Full Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.GIRISH FRIDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF JULY 2024 / 4TH SRAVANA, 1946 CRL.A NO. 487 OF 2019 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 12.09.2018 IN SC NO.760 OF 2017 OF
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT & SESSIONS COURT - II, NORTH PARAVUR APPELLANT/ACCUSED: BENU DAS AGED 35 YEARS, S/O BADAN DAS, KHARGRAM, DURGAPUR UTTAR MURSHIDABAD, WEST BENGAL PIN- 742147 C NO: 4345, CENTRAL PRISON VIYYUR, THRISSUR- 10 BY ADV ANANDAN PILLAI RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT: STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, OTHER PRESENT: SRI. ALEX M THOMBRA, SR. PP THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 26.07.2024, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :2:
JUDGMENT
Raja Vijayaraghavan, J.
The above appeal is preferred by the accused in S.C.No.760 of 2017 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge -II, North Paravur. In the above case, the appellant was charge-sheeted for having committed the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.
2. Short facts: The deceased, Asok Patra, a resident of Orissa, worked as a machine
operator at the Golf Club attached to the Cochin International Airport. He used to supply workers for carrying out incidental work at the Golf Club. The accused, Benu Basu, hails from West Bengal. The prosecution alleges that Asok Patra owed the accused some wages, and there was some delay in payment. On having dinner, the accused is alleged to have entered the room armed with a heavy threaded iron rod and inflicted a fatal blow on his head causing severe head injuries. Asok Patra died shortly thereafter. Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :3:
3. Registration of the crime and investigation: Based on information furnished by one Shaju (PW1) at 1.40 a.m. on
17.4.2017, Crime No. 544 of 2017 of the Nedumbassery Police Station was registered under Section 302 of the IPC. PW14 arrived at the scene at 9.30 a.m. and conducted the inquest. He secured the services of the Scientific Officer, Fingerprint Expert, and Photographer for obtaining trace evidence. The accused was arrested at 3:30 p.m, at the Bus stop while he was allegedly attempting to flee from the place. The clothes worn by him were seized as per Ext.P11 Mahazar. After completion of the investigation, the final report was laid before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Angamaly.
4. Proceedings before court: After complying with the procedure, the Judicial First Class Magistrate
Court, Angamaly, committed the case to the Court of Session. The case was made over to the Additional Sessions Judge-II, N. Paravur for trial. After hearing both sides, the learned Sessions Judge framed the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried.
5. Evidence tendered during trial:
The prosecution examined PWs 1 to 15 to prove its case. Exts.P1 to P19 were exhibited and marked. MOs 1 to 6 were produced and identified. After the Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :4:
close of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials arising out of the prosecution evidence were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. He denied all the incriminating circumstances brought against him and maintained his innocence. On finding that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 of the Cr.P.C., he was called upon to enter his defence. However, no evidence was adduced by the defence.
6. Findings of the learned Sessions Judge: The learned Sessions Judge, after evaluating the evidence of prosecution
witnesses, concluded that the evidence let in by the prosecution established beyond any semblance of doubt that the accused inflicted the fatal blow and caused the death of the deceased. Accordingly, the accused was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- under Section 302 of the IPC. In default of payment of fine, the appellant was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.
7. The contention of the appellant: Sri. Anandan Pillai, the learned counsel appearing for the accused, submitted that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the presence or involvement of the accused. He criticized the learned Sessions Judge for placing Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :5:
implicit reliance on the evidence of PW2, who was projected as an eyewitness. It is urged that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses were discrepant in material particulars. The true facts were also not placed before the Sessions Court. The investigation conducted in this case is flawed, the benefit of which had to be extended to the accused. Finally, the learned counsel submits that under no circumstances would the alleged offence committed by the accused attract the charge under Section 302 of the IPC. At the most, the appellant could be attributed with the knowledge that the injury inflicted was likely to cause death, warranting a lesser punishment.
8. Submissions of the learned Public Prosecutor: Sri. Alex M. Thombra, the learned Public Prosecutor, submitted that the
evidence tendered by PW2 was credible, as he was a resident of the building where the incident occurred. It is further submitted that other witnesses have also testified to the presence of the accused in the room and his possession of the offending weapon. The forensic analysis revealed the presence of human blood on the trousers and T-shirt of the accused and it matched the blood group of the deceased. Another circumstance stated by the learned Public Prosecutor is that immediately after the incident, the accused attempted to flee and was arrested at the bus stop. The inquest report indicated that the deceased had rice in his mouth and hand at the time when he was inflicted the blow, revealing that
Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :6: he was in a helpless condition and did not expect to be attacked in such a cruel fashion. A. Whether the death of Asok Patra was a case of homicide? a. PW9 is the District Police Surgeon, Ernakulam, who had conducted Ext.P4 postmortem examination of the deceased Asok Patra on 20.4.2017. At the time of examination, he had noted four antemortem injuries, which are the following:
1. Laceration horizontally 6 cm x 1 cm bone deep on the back of
heard, crossing midline and 3 cm below occiput. Underneath scalp was contused. Under this injury, skull showed depressed comminuted fracture over an area of 5 cm x 3 cm. Entre brain had shown bleeding.
2. Laceration of 5cm x 3 cm on forehead crossing midline. Underneath scalp was contused.
3. Contused abrasions 6 cm x 4 cm on back of neck.
4. Contused abrasion 4 cm x 3 cm over left arm outer aspect, 12
cm below top of shoulder. The doctor stated that injury No. 1 is a fatal injury and the same would inevitably result in death. He added that the said injury will cause death in the ordinary of nature and that MO1 weapon can be used to cause such an injury. In cross-examination, he stated that it Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :7: is quite unlikely that timely treatment would have saved the life of the injured. In view of the emphatic evidence let in by the prosecution, there cannot be any doubt that Asok Patra’s death was a case of homicide.
9. The prosecution evidence:
a) The records disclose that PWs 2, 6, 7 and the accused are migrant laborers. The learned Sessions Judge had utilized the services of translators while examining witnesses and during trial at appropriate stages. There is no case for the accused that any prejudice was caused to him or that there was any violation of procedure.
b) Shaju (PW1) set the law in motion. According to him, he had been working as a Security Guard at the Golf Club attached to the Cochin International Airport. Asok Patra was a machine operator and he also used to supply employees. On 16.4.2017, he was called over the phone by Sabu Thomas (PW3), the Administrator of the Golf Club and he was told to enquire about the incident that had occurred at the Golf Club. When he reached the Golf Club, he met the guard Babu Jose. At that point of time, Sapan (PW6) and six other employees approached him and he was told that the accused had murdered Asok Patra by striking him with an iron rod. He immediately called up Sabu Thomas and informed him what
Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :8:
he had heard. Later, he went to the Nedumbassery Police Station and lodged information based on which, the crime was registered. His version was supported by Sabu Thomas (PW3), who stated that he had acquaintance with the deceased for over 5 years and he used to supply employees. The accused was also a person known to him. He stated that the accused, Pradeep (PW2), Sapan (PW6), Kalicharan (PW7), Umesh, Anand, Utham and Somnath were workers of the Golf Club. He stated that he was called over the phone at about 9.45 p.m. and he was told that Asok Patra had been murdered. He asked the security personnel to enquire about the same. However, he stated that he had no direct knowledge as regards the incident.
c) Pradeep (PW2) entered the box and stated that he was hailing from West Bengal and had been working in the Golf Club near the Cochin International Airport at Nedumbassery. He was employed as a grass cutter in the Golf Club. According to him, Sapan, Kalicharan, Umesh, Utham, Anand, and the accused were staying in the same building. It was Asok Patra, who had brought them from their native State and provided them with employment and boarding facilities. However, Asok Patra was residing in another house. He stated that at about 7.30 p.m., on 16.4.2017, a dispute erupted between Asok Patra and the accused in connection with non-payment of wages. PW2 as well as Somnath
Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :9:
intervened and separated them. Thereafter, the witness went back to his room. He stated that the accused, who was with him in the same room, kept murmuring about the amounts due to him from the deceased. While so, the accused abruptly got up and left the room. Immediately thereafter, he heard a hue and cry. He rushed to the place and saw the accused, hitting Asok Patra on his head with MO1 iron rod. On hearing the commotion, Sapan and the others residing in the same building rushed to the room. They found that Asok Patra stopped breathing by then and had died. He also stated that the accused was wearing a Banian and shorts while inflicting the injuries He identified the said Banian and Bermuda as MOs 4 and 5. He identified the clothes that were worn by Asok Patra. In his cross-examination, it was brought out that Asok Patra was staying alone. He reiterated that he had seen the accused beating the deceased with the iron rod. He denied that Asok Patra was a friend and stated that he was his contractor.
d) PW4 is a security guard who stated that he was having acquaintance with the deceased, the accused, and other witnesses and that he had heard that Asok Patra was murdered. PW5 is a contractor who availed the services of Asok Patra to get employees from out of State. He identified the accused and stated that he was brought by the deceased for employment. The wages were being directly paid to Asok Patra.
Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :10:
e) PW6 is one Sapan. His presence is corroborated by PW2. In his testimony, Sapan stated that he is a resident of Purulia in West Bengal and had been working in Kerala for the past nine months. He stated that Asok Patra was his contractor, and Beny Das, the accused, was his co-worker. Sapan and eight others including the accused, Pradeep (PW2), Umesh, Kalicharan, Utham and Anand stayed in an accommodation provided by Asok Patra. On 16.4.2017, at about 7.30 p.m., there occurred a scuffle between the accused and the deceased. Somnath and PW2 intervened and separated them. Asok Patra left the place and at about 8.15 p.m. he returned back to the room. He requested Kalicharan (PW7) to serve him food. Kalicharan took Asok Patra to a nearby room, served him food, and while Kalicharan was washing plates, he heard Asok Patra scream. He rushed to the room and found that Asok Patra was lying on the ground with an injury on his head and the accused was standing nearby with an iron rod in his hand. He noticed that there was food in the hand and mouth of Asok Patra. After confirming that Asok Patra was no more, the accused left the building. When they realized that Asok Patra was no more, they took their belongings and went to the security. He identified the weapon which was seen in the hands of the accused. The clothes worn by the accused and the deceased were also identified. During cross-examination, he stated that he had no occasion to witness the
Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :11: infliction of injury by the accused. He also mentioned that when the manager arrived, PW2 stated that Asok Patra had been murdered.
f) Kalicharan (PW7) is another employee of the Golf Club. He stated that the deceased was his employer. He was also residing in the same building as PWs 2 and 6. He spoke about the quarrel between Asok Patra and the accused at 7.30 p.m, on the date of the incident. According to him, at about 8.15 p.m. Asok Patra returned to the house and asked him to serve food. He served food and later he had gone out to wash the plates of other inmates, while Asok Patra was having his food in a room adjacent to the kitchen. Later, after washing the plates, when he returned, he found that Asok Patra was lying in the room with bleeding from the back of his head. He stated that PW2 (Pradeep), Somnath and Sapan (PW6) were also present there. However, he stated that the accused was not present there. As he did not support the case of the prosecution, the prosecutor requested the court to put leading questions, and the same was permitted. He denied that he had given a statement to the police that the accused had stood there with an iron rod in his hand.
g) Another witness of some relevance is PW13, the Scientific Assistant attached to the DCRB, Ernakulam. He spoke about samples of blood seized from the scene of crime. PW14 is the Sub Inspector of Police Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :12: Nedumbasserry Police Station, who recorded the FI statement and registered the crime.
h) PW15 is the Circle Inspector of Police Nedumbasserry who conducted the investigation. He stated that he took over the investigation at 9.30 am. He ensured the presence of the scientific experts and conducted the inquest. Samples were taken from the scene for forensic examination. The clothes worn by the deceased were seized. The body was sent for autopsy. At 3.30 pm on the same day, the accused was arrested. At the time of arrest, the accused stated that the clothes that he was wearing were the clothes that he had worn at the time of the incident. The clothes of the accused were also seized. In cross-examination, he stated that the accused was initially kept under surveillance and the arrest was recorded much later. He admitted that the register of employees of Ashok Patra was not seized by him.
i) Ext.P19 is the report received from the Forensic Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram, which was forwarded to the court by the Director of the FSL. The blood collected from the deceased by PW9 was tested and the same was found to be of ‘A’ group. The same group of blood was detected from MO5 Bermuda worn by the accused and MO1 iron rod. The blood group of the accused was ‘B’.
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10. Our evaluation:
a) We have carefully evaluated the evidence of PWs2, 6 and 7. PW2 is a coworker of the accused and was in the same room as the accused immediately prior to the incident. He rushed to the scene of crime hearing the commotion and had occasion to witness the gruesome act committed by the accused. His presence in the room is not disputed. No contention is advanced before us to doubt his version before court. However, it was argued that it is unsafe to convict the accused on the basis of the evidence of a solitary eyewitness. The learned counsel added that none except PW2 had witnessed the incident though admittedly numerous others are residing in the same building. b) The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and
(iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two
categories, there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of a single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness. (See: Vadivelu Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :14:
Thevar v. The State of Madras1). c) It is also settled law that corroboration is not a rule of law, but one of caution as an assurance. The conviction could be made based on the testimony of a solitary witness. The occasion for the presence of the witness at the time of occurrence, the opportunity to witness the crime, the normal conduct of the witness after the incident, the nearness of the witness to the victim, and his predisposition towards the accused, are some of the circumstances to be kept in view to weigh and accept the ocular evidence of a witness. It is not the quantum of the evidence but the quality and credibility of the witness that lends assurance to the court for acceptance. (See Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab2). Having considered the evidence of PW2 from all perspectives, we have no hesitation to conclude that PW2 is a witness of truth and inspires us to believe his evidence. d) We also find that PW2 had spoken about the presence of Sapan in the same room immediately after the injury was inflicted. Though Sapan did not witness the act committed by the accused, he stated that when he entered the room, he found the accused standing with the murder weapon and the deceased lying on the floor in a pool of blood. Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act speaks about relevancy of facts forming part of [AIR 1957 SC 614)
(1991) 4 SCC 341) Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :15:
the same transaction. It states that facts, which, though not in issue, are so connected with the facts in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places. Sir Taylor in his treatise on the Evidence Act, speaks about res gestae, the essence of which finds a place in Section 6 of the Evidence Act. The learned author has stated that res gestae, may broadly be defined as a matter incidental to the main act and explanatory of it including acts and words which are so closely interconnected therewith so as to constitute a part of the same transaction and without the knowledge of which the fact might not be properly understood. They are events themselves speaking through the
instructive words and acts of the participants, the circumstances, facts
and declarations, which grow out of the main fact that are contemporaneous with it and serve to illustrate its character. (See CD Field’s Commentary on Law of Evidence, 13th Edn.). There cannot be any doubt that both the acts as are done and the words which are spoken are relevant. This is plainly clear from words “whatever was said or done”. In the instant case, the presence of the accused in the room holding the weapon of offence and the deceased lying injured on the floor as witnessed by Sapan are all circumstances so intertwined with each other by the proximity of time and space that they become part of the same
Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :16: transaction. Hence that portion of the evidence tendered by PW6 is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. The above evidence would lend corroboration to the evidence tendered by PW2. Kalicharan
(PW7) also spoke about the presence of the deceased and the accused
though he resiled from his earlier version before the police and did not support the prosecution. e) Another strong corroborative piece of evidence linking the accused with the crime is the scientific evidence adduced by the prosecution. The blood group of the deceased was Group ‘A’ and the same blood was found in the Bermuda shorts of the accused and the weapon of offence. A strand of human hair was also found in MO1. PW2 stated that the accused threw away the weapon when he left the place, which was later seized by the police. f) In view of the above clinching pieces of evidence, we find that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that it was the appellant who had inflicted fatal blows on the head of the deceased with a heavy iron rod and caused his instantaneous death. g) A valiant attempt was made by the learned counsel to persuade us to hold that the offence committed will attract the punishment under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and not murder as defined under Section 300 of the IPC. Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :17:
h) The Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Another3 has delineated the principles to be borne in mind when the court is confronted with the question of whether the offence is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. After referring to Virsa Singh v State of Punjab4, the locus classicus, it was
held as follows:
“21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is “murder” or “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, on the
facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem
in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such a causal connection between the act of the accused and the death leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300 of the Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of “murder” contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the
(1976) 4 SCC 382 [(1958) SCR 1495] Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :18:
second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the first part of Section 304, of the Penal Code.” i) In Anpazhagan v State Represented by the Inspector of Police5, the Apex Court, after having surveyed all the past precedents have summed up the principles as under:
(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence
the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate:‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused 2023 SCC Online SC 857
Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :19: and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall
within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls
within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :20: clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was
intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of
cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case
Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :21: within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from
more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the
IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :22:
ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable
homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death
of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the
facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the
intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty Crl.A. No. 487 of 2019 :23:
intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. j) In the case on hand, we find that the accused had attacked the deceased while he was sitting on the floor and about to have his dinner. The inquest shows that he had food in his hand and mouth. He was in a helpless state and never expected to be attacked by a deadly weapon. We find that the weapon used by the accused is a heavy iron rod and the injuries inflicted were on the back side of the head and the forehead. The appellant having inflicted the injuries as is described in Ext. P4 Postmortem Certificate can safely be assumed to have intended to cause the death of the deceased. Under clause firstly of Section 300 of the IPC or for that matter, clause thirdly of Section 300, the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC is thus clearly established. The Doctor has also opined that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
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11. Our conclusion:
We are, in the above circumstances, satisfied that the verdict of guilt, conviction, and sentence imposed on the appellant by the learned Sessions Judge does not warrant any interference. This appeal is dismissed. Sd/- RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V, JUDGE Sd/- G. GIRISH, JUDGE PS/26/7/24