 21 all. 107; king-emperor v. fyaz-ud-din (1901) i. l. r. 24 all. 148; and queen-empress v. mona puna (1892) i. l. r. 16 bom. 661 followed. ;queen-empress v. iman mondal (1900) i. l. r. 27 cal. 662 and velu tayi ammal v. chidambaravelu pillai (1909) i. l. r. 33 mad. 85 not followed. - chandavarkar, j.1. the question before us is whether the district magistrate has jurisdiction under sections 437 of the code of criminal procedure to order a fresh inquiry into the case of a person 'discharged' by a subordinate magistrate under sections 119 of the code. the decision of the question turns upon the interpretation of the words 'any accused person' and 'discharged' used in sections 437. there is no definition of 'accused person' in the code and we see no sound reason for confining its application to a person against whom 'a complaint' has been made under sections 200 of the code. persons proceeded against under chapter viii of the code are persons against whom there is an accusation in the ordinary acceptation of the word. the word 'discharged' is also not defined in the code and there is no valid ground for departing in respect of it from the rule of construction that where in a statute the same word is used in different sections it ought to be interpreted in the same sense throughout unless the context in any particular section plainly requires that it should be understood in a different sense. we think that we should follow the rulings of the allahabad high court, queen-empress v. muttasaddi lal (1) and king-emperor v. fyaz-ud-din (2), which follow the decision of this court in queen empress v. mona puna(s); and not the rulings in queen-empress v. iman mondal (4) and velu tayi ammal v. chidambaravclu pillai (5). the rule is accordingly discharged.