Full Judgment
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 9884 OF 2023 (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS) BETWEEN: SRI PUNITH SHETTY S/O PADMANAB SHETTY, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, R/AT KURGAMBIKA KRUPA, KUNTALPADI, PADAVU GRAMA, SHAKTHINAGARA, MANGALORE TALUK MANGALORE 575 006. …PETITIONER (BY SMT. HALEEMA AMEEN, FOR SRI. ASHOK KUMAR SHETTY.K, ADVOCATES) AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY URVA POLICE STATION MANGALORE, REPRESENTED BY SPP, HIGH COURT BUILDING, BANGALORE 560 001. Digitally signed by LEELAVATHI S R
2. SRI VENUGOPAL A Location: High Court of AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS Karnataka ASSISTANT SUB INSPECTOR OF
POLICE URVA POLICE STATION, STATION AT: URVA POLICE STATION, URVA, MANGALORE - 575 006. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. WAHEEDA, HCGP) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.75/2023 OF URVA POLICE STATION, REGISTERED FOR OFFENCE P/U/S.353,506,507 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE JMFC III COURT, MANGALURU.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER
WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: -2- CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
In this petition, the petitioner who is the sole accused in Crime No.75/2023 dated 12.08.2023 seeks quashing of the aforesaid proceedings registered against him for the offences punishable under Sections 353, 506 and 507 of IPC.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent and perused the material on record.
3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that a
suo moto complaint is was said to have been given by respondent No.2- the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, respondent No.1 registered an FIR in Crime No.75/2023 for the alleged offences under Sections 353, 506 and 507 of IPC. It is an undisputed fact as borne out from the material on record that the petitioner- accused was not physically present at the police station and instead the entire allegations revolve around a phone call said to have been made by the petitioner to respondent No.2 so as to enable him to register an offence under Section 304-A IPC. -3-
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention
to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Manik Taneja and another Vs. State of Karnataka and another - (2015) 7 SCC 423, which has been followed by this Court in subsequent
judgment in order to point out that general / vague / bald
allegations would not be sufficient to constitute the offences under Sections 353 or 506 or 507 of IPC especially based on an alleged phone conversation, which does not indicate that any of the said offences have been committed by the petitioner as contended in the impugned complaint. It is therefore submitted that the impugned proceedings against the petitioner deserves to be quashed.
5. Per contra, learned HCGP submits that there is no merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed.
6. Before adverting to rival contentions, it would be
apposite to extract the averments made in the complaint, which reads as under: “EªÀjUÉ, oÁuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ, GªÁð ¥ÉÆð¸ï oÁuÉ, ªÀÄAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ. ರಿ೦ದ. ವೇಣುಗೋಪಾಲ.ಐ ಸಹಾಯಕ ಪೋಸ್ ಉಪ ನೀರೀಕ್ಷಕ ಉರ್ವಾ ಪೋಲಸ್ ಠಾಣೆ ಮಂಗಳೂರು ಮೊ.ಸ೦. ೨44೨೦45156. ಮಾಸ್ಟರೇ.
ಸಾಸು ಈ ದಿನ ಠಾಣೆಯಲ್ಲ ಕರ್ತವ್ಯದ ರುವ ಸಮಯ ಸುಮಾರು 17-33 ವೇಳೆಗೆ vy, QO.VO.8310043201 र्ठ ಮೊ.ಸ೦. 7624೨43424 ರಿಂದ ಪೋಸ್ ಕರೆ ಬಂದಿದ್ದು ಕರೆಯಸ್ನು ಛ್ವೀಕರಿಸಿದಾಗ ಕರೆ ಮಾಡಿದ ವೃಕ್ತಿ Males ದಿನಾ೦ಕ: 10.08.2023 ರಂದು ರೇಯಾಸ್ ಎ೦ಖಬುವರ ಕಾರು 2988; ಆನೆಗು೦ಡಿ ಖಳ ಮೋಟಾರು Beers ತಾಗಿ ಅದರ ಸವಾರಸು ಕೆಳಗೆ ಅದ್ಪು ಸಂತರ ಮೋಟಾರು ಸ್ಟೆ ಲ್ ಸವಾರ ಅರ್ಜದಾರರಿಗೆ ಅವಾಚ್ಯ ಶ್ಞಾಗಳ೦ದ ಬೈದು BOE” VOD ಕಾರಿಸ ಗಾಜಿಗೆ ಹೊಡೆದು 2९202 2 vy ९00८2 ಮಾಡಿರುವ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ದೂರು ನೀಡಿದ್ದ ಅದರ೦ತೆ ಠಾಣೆಯಲ್ಲ ಹಿಆಷನ್ WO. 5೦೨/೨೦೦೪ ರಂತೆ ಪ್ರಕರಣ ದಾಖಲಾಗಿರುತ್ತದೆ. ಇದೊಂದು ಅಸ೦ಜ್ಯ್ಛೇಯ ಅಪರಾಧವಾಗಿರುವುದರೀಮದ ಈ ಅರ್ಜಿಯ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಮಾಸ್ಟ ಸ್ಥ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯದಿ೦ದ ಅಸುಮತಿ ಪಡೆದು ದಿಸಾ೦ಕ: 12.08.2023 ರಂಯಿ ಠಾಣಾ ಮೊ.ಸ೦. 74/2023 FLO 5೦4, 427,506 ಐಪಿಸಿಯಡಿ ಪ್ರಕರಣ ९०००९५९ ತನಿಖೆಯನ್ನು ಮು೦ದುವರೆಕಿ ಕಾರಿಸ ಮಹಜರಿಗಾಗಿ ಸಾಸು ಪಿರ್ಯಾದಿದಾರರಿಗೆ ಪೋಸ್ ಕರೆ ಮಾಡಿ ಕೇಳಸಿಕೂೊ೦ಡಿದ್ದು ಇದೇ ಪಿಚಾರವಾಗಿ ಈ ವೇಳೆಗೆ ಪಿರ್ಯಾದುದಾರರ ಮೊಬೈಲ್ VO. 7624943424 DOW ವಾಪಸು ಸಸಗೆ ಕರೆ BOOM ಕರೆಯಸ್ನು ءن ۶۵۸۰ ಕರೆ ಮಾಡಿದ ವ್ಯಕ್ಕಿಯು Vahey, ಸಾಸು ಪುಸೀತ್ Fg ಮಾತನಾಡುವುದು ನಿಮಗೆ ಕಾರು ಯಾಕೆ ತಂದು ಹಾಜರು ಮಾಡಬೇಕು? ನೀವು ಆರೋಪಿಯನ್ನು ದಸ್ಟಗಿರಿ ಮಾಡಿ ಠಾಣೆಯಲ aBabes ಕೂರಿಸಿರುವುದ್ದಿಲ ಸಾಸು ಕಮೀಷಸರ್ ಕುಲ್ದೀಪ್ ಗೆ ಹೇಳುತ್ತೇನೆ ಎ೦ಬುದಾಗಿ ಹೇಳದನಸು ಅದಕ್ಕೆ Wow COD ಐಸ್ 2 ಅರ್ಜಿ ಆಗಿರುವುದರಿಂದ ಸ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯದಿ೦ದ ಅಸುಮತಿ ಪಡೆಯದೆ ADVI ವಎಫ್ಐ.ಆರ್ ಮಾಡಲು ಆಗುವುದಿಲ್ಲ ಎ೦ದು ತಿಳಸಿದಾಗ ದಾನೆ ಯಾನ್ Biv ಸ್ಟೇಷಸ್ಗ್ ಲಪ್ಪಡಾವಡಾ ? ಉರ್ವಾಗ್ ( ಸ್ಥಾಯಾಧೀಶರಸ್ದು ಠಾಣೆಗೆ ಕರೆಸಬೇಕಾ) ನೀವು ಹಾಗೆ ಮಾತಸಾಡಖೇಡಿ ಎ೦ಖುದಾಗಿ ಸಾಸು ತಿಳಿದಾಗ ಒಮ್ಮೆಲೇ ಹೋರಾದ وت2 ಈರ್ DOB. ಪಸ್ಟರ್ಯೆ 2 ಈರ್ಸ ಮಿತ್ರ ಕೇಸ್ ಕೊರ್ಪೆ ( ಸೀಸು ಏಸು ಮಾತಸಾಡುತ್ರೀ ಸಿನ್ಹ ಮೇಲೆ ಕೇಸ್ ಕೊಡ್ರೇನೆ ಎ೦ಖುದಾಗಿ ಬೆದರಿಸಿರುತ್ತಾರೆ. ನಿಮಗೆ ಆಗದಿದ್ದರೆ ಸಾನೆ ಅವಸಸನ್ನು ಎಲೆ ಕಾ೦ಡೆ (ಸಾಳೆ ಬೆಳಗ್ಗೆ ಕಮೀಷನರ್ ಮುಂದೆ ಚಡ್ಛಿಯಲಾ ಕೂರಿಸುತ್ರೇನೆ Beg, ಪುದರ್ ಖೋಡಾ೦ಢ Dogs ಎಲ್ಲೆ ಕಾಂಡೆ ಯೀಡಿಯಾಡ್ ಐರಪುಂಡು ಈರ್ com, Fe Be OS, ಪುದರ್ VeBavow® ಪಡುವೆ ಈರ್ ಆಯಸ್ DGD ಮಲರಾ? AF ಯಾಸ್ ಕಮೀಷನರ್ ಕುಲ್ದೀಪ್ (7 ಪೋಸ್ ಮಲ್ಪುವೆ ಯಾಸ್ ಕುಲ್ದೀಪ್ಗ್ ಆಯನ Mad ಕಾರ್ದ ಪೋಟೋ SHOES ಈರ್ DOTS ಮಲಖರದಾ೦ಡ ಸೋಮವಾರದ ಉಲಯು ದಾದ
ಮಲ್ಯೋಡು ಅವೆಸ್ ಯಾಸ್ ಮಲ್ಪುವೆ ಆಯಸ್ DIDS WBS ಉರ್ವಾ ಸ್ಟೇಷನ್ದ ಏರ್ ಇಸ್ಚಾರ್ಜ್ WEF ಆಯಸ್ ಇಲ್ಲಗ್ ಕಡಪುಡಸ ಬೇಲೆ ಯಾಸ್ WOW ಎ೦ದು ಧಮಕಿ ಹಾಕಿದ್ದು ಆಗ ಸಾನು OY, ಮೇಲಾಧಢಿಕಾರಿಯವರಲ್ಲ ಮಾತಸಾಡಿ ಎ೦ದು ಹೇಳದಾಗ ಆತಸು ಉರ್ವಾ ಸ್ಟೇಷಸ್ಸ ಇಸ್ಲ್ಪೈಕ್ಟರ್ನ್ನು ಸಸ್ತೆ೦ಡ್ ಮಾಡಿಸುತ್ತೇನೆ. ಅಲ್ಲದೆ ಆತನು Mayer ಯಾನ್ ಕಮೀಷಸರ್ ಇಲ್ಲಗ್ ಪೋದು ಎಫ್. ಐ.ಆರ್ ಮಲ್ಟಾದ್ ಆಯಸ್ ےت ಕುಲ್ಲಾವೆ. DOO) ae ಗವರ್ಮೆ೦ಂಟ್ ಉಪ್ಪುಸು ಸಿ.ಎ೦. ದೆ ಪೋಸ್ ಮಲ್ಬವೇ Bos ಪಾತೆರಿಯೆರ್ಡ seg, ಮಿತ್ತ್ಲಾ ಎಅಗೇಷಸ್ ಮಲ್ಬವೆ ಆಯೆಸನ ಶ್ಚ ಕಾರ್ ಪೊಅಪಾವೆ ಆಯೆ ದಾನೆ ಆಯೆ ದಾನೆ ಇಸ್ಲ್ಪೈಕ್ವರ್ನ ಸಂಖ೦ಂಧದಾಯೆಸಾ? ಐರೆಸ್ಟ್ ಈರ್ ಮಲ್ವ್ಪೋಡ್ಚಿ ಪದ್ರಾಡ್ ಗಂಬೆದುಲಾಯಿ ಶಾರೆಸ್ ಕಮೀಷಸರ್ಸ ಅಆಡೆಗೆ ಲೆಪ್ಪುಡಾವೆ ಎ೦ಬುದಾಗಿ ಏರು ಧ್ವಸಿಯ( ಬೈದು ಸಸ್ನನ್ನು ನಿ೦ದಿಸಿರುವುದದೆ ಬೆದರಿಕೆ ಕೂಡಾ ಹಾಕಿ ಸಸ್ಜ ಕರ್ತವ್ಯಕ್ಕೆ ಅಡ್ಚಿಪಡಿಸಿರುತಾರೆ ಸಸಗೆ ಮಾಸಸಿಕವಾಗಿ ಸಿ೦ದನೆ ಮಾಡಿ چیہ یہ Bade say, ಕುಗ್ಗಿಸಿ OY, ಕರ್ತವ್ಯಕ್ಕೆ ಅಡ್ವಿ ಪಡಿಸಿರುವ ಪುಸೀತ್ Beg ಇವರ ವಿರುದ್ದ ಸೂಕ್ತ ಕಾಸೂಸು ಕ್ರಮ ಕೈಗೊಳ್ಳಬೇಕಾಗಿ ಕೋರಿಕೆ.”
7. In Manik Taneja’s case (Supra), regarding the offences under Sections 353 and 506 of IPC, the Apex Court held as under:
“10. So far as the issue regarding the registration of FIR under Section 353 IPC is concerned, it has to be seen whether by posting a comment on the Facebook page of the traffic police, the conviction under that section could be maintainable. Before considering the materials on record, we may usefully refer to Section 353 IPC which reads as follows:
‘353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty.- Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
A reading of the above provision shows that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC -6-
are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not made out.
11. Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation. “Criminal intimidation” as defined in Section 503 IPC is as under:
“503.Criminal intimidation.-Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.-A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.” A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to -7-
another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.
12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the
appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.
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13. Of course, in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr PC, the court should be extremely cautious to interfere with the investigation or trial of a criminal case and should not stall the investigation, save and except when it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of offence and that continuance of the criminal prosecution would amount to abuse of process of the court. As noted earlier, the page created by the traffic police on Facebook was a forum for the public to put forth their grievances. In our considered view, the appellants might have posted the comment online under the bona fide belief that it was within the permissible limits. As discussed earlier, even going by the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR, in our view, none of the ingredients of the alleged offences are satisfied. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be unjust to allow the process of the court to be continued against the appellants and consequently the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside.
14. In the result, the impugned order of the High Court
in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [2014 SCC OnLine Kar 4237] dated 24-4-2014 is set aside and this appeal is allowed and the FIR in Crime No. 174 of 2013 registered against the appellants is quashed.”
8. The said judgment was followed by this Court in the
case of Mr. Satish Vs. State of Karnataka and others - W.P.No.6880/2020 dated 08.04.2022, wherein it is held as under: -9- “8. I have considered the arguments. In this petition the quashing of FIR is sought. It is a well established principle that the High Court should
exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or section 482 of the Cr.P.C with great circumspection for quashing the FIR. Nipping the criminal action at the inception is not encouraged unless it is pointed out that the FIR does not disclose existence of the ingredients of the offence complained of or registration of FIR is
with mala fide intention. Investigation process
should not be stalled. In the case of State of Karnataka and Another vs Pastor P Raju [(2006) 6 SCC 728] it is held that the inherent power of the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C should be exercised to prevent the abuse of process of any court or to secure ends of justice, but such a power cannot be exercised to interfere with statutory power of the police to investigate a cognizable case.
9. In the case on hand, second respondent police has registered FIR against the petitioner for the offences under sections 353, 506 and 507 of
IPC. Of these three offences, the only cognizable offence is under section 353, the other two being non-cognizable. Therefore, firstly it is to be found out whether the report given by the third respondent makes out ingredients necessary for invoking that offence. In order to appreciate the -10- facts, it is better to extract here the report made by the third respondent : - ಉಗಪ್ಪ وم“ ಪಂಚಾಯ) ಅಭಿವೃದ್ಧಿ ಅಧಿಕಾರಿ FOVOAOD ಗ್ರಾಮ ಪಂಚಾಯಿತಿ ಇವರಿಗೆ ಆರಕಕ ಉಪಸನಿರೀಕಕರು ಆರಕ್ಷಕ ಠಾಣೆ ಮೂಡುಬದಿರೆ ಮಾಸ್ಟರೇ. ಖಯಿಷಯ: FSET (^ رد 7 ಕುರಿತು evejea: ತಮ್ಮ ಕಛೇರಿಗೆ ದೂರು ಅರ್ಜ Tee ದಿಸಾ೦ಕ:೦೨ 4.20
EOC ವಿಷಯಕ್ಕೆ ಸ೦ಬ೦ಧಿಸಿದ೦ತೆ ಮೇಅನ (+ (4 ಶ್ರೇ.ಸತೀಶ್ ತೋಡಕಿಲ ठछन्य7०व्व् कल ಇವರ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಈಗಾಗಲೇ ದೂರು ಅರ್ಜಿಯನ್ನು ಸ್ನಣ್ಯಿಸಿರುತ್ತೇನೆ ಈ ದೂರು ಅರ್ಜಿಗೆ ಸ೦ಖ೦ಧಪಟ್ಟ೦ತೆ ಈ ವಿಷಯಗಳನ್ನು ಕೂಡಾ ತಮ್ಮ ಗಮನಕ್ಕೆ ಸಲ್ಲಸುತಿದ್ದೇನೆ 1 ಸತೀಶ್ ಇವರು ಸಾಮಾಜಕ ಹಾಲತಾಣದಲ್ಲ VAY, ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಕೇಳು यद्र" ಖರವಣಿಗೆಗಳನ್ನು ಹಾಕುವುದು ಮತ್ತು ಹಾಕಿಸುವುದು. 2 ಅವರು ಹೇಳದ ಕೆಲಸಗಳು ಕಾಸೂಸು ಖಥವಾಗಿರದಿದಆ ಸಾಸು ಮಾಡಲು ಒಪದಿದರೆ DUNT ಖೆದರಿಕೆ ಹಾಕಲು ಮತ್ತು ಮಾಹಿತಿ ಹಕ್ಕಿ ಸಲಿ ಮಾಹಿತಿಗಳನ್ನು ಕೇಳ Bed ರೀತಿಯಲ್ಲ ಮಾಸಸಿಕ ಹಿ೦ಸೆ ಸೀಡಿ ಕರ್ತವ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಅಡಿ ಪಡಿಸುವುದು. 3. ಊರಿನ ಇವರೊಂದಿಗೆ ವೈಮನಸಸ್ಸ ಹೊ೦ದಿರುವ ಯಾರಿಗಾದರೂ ಕಛೇರಿ ಕೆಲಸ ಮಾಡಿಕೊಟ್ಟರೆ Dorr ವರ್ಗಾವಣೆಯನ್ನು Bed ಕಡೆಗೆ (MOOD ಪುದೇಶಕ್ಕಿ ಮಾಡಿಸುತ್ತೇನೆ ಎ೦ದು ಬೆದರಿಕೆ ಹಾರಿ ಸೆ ನೀಡುವುದು. ಆದ್ದರಿ೦ದ ಅವರ ಮೇಲೆ ಕಾಸೂಸು ರೀತ್ಯಾ: ಕಮ ಕೈಗೊಳ್ಳುವಂತೆ ತಮ್ಮ ಮತ್ತೊಮ್ಮೆ ಖಿಸ೦ತಿಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳತ್ತೇನೆ ತಮ್ಮ ಸಂಖುಗೆಯ 2 ಉಗಪ್ಪ ” - 11 -
10. The FIR came to be registered in the background of posting of a message or information by the petitioner on social media. For invoking the offence under section 353 the essential ingredient to be present is that a person accused of committing this offence should have assaulted or used criminal force against a public servant while discharging his official duty. The words ‘criminal force ’ and ‘assault’ find their meaning in sections 350 and 351 IPC respectively. Section 350 requires the following ingredients to be satisfied : -
(i) Intentional use of force to any person
(ii) Force must have been used without the person’s consent and
(iii) The force must be used for committing an offence or with intention to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom it is used.
11. The word ‘assault’ as defined in section
351 means making of a gesture or preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that the gesture or the preparation will cause apprehension in the mind of another person that criminal force will be used against him. The illustrations to sections 350 and 351 IPC make the meaning of words ‘criminal force ’ and ‘assault’ very clear. In common parlance, the word ‘assault ’ is understood as ‘one person beating another person with or without weapon’. But this common parlance meaning - 12 - cannot be employed while examining the FIR to find out whether an offence under section 353 IPC
is made out or not, in the given set of circumstances. In the case on hand, the third respondent has made three allegations as extracted above. First allegation is that the
petitioner posted certain messages in awkward language. The second one pertains to putting threat to him in case he did not agree for his demands and that the third one is again putting threat to getting him transferred to another place in case he attended to the work of anybody whom the petitioner did not like. These allegations do not disclose either using criminal force or making assault. No doubt the third petitioner is a public servant. Mere posting of a message on social media does not amount to interference by the
petitioner with his official duties and thereby constitutes an offence punishable under section 353 IPC. There is no allegation that the petitioner ever made a gesture or used criminal force to the annoyance of the third respondent. Of course, the third allegation of getting the third respondent transferred may amount to putting threat which is punishable under section 506 IPC, but it does not fall within the ambit of section 353. Further, there are no ingredients for attracting the offence under
section 507 at all. Both the offences under sections 506 and 507 are non-cognizable and no investigation could have been undertaken without - 13 -
the permission of the Magistrate. Probably in order
to obviate the necessity of taking permission from the Magistrate, the second respondent might have
invoked the offence under section 353 IPC. The learned counsel for respondent No.3 has placed reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Surajkumar Satyabrath Pal vs State of Maharashtra [2015 SCC Online Bombay 2994] to garner support for his argument that there is no case for quashing FIR. The facts of this case clearly disclose that the offence under section 353
IPC was invoked and in the facts and circumstances of that case it was held that the assault as defined under section 351 was made out. This judgment is not applicable here. Even in Annexure-R9 there are no materials disclosing commission of offences under sections 353, 506 and 507 IPC. Therefore, if the petitioner is unnecessarily prosecuted for this offence, it is nothing but abuse of process of court. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has been able to make out a ground for quashing the FIR.
12. Another complaint of the petitioner is
that he was not able to procure a copy of the FIR as it was not uploaded on the official website of the police department. In this regard it is necessary to place reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Youth Bar Association of - 14 -
India (supra) where certain guidelines are given by the Supreme Court to the police. It is not necessary to refer to all the guidelines here. Though it is submitted by the Government Pleader that the FIRs are being uploaded on the official website of the police department, in order to emphasize the strict compliance of the directions of the Supreme Court given in the case of Youth Bar Association of India (supra), direction may be issued once again.
13. In the result, this writ petition succeeds. The FIR in Crime No. 95/2020 against the petitioner for the offences under sections 353, 506 and 507 of IPC is quashed.
The Department of Home, Government of Karnataka, is hereby directed to upload every FIR registered in every police station across the State of Karnataka in accordance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Youth Bar Association of India vs Union of India and Another [(2016) 9 SCC 473]. Copy of this order shall be forwarded to the Director General of Police, Karnataka State, and the Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru, for implementation.”
9. So also, in the case of Jagadeesh Karanth Vs. The
State of Karnataka - W.P.No.14198/2022 dated 16.09.2022, a - 15 - co-ordinate Bench of this Court while considering the scope and ambit of Sections 353 and 506 of IPC placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Manik Taneja (supra)
and quashed the proceedings, which reads as under: “ 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the issue in the lis stands covered by the
judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of MANIK
TANEJA AND ANOTHER VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER reported in (2015) 7 SCC 423 and the
judgment rendered by the High Court of Kerala in the case
of RAJU THOMAS @ JOHN THOMAS VS. STATE OF KERALA reported in (2012) 4 KLJ 382.
4. The Apex Court in MANIK TANEJA case (supra), has held as follows:
9. In State of T.N. v. Thirukkural Perumal
[(1995) 2 SCC 449 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 387] considering the scope of Section 482 Cr PC to quash the FIR/criminal proceedings, this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 450, para 4) “4. … The power of quashing an FIR and criminal proceeding should be exercised sparingly by the courts. Indeed, the High Court has the extraordinary or inherent power to reach out injustice and quash the first information report and criminal proceedings, keeping in view the
guidelines laid down by this Court in various
judgments (reference in this connection may be made with advantage to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC
(Cri) 426] ) but the same has to be done with circumspection. The normal process of the criminal trial cannot be cut short in a rather casual manner.” 10. So far as the issue regarding - 16 -
the registration of FIR under Section 353 IPC is concerned, it has to be seen whether by posting a comment on the Facebook page of the traffic police, the conviction under that section could be maintainable. Before considering the materials on record, we may usefully refer to Section 353 IPC which reads as follows:
“353.Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty.-Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
A reading of the above provision shows that the
essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not made out.
- 17 -
11. Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation. “Criminal intimidation” as defined in Section 503 IPC is as under:
“503. Criminal intimidation.-Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.-A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.” A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation”
would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.
12. In the instant case, the allegation
is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the - 18 -
complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.”
5. The High Court of Kerala in RAJU THOMAS @ JOHN THOMAS case (surpa), has held as follows:
“2. I heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Public Prosecutor. The materials placed by the prosecuting agency do not disclose of any of the essential ingredients constituting the offences, to proceed against the petitioner, and as such the criminal proceedings initiated against him are an abuse of the process of the court, is the submission of his counsel.
3. Annexure A1 is the complaint given by the
defacto complainant before the Circle Inspector of Police to proceed against the accused for the alleged criminal acts imputed over the destruction of a notice board. Annexure A6 is a copy of the notice affixed on such board, which was destroyed by the accused. Going through Annexure A6, it is seen that the notice put up naming the accused imputed him as an uncivilized person indulging in antisocial activities. If he does not reform, then, the people of the locality will do what is necessary, is the substance of the notice published. Such a notice published and put up in a board at a public - 19 -
place was torn up and destroyed by the petitioner/accused, is the case of the complainant alleging that thereby he has suffered loss of Rs. 500/-. Even assuming that the allegation raised is true and correct, still, how far the complainant or any other person could have put up a notice board in a public place, the contents of which are per se defamatory against the petitioner is also a larger issue resented on the allegation raised in the complaint. Petitioner has got a case that as against the complainant he had previously launched criminal proceedings which after investigation by the police, has led to his indictment and trial before a court. When such circumstances are canvassed of, which are not refuted, that has also to be taken note of in considering whether the criminal proceedings launched against the petitioner on the complaint over the destruction of the notice board is justified.
4. To constitute an offence under Section 153 of
the IPC, the essential ingredients thereof have to be made out. The ‘act’ imputed against the accused is illegal, he has done such act malignantly or wantonly, and, he has given provocation to any person intending or knowing that such provocation will cause the offence of rioting are the ingredients to establish the offence. To hold that an act is done malignantly, it must be an unlawful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. “Malignant” means extreme malevolence or enmity; violently hostile or harmful. The act imputed, if not malignantly, should be at least shown to have been done wantonly.
“Wantonly” simply means recklessly, thoughtlessly, without regard for right or consequences. More than that the act has been done malignantly or wantonly, it is also required to be shown that the act of the accused was illegal. A notice containing defamatory statement put up in a board at a public place against the accused was torn of by him. Even if that is accepted on its face value, it cannot be viewed as an unlawful act done by him out of extreme malevolence or enmity or
- 20 -
recklessness. Notice board contained defamatory statement against the accused is not disputed. None has a right to exhibit such a notice board in a public place cannot also be lost sight of. Even assuming that the complainant should have approached the law enforcing agency rather than taking action by himself, in the given facts and circumstances presented, it cannot be stated that tearing of the notice board containing defamatory statement against him and that too exhibited in a public place was an act done by him with intend to provoke any person to commit the offence of rioting. Where the exhibiting of such a board against him at a public place itself is shown to be illegal, tearing away that notice board, even if such allegation is accepted as true, cannot be considered as an act intentionally done to provoke any other person to commit rioting. At best, it was an act of removing a notice board affecting his self respect and dignity when it was exhibited by some miscreants at a public place.”
6. Learned HCGP, though, refute the submission
of the learned counsel for the petitioner, is not in a position to dispute the position of law as is laid down by the Apex Court and the High Court of Kerala (supra).
7. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, the following:
ORDER
i) Writ petition is allowed. ii) The proceedings in C.C.No.284/2022 pending on the file of Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Bantwalal Taluk, stand quashed.”“
10. Similarly, in the case of Shri Vijay Tata Vs. The State
of Karnataka - Crl.P.No.9366/2018 dated 10.01.2019, a co- - 21 - ordinate Bench of this Court followed the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Manik Taneja (supra) and quashed the proceedings by holding as under: “Heard Shri C.V.Nagesh, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Shri A.S. Ponnanna, learned Additional Advocate General for the State.
2. This petition is filed challenging FIR
No.59/2018 registered on 13.12.2018 in Vidhana Soudha police station alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 353 & 120B of IPC against petitioner and two others.
3. Shri C.V.Nagesh, learned Senior advocate,
adverting to the complaint lodged by one Shri Manjunath.B, Police Inspector, CCB, Bengaluru, pointed out that the contents of complaint are to the effect that Mr. Zaid Khan and Mr. Sirajuddin held a press conference in Press club in Bengaluru on 12.12.2018 and in the said press conference, they had allegedly made certain uncharitable allegations against Police officers, CCB, who were investigating the offences in respect of a Company called ‘Ambident’; and stated that their investigation had facilitated the accused in the said case to obtain bail. With the said allegations, instant complaint has been lodged alleging offence punishable under Section 353 of IPC in Vidhana Soudha police station. He argued that if the complaint is read in its entirety, it does not disclose any offence punishable under Section 353 of IPC. He placed reliance on Manik Taneja and another v. State of Karnataka - 22 -
and another and submitted that the instant complaint does not fulfill the ingredients of Section 353 of IPC. Accordingly, he prays for allowing this petition.
4. Shri A.S.Ponnanna, learned Additional Advocate General argued in support of the complaint.
5. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned Senior Advocate, learned Additional Advocate General and perused the records.
6. Section 353 of IPC reads as follows:
“353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty.- Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
7. In substance, what is alleged in the complaint is
that two persons namely, Mr. Zaid Khan and Mr. Sirajuddin had made certain uncharitable comments against Police officers. When the allegations levelled in the complaint are examined in the light of language employed in Section 353 of IPC, it is clear that complaint does not contain any allegation of assault or use of criminal force to a public servant with intent to prevent him from discharging his duty. It is unfortunate that Police officers have resorted to registering a complaint without there being any ingredients
- 23 - attributable to Section 353 of IPC. In Manik Taneja, the Supreme Court of India has held as follows:
“10. So far as the issue regarding the registration of FIR under Section 353 IPC is concerned, it has to be seen whether by posting a comment on the Facebook page of the traffic police, the conviction under that section could be maintainable. Before considering the materials on record, we may usefully refer to Section 353 IPC which read as follows:
“353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty.-Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” A reading of the above provision shows that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent that second respondent from discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, the - 24 -
ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not made out.”
8. In the circumstances, it leaves no doubt that
the allegations in the complaint do not conform to the attributes and ingredients of Section 353 of IPC. Resultantly, this petition merits consideration and is accordingly allowed. FIR No.59/2018 registered in Vidhana Soudha Police station pending on the file of I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru and all further proceedings thereon are quashed.
9. At this stage, Shri C.V.Nagesh, learned Senior
Advocate contends that since this Court has taken a view that FIR is bad in law and quashed the same, any materials seized during the course of investigation shall be returned. He is right in his contention. In the circumstances, respondents are directed to release any or all articles seized during the course of investigation, forthwith.
10. In view of disposal of the petition, I.A.No.1/2019 does not survive for consideration and the same stands disposed of. No costs.”
11. As stated supra, a bare the reading of the complaint
will clearly indicate that necessary ingredients to constitute the offences under Sections 353, 504 and 506 of IPC was not made out especially when a complaint is based on a telephonic conversation, even without presence of the accused, who has not - 25 - committed any of the offence as alleged against him, in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court and the same would tantamount to abuse of process of law, warranting interference by this Court.
12. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The Criminal petition is allowed.
(ii) The impugned criminal proceedings in Crime
No.75/2023 registered by respondent No.1 Police, for the offences under Sections 353, 506 and 507 of IPC, pending on the file of the JMFC-III Court, Mangalore, in so far as the petitioner is concerned, are hereby quashed. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE BMC