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Emperor Vs. Nandbasappa Basappa

Emperor vs Nandbasappa Basappa

Type Court Judgment Court Mumbai Decided Mar 20, 1912
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/329118

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Citation
Court
Mumbai
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Criminal Application for Revision No. 12 of 1912
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) Section 257-magistrate-Witnesses for defence-Powers to decline to summon-Procedure-Magistrate cannot arbitrarily decline to examine witnesses.;It is not competent to a Magistrate to decline to examine witnesses cited for the defence on the ground that their evidence is unnece...

Key legal issue
Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Emperor

Respondent

Nandbasappa Basappa

Legal References

Reported In
(1912)14BOMLR360

Excerpt

criminal procedure code (act v of 1898) section 257-magistrate-witnesses for defence-powers to decline to summon-procedure-magistrate cannot arbitrarily decline to examine witnesses.;it is not competent to a magistrate to decline to examine witnesses cited for the defence on the ground that their evidence is unnecessary. he can, however, decline, under the provisions of section 257 of the criminal procedure code of 1898, to summon the witnesses. - maharashtra scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, de-notified tribes (vimukta jatis), nomadic tribes, other backward classes and special backward category (regulation of issuance and verification of) caste certificate act (23 of 2001), sections 6 & 10: [s.b. mhase, a.p. deshpande & p.b. varale, jj] caste certificate petitioner seeking appointment against the post reserved for member of schedule tribe his caste certificate was invalidated subsequently held, his appointment would not be protected. the observations/directions issued by supreme court in para 36 of judgment in the case of state v millind reported in 2001 91) mah. lj sc 1 is not the law declared by supreme court under article 141 of the constitution of india. said observations/directions are issued in exercise of powers under article 142 of the constitution and also have no application to the cases relating to appointments and are restricted to the cases relating to admissions. the protection, if any, to be granted in the fact and circumstances of case would depend upon exercise of discretion by supreme court under article 142 of the constitution. said powers under article 142 of constitution is not available to the high court. hence no protection can be granted by high court even in cases relating to admissions. .....code, and have been sentenced each to a small fine. they apply in revision on the ground that a serious illegality was committed by the learned second class magistrate, before whom this trial was heard. fortunately-there is no dispute as to the facts under, lying this contention. these facts are: that after the petitioners had been called upon to open their defence several witnesses were called by them. eight of those witnesses' depositions were recorded by the learned magistrate, though in regard to six of them, it is clear, that their story has been seriously abbreviated, possibly mutilated. however that may be, when the magistrate had exhausted these witnesses, it would seem that he had also exhausted his own patience. for, concerning five other witnesses, who remained to be examined, he writes only: ' all these people repeat the defence story; i shall dispense with their evidence as unnecessary.' it does not appear upon what grounds the learned magistrate stated that these people, who had never been heard, would, if they were heard, repeat the defence story. and the magistrate should have borne 'in mind that although the evidence of these witnesses may have appeared to him to be unnecessary, those witnesses' attendance was needed, not in the magistrate's interest, but in the interests of the accused persons. if, therefore, the accused persons regarded them as necessary witnesses, it was not for the magistrate to pronounce them to be unnecessary, before he had heard them. it is quite clear that procedure such as this cuts at the very root of the fairness of a criminal 1 trial. the case might have been different if the learned magistrate had brought himself within the provisions ,of section 257 of the criminal procedure code, which empowers a magistrate to decline to issue process where he considers that application for such process is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. where the magistrate so considers arid.....

Full Judgment

Batchelor, J.

1. The petitioners here have been convicted of the offence of rioting under Section 147, Indian Penal Code, and have been sentenced each to a small fine. They apply in revision on the ground that a serious illegality was committed by the learned Second Class Magistrate, before whom this trial was heard. Fortunately-there is no dispute as to the facts under, lying this contention. These facts are: that after the petitioners had been called upon to open their defence several witnesses were called by them. Eight of those witnesses' depositions were recorded by the learned Magistrate, though in regard to six of them, it is clear, that their story has been seriously abbreviated, possibly mutilated. However that may be, when the Magistrate had exhausted these witnesses, it would seem that he had also exhausted his own patience. For, concerning five other witnesses, who remained to be examined, he writes only: ' all these people repeat the defence story; I shall dispense with their evidence as unnecessary.' It does not appear upon what grounds the learned Magistrate stated that these people, who had never been heard, would, if they were heard, repeat the defence story. And the Magistrate should have borne 'in mind that although the evidence of these witnesses may have appeared to him to be unnecessary, those witnesses' attendance was needed, not in the Magistrate's interest, but in the interests of the accused persons. If, therefore, the accused persons regarded them as necessary witnesses, it was not for the Magistrate to pronounce them to be unnecessary, before he had heard them. It is quite clear that procedure such as this cuts at the very root of the fairness of a criminal 1 trial. The case might have been different if the learned Magistrate had brought himself within the provisions ,of Section 257 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which empowers a Magistrate to decline to issue process where he considers that application for such process is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. Where the Magistrate so considers arid records in writing his ground for so considering, it is competent to him to decline to enforce the attendance of witnesses. In this case, however, the Magistrate has not brought himself or his procedure within the provisions of 3.257. And there is no justification for his action in refusing to hear the witnesses whom the defence desired to call. I think, therefore, that the petitioners are entitled to have their conviction set aside.

2. Mr. Kelkar, who appears on the other side, has urged that if the conviction be set aside a retrial ought to be ordered. But having regard to the triviality of the offence, said to have been committed by these accused persons, as disclosed by the punishment which the Magistrate saw fit to award, and having regard also to the harassment, which these proceedings, protracted for such a long period, must have already caused to the petitioners, I think it unnecessary that a retrial should be ordered. The fines, if paid, to be refunded.

Heaton, J.

3. I concur.

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