Full Judgment
&
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS FRIDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2022 / 11TH BHADRA, 1944 CRP(LR) NO. 14 OF 2020 AGAINST THE ORDER IN A.A. 73/2016 ON THE FILE OF APPELLATE AUTHORITY (LR) KANNUR DATED 7.3.2018 IN SMP 75/1990 OF LAND TRIBUNAL, KUTHUPARAMBA
REV.PETITIONERS/APPELLANTS IN A.A/NON PARTIES IN SMP: 1 N.RADHAKRISHNAN AGED 56 YEARS SREELAKSHMI, P.O.PONNIYAM WEST, THALASSERY-670641 2 N.RADHABAI 24 GROUND FLOOR, ASHIRWADA, 1ST CROSS LAY OUT, KEVUMPA, HABBLA, KAMPAPURA, BANGALORE-560024. 3 RATHI RADHAKRISHNAN, H.NO.4/85, NR.5TH GATE, CALICUT-670001. 4 N.RUGMINI DEVI LAKSHMI, KAGUMBHAGAM.P.O, THALASSERY-670610 5 N.RAJALAKSHMI, SRI.VENKEDSWANAPPA NOLAYAM, 2ND CROSS, DEPOT, MUNISWAMAPPA LAYOUT, KAMMAHANDANA HALLI, JALAHALLI WEST, BANGALORE-560015 6 MEERA, BY ADVS. B.KRISHNAN SRI.R.PARTHASARATHY RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS IN A.,A/TENANT & LEGAL HEIR OF LAND OWNER IN SMP & STATE: 1 PRESIDENT, PATHIRIYAD AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT CO OPERATIVE SOCIETY PATHIRAYAD VILLAGE, P.O.MAMBARAM, VIA, PINARAYI, THALASSERY-670741 & 2 EDAPPADY APPUKUTTAN NAIR, (LEGAL HEIR OF EDAPPADI NARAYANI) S/O.LATE NARAYANAN, THERCHERY VEEDU, PATHIRIYAD AMSOM, KELALUR DESOM, P.O.MAMBARAM, VIA, PINARAYI, KANNUR-670741 3 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANANTHAPURAM-695001 BY ADV SRI.CIBI THOMAS THIS OP (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 25.8.2022 ALONG WITH OP(C)1063/2020, THE COURT ON 2.9.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: &
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS FRIDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2022 / 11TH BHADRA, 1944 OP(C) NO. 1063 OF 2020 AGAINST THE ORDER IN 14/2019 OF MUNSIF COURT, KUTHUPARAMBA PETITIONER/6TH PLAINTIFF IN O.S: N.MEERA AGED 56 YEARS D/O.PADMANABHAN NAIR, 48/1972 G, PERUMPOTTA ROAD, ELAMAKKARA.P.O., KOCHI - 682026. (WRONGLY SHOWN AS R.MEERA IN THE LOWER COURT JUDGMENT) BY ADVS. B.KRISHNAN SRI.R.PARTHASARATHY SMT.SEEMA RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANT &PLAINTIFFS 1 TO 5 IN O.S
1 KRISHNANKUTTY AGED 70 YEARS, PRESIDENT, PATHIRIYAD KRISHI PARISHKARANA SAHAKARANA SANGHAM, PATHIRIYAD VILLAGE, P.O.MAMBRAM, (VIA) PINARAYI, THALASSERY, NOW AT POWERLOOM MATTA, P.O.MAMBRAM, KANNUR-670741.
2 RADHAKRISHNAN, AGED 70 YEARS, S/O.LATE P.V.PADMANABHAN, SREELAKSHMI, PONNYAM WEST.P.O., THALASSERY-670641. 3 RADHA BHAI.N., AGED 76 YEARS, C/O.ARJUN R.NAIR, NO.3, 20TH CROSS ROAD, BEHIND ST.JOHNS SCHOOL, BHUVANESWARI NAGAR, HEBBAL, KOMPAPURA ROAD, BANGALORE-560024. 4 RATHI RADHAKRISHNAN, AGED 62 YEARS, NOW AT HOUSE NO.4/85, NEAR 54TH GATE, KOZHIKODE-670001. & 5 RUGMINI DEVI.N., AGED 60 YEARS, NOW AT LAKSHMI, P.O.KAVUMBHAGAM, THALASSERY-670160. 6 N.RAJALAKSHMI, AGED 58 YEARS, NOW AT FLAT NO.304, SUNRISE AURORA, SANVI SANKALPAM MAIN ROAD, NAGODANAHALLY, WHITEFIELD, BANGALORE-670067. BY ADVS. SRI.CIBI THOMAS SRI.RAJESH V.NAIR THIS OP (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 25.8.2022 ALONG WITH CRP(LR)14/2020, THE COURT ON 2.9.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: &
C.S DIAS,J.
--------------------------- & ----------------------------- Dated this the 2 September, 2022. nd
COMMON JUDGMENT
As the principal question involved in the two cases is the interpretation of the registered lease deed No.2211/1960 of the SRO, Kuthuparamba, they are consolidated, heard together, and disposed of by this common judgment.
2. O.P(C) No.1063/2020 is filed by the 6 th plaintiff in O.S.No.14/2019 of the Court of the Munsiff,
Kuthuparamba, (court below) to set aside the order
dated 18.3.2020 (Ext.P4). Whereas CRP (LR)No. the Appellate Authority (LR), Kannur - the plaintiffs in O.S No.14/2019 - to set aside the order in SMP No.75/1990 of the Land Tribunal, Kuthuparamba and the order in AA No.73/2016 passed by the Appellate & Authority. The parties are, for the sake of convenience and wherever the context so requires, referred to as per their status and pleadings in the respective case.
3. The revision petition is filed by the appellants in
AA No.73/2016 against the respondents, challenging the order in SMP No.75/1990. The Appellate Authority remanded SMP No.75/1990 to the Land Tribunal for fresh consideration. The revision petitioners contend that the Land Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide on the subject matter, which falls within the realm of the civil court. Therefore, the remand is unwarranted.
4. The original petition is filed by the 6 plaintiff
th in O.S.14/2019 against the defendants and other plaintiffs, challenging Ext.P4 order passed by the court below. The petitioner has, inter-alia, contended that the suit is filed by her and the respondents 2 to 6, to recover possession of the plaint schedule property from the 1 respondent, who is given the property as st per the above-mentioned lease-deed, by the & petitioner's father, for an industrial purpose. The 1 st respondent has resisted the suit claiming fixity of tenure and alleging the lease is for an agricultural purpose. As no issue of tenancy was raised in the suit, the petitioner approached this Court and filed OP(C)No.3291/2019. By Ext.P3 judgment, this Court directed the court below to frame an issue and decide whether the matter is to be referred to the Land Tribunal. Pursuant to Ext.P3 judgment, the court below, by the impugned Ext.P4 order, has referred the issue of tenancy to the Land Tribunal. Ext.P4 is erroneous and wrong. Hence the original petition.
5. Heard; Sri.B Krishnan, the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner in O.P(C)No.1063/2020 and the revision petitioners in CRP(LR) No.14/2020 and Sri. Cibi Thomas, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents in both cases.
6. Sri.B.Krishnan argued that in the light of the
law laid down in Thomas Antony v. Varkey Varkey & [(2000) 1 SCC 35], the civil court is well within its bounds to consider whether a plea that a party is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran is a bona fide contention. If there is not even a remote possibility of the plea being upheld by the Land Tribunal, then the Civil Court can conclude that the question does not reasonably arise in the case. He also relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Govinda Panicker v. Sreedhara Warrier [2000 (2) KLT 43] and Paravur Puttingal Devaswom v. K.K.Madhavan and others [2012 (2) KHC 640] to canvass the position that there was no necessity to refer the dispute to the Land Tribunal because the question revolves on the interpretation of Ext.P1 lease deed.
7. Sri. Cibi Thomas, on the other hand,
contended that there is no necessity for this Court to interfere with the findings of the court below, as well as the Appellate Authority. The dispute needs to be determined by the Land Tribunal as provided under & Section 125 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (in short, 'Act'). Hence there is no merit in both the cases, which may be dismissed.
8. The point is whether there is any illegality or impropriety in the orders passed by the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority and Ext.P4 order passed by the court below.
9. The petitioner and the respondents 2 to 6
have filed the suit for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property from the 1 respondent. They st have averred that late Padmanabhan Nair - their father - had executed the registered lease deed No.2211/1960 of SRO, Kuthuparamba, in favour of the 1 respondent for a period of 12 years. st As the tenure of the lease had come to an end, they issued a lawyer notice to the 1 respondent terminating the lease and st claimed recovery of possession. The respondent replied by claiming fixity of tenure. Since the claim of & the 1 respondent is unsustainable in law, the suit is st instituted.
10. The 1 respondent is resisting the suit, inter- st alia, contending the purchase certificate bearing No. was already issued in their favour by the Land Tribunal, Kuthuparamba in SMP No.75/1990.
11. Immediately, the petitioner and respondents
2 to 6 filed AA No.73/2016 before the Appellate Authority (LR), Kannur, inter alia, contending that the Land Tribunal had not issued notice to the intermediary or legal heirs of Padmanabhan Nair and the purchase certificate was issued behind their back. It is only on receipt of the reply notice from the 1 st respondent that they came to learn about the purchase certificate. The 1 respondent has perpetrated fraud st on them. The 1 st respondent is not entitled to protection under Section 106 of the Act. The 1 st respondent resisted the appeal. Nonetheless, the & Appellate Authority partly allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Land Tribunal for fresh consideration. Now the matter is pending before the Land Tribunal.
12. This Court, by Ext.P3 judgment, on the basis
of the assertion made by the petitioner that the lease was for an industrial purpose, directed the court below to raise an issue and decide on the question of jurisdiction. Consequently, the court below has passed Ext.P4 impugned order.
13. The petitioner has contended that as Ext.P1 -
lease deed, the property was leased for the purpose of starting a 'bone meal' factory, that too, only for a period of 12 years. Therefore, the purpose of the lease squarely falls within an industrial purpose as defined in Section 3 (1) Explanation (iii) of the Act, and there is no necessity to refer the dispute to the Land Tribunal. &
14. The 1 respondent has contended that the
st object of the 1 respondent is to promote agricultural st activity among its members and, therefore, the property was taken on lease for an agricultural purpose. The 1 st respondent has developed the property into an agricultural demonstration plot and is exhibiting its 'bone-meal' products. Hence, the 1 st respondent is entitled to fixity of tenure. The property has vested in the Government on 1.1.1970 as per the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
15. Undisputedly, the proceedings before the Land Tribunal were initiated and culminated without impleading the legal heirs of late Padmanabhan Nair or the intermediary.
16. The Appellate Authority accepted the
contention of the revision petitioners and partly allowed the appeal by ordering the remand of the matter for fresh consideration. Likewise, by the & impugned Ext.P4 order, the civil court has also referred the question whether the 1 respondent is a st tenant or not to the Land Tribunal.
17. In Thomas Antony(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “15. Section 125 of the Act makes provision regarding
bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts. Sub-section(l) of the said section lays down that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal or the Appellate Authority or the Land Board or the Government or an officer of the Government. The proviso to the said sub section makes an exception in case of proceedings pending in any court at the commencement of Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. In sub-section (2) of Section 125 it is laid down that no order of the Land Tribunal or the Appellate Authority or the Land Board or the Government or an officer of the Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any civil court, except as provided in this Act. Sub-section (3) which is relevant for the present purpose mandates that if in any suit or other proceedings any question regarding rights of a tenant or of a Kudikidappukaran (including the question as to whether a person is a tenant or Kudikidappukaran) arises, the civil court shall stay the suit or other proceedings and refer such question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situated together with the relevant records for the decision of that question only. Under sub-section (4) provision is made that the Land Tribunal shall decide the question referred to it under sub-section (3) and return the records together with its decision to the civil court. In subsection (5) it is laid down that the civil court shall then proceed to decide the suit or other proceedings accepting the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it. Sub-section
(6) provides that the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it shall, for the purpose of appeal, be & deemed to be part of the finding of the civil court. Sub-section
(7) bars any civil court from granting injunction in any suit or
other proceeding referred to in sub-section(3) restraining any person from entering into or occupying or cultivating any land or Kudikidappukaran or to appoint a receiver for any property in respect of which a question referred to in that sub-section has arisen, till such question is decided by the Land Tribunal, and any such injunction granted or appointment made before the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, or before such question has arisen, shall stand cancelled.
16. From the aforementioned provisions the statutory
scheme is clear that when a question regarding status of a person as a tenant or as a Kudikidappukaran arises in any suit or proceeding before a civil court that Court shall refer the matter to the Land Tribunal for a decision on that question only. On receipt of the decision of the Tribunal on the question the trial court shall decide the suit or proceeding accepting the decision of the Tribunal on the question referred to it. While making a reference to the Tribunal mandatory the legislature cannot be said to have intended that even a patently frivolous, malafide and illegal plea of tenancy taken by a party merely to delay the proceeding and to remain in possession of the property is also to be referred to the Tribunal. The statutory provisions in our considered view, envisage a case where a bonafide and legally sustainable plea of tenancy is taken by the party, that question shall be referred to the Tribunal. It is of significance that in sub-section (6) of Section 125 a provision is made that the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it shall for the purposes of appeal be deemed to be a part of the finding of the civil court. It follows that while the trial court is to accept the decision of the Tribunal and base its decision in the suit or proceeding on the same no such constraint is placed on the Appellate Court while deciding the appeal arising from the suit or proceeding. Before the Appellate Court is open to the parties to challenge the finding recorded by the trial court on the basis of the decision of the Tribunal as any other finding. The Tribunal has been created as a special forum for adjudication of the question of status of a person who claims to be a tenant or Kudikidappukaran. The legislative scheme appears to be that at the trial stage adjudication on the question should be confined to one forum &
i.e. the Tribunal and the civil court should not go into the very same question again after the decision of the Tribunal is received by it. xxxxxxx
23. The civil court can consider whether the plea
raised by the party that he is a tenant or a Kudikidappukaran is a bonafide contention. If there is not even a remote possibility of the said plea being upheld by the Land Tribunal the civil court can conclude that the question does not reasonably arise in the case. Such an unreasonable plea would be raised with the idea to procrastinate or prolong the litigation. Civil court cannot afford to aid such sinister tactics.
24. It has been contended before us that in the light of
the decision of this Court in Sankaranarayanan Potti (dead) by L.Rs v. K.Sreedevi and Ors, [1998] 3 SCC 751 the civil court has no other alternative than to refer the question if a party has raised the contention that he is a tenant or a Kudikidappukaran. A reading of the said decision does not show that this Court has taken such an extreme position. That apart the scope of the word "arises" in Section 125(3) of the Act was not a point which arose for consideration in the said decision. There is nothing in that decision to suggest anything contrary to the legal position adumbrated above. Hence we reiterate that a civil court is not obliged to make a reference to the Land Tribunal as per Section 125(3) of the Act merely because a party has raised a contention that he is a tenant or a Kudkidappukaran, and the civil court has power to consider whether such contention has been raised without any legal foundation or with the only intention to gain time by protracting the litigation.
25. If the civil court is of opinion that there is not
even a remote possibility of the plea being upheld the court can proceed to dispose of the suit without resorting to the circumlocuted route via the Land Tribunal.” &
18. In Paravur Puttingal Devaswom (supra), this Court has held as follows:- “14. The tendency to refer disputes under Section 125(3) of the Act on untenable contentions has been viewed with disfavour by this Court on earlier occasions.
15. A Full Bench of this Court in E.Keshava Bhat v.
Subraya Bhat observed that unless the question of tenancy actually arises for consideration, there is no obligation under Section 125 (3) to make a reference to
the Land Tribunal. The mere incorporation of an unnecessary irrelevant plea of tenancy into the written statement which has no relation whatsoever to the material averments and reliefs sought in the plaint cannot attract the bar of Section 125(1) or the provisions of Section 125(3); so held in the aforesaid case. It was further held that a plain and simple suit for injunction is not liable to be referred to the Land Tribunal under Section 125(3) as in suits for injunction, the Court is concerned only with the question of possession, the nature and character of possession being immaterial. I do notice that the present suit is instituted by the petitioner for injunction.
16. A Division Bench of this Court in Sundaran v.
Mohammed Koya observed that the amplitude of the expression “arises” must be constricted to what genuinely arises in a case in view of the very unsatisfactory function of the present Land Tribunal system in Kerala. The Courts have to give a useful and practical interpretation to lessen the abuse of the legal requirement envisaged in Section 125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, it was held. Here, I would like to extract an observation made by Romer L.J.in Lee v. Showman's Guild of Great Britain at p.354 feeling reluctance to disturb the established state of the law or to deny to the subject access to the seat of justice. It reads:
“The proper tribunals for the determination of legal disputes in this country are the Courts and they are the only tribunals which, by training and experience and assisted by properly qualified advocates, are fitted for the task. I do not think that the present situation in Kerala is different from what is stated above.” &
19. Again in Govinda Panicker (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has held as follows: “12. The discussion above is only intended to indicate
that in interpreting S.125(3) of the Act, what is called for is a pragmatic approach and not an approach with the object of expanding the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal or unduly restricting the jurisdiction of the civil court. After all, the ouster of jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred. It is in this context that the question whether a plea for protection under S.106 of the Act has to be referred to the Land Tribunal for decision or not, has to be considered.
13. As far as we can see, the Act makes a distinction
between a tenancy and a lessee. The same is the position with S.74 of the Act which provides that after the commencement of the Act, no tenancy shall be created in respect of any land. The distinction becomes significant when we refer to the exemption contained in S.3(1) (iii) of the Act, which exempts from the purview of Chapter II of the Act, lease of land, or of buildings or of both, specifically granted for industrial or commercial purposes. It is in this context that one has also to note S.106 of the Act which speaks of a land being leased for a commercial or industrial purpose wherein a lessee had constructed buildings before the date referred to in that Section, as being entitled to be protected against eviction only. We have already noticed that a lessee entitled to protection under S.106 of the Act is not brought within the purview of the definition of a tenant occurring in S.2(57) of the Act by inclusion. We have also noticed that S.106 was not really a measure of agrarian reform. If one were to read in this context S.125(1) and 125(3) of the Act, it is quite possible to say that a claim for protection under S.106 of the Act by a person in a suit filed in a civil court, need not be referred to a Land Tribunal for decision, since there is no ouster of jurisdiction of the civil court, namely the trial Court, regarding the question. S.125(1) merely provides that the civil court shall not have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act, required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Land Tribunal. It may now be useful to quote S.125(3) of the Act:- &
“If in any suit or other proceeding any question regarding
rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran (including a question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran) arises, the civil court shall stay the suit or other proceeding and refer such question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situate together with the relevant records for the decision of that question only”.
S.125(3) only speaks of a question regarding the rights of
a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran. We have already noticed that a lessee seeking protection under S.106 of the Act is not a tenant by description. He is also not a person on whom any right is conferred by S.13 or S.72 and 72B of the Act. In fact, the transaction in his favour is one which is exempted from the operation of Chapter II of the Act by S.3(1)(iii) of the Act. Prima facie, therefore it appears that the question whether a lessee of land is entitled to protection of S.106 of the Act need not be referred to a Land Tribunal for decision.”
20. On an analysis of the law on the point and
the binding decisions referred above, it is abundantly clear that a court is under no obligation to make a reference to the Land Tribunal under Section 125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act on the mere incorporation of a plea of tenancy in the written statement which has no relationship whatsoever with the averments and reliefs sought for in the suit.
21. The dispute in the present case stands
narrowed down to the interpretation of Ext.P1 registered lease deed, to examine whether the lease & falls within the fold of Section 3(1) Explanation (iii) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
22. Section 3(1) Explanation (iii) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act reads as follows: “3. Exemptions:- (1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to- Explanation:-xxx xxx xxx
(i) xxxx
(ii) xxxx
(iii) leases of land or of buildings or of both specifically granted for industrial or commercial purposes; or”
23. The above extracted provision clearly states, if the lease of land or a building is for an industrial or commercial purposes, the land or building will be exempted from the purview of the Act.
24. Ext.P1 lease deed unambiguously states that
the plaint schedule property, having an extent of 10 cents of land, was leased out by late Padmanabhan Nair to the 1 respondent - Society for the purpose of st starting a 'bone-meal’ factory.
25. Meriam Webster's dictionary defines 'bone-
meal' as crushed or ground bone used especially as & fertiliser or feed. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines 'bone-meal' as a substance made from crushed animal bones which is used to make soil richer.
26. In Subharaj & Co. v. Collector of Central
Excise [(1997) 10 SCC 405], the Honourable Supreme Court, while interpreting the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, held that bone-meal is manufactured by breaking and crushing raw animal bones in a mechanical device called disintegrator.
27. On a consideration of recitals in Ext.P1 lease
deed and the fact that ‘bone-meal’ is made through a manufacturing process; this Court has no doubt that the property was leased out for an industrial purpose, which does not fall within the purview of the Act. Now, for deciding this issue, there is no necessity to refer the matter to the Land Tribunal because there is not even a remote possibility that the plea of the 1 st respondent, that it is a cultivating tenant, being & upheld by the Land Tribunal. Thus, I hold that the plea raised by the 1 respondent is not bona fide and is st alleged with the sole intention to protract the determination of the suit.
28. In the above factual and legal analysis, this
Court holds that the orders of the court below and the Appellate Authority are erroneous and unsustainable in law. The court below shall decide the suit in accordance with law. In the result, in exercise of the supervisory powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I dispose of the cases in the following manner:
(i) CRP (LR) No.14/2020 is allowed by setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority in A.A.73/2016 to the extent of remitting the matter back to the Land Tribunal. &
(ii) A.A.No.73/2016 is allowed, and the order in SMP No.75/1990 of the Land Tribunal, Kuthuparamba, is set aside.
(iii) O.P(C)No.1063/2020 is allowed by setting aside Ext.P4 order passed by the Court of the Munsiff, Kuthuparamba.
(iv) The Court of the Munsiff, Kuthuparamba, is directed to consider and dispose of O.S.No.14/2019, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.
(v) The parties shall bear their respective costs.
ma/30.8.2022 Sd/-C.S.DIAS, JUDGE & APPENDIX OF OP(C) 1063/2020 PETITIONER EXHIBITS EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF EXHIBIT A1 LEASED DEED EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED BY APPELLATE AUTHORITY (LR), KANNUR DATED 7.3.2018. EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THIS HONOURABLE COURT IN OP(C)3291/2019 DATED 3.2.2020. EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE MUNSIFF COURT, KUTHUPARAMB DATED 19.3.2020.