Full Judgment
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 29.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 04.05.2026
+ CRL.A. 35/2018
STATE .....Appellant Through: Mr. Utkarsh, APP for the State with PSI Manjeet Dhaka, PS Seelampur.
versus
GANGA SHARAN .....Respondent Through: Mr. Archit Upadhayay, Advocate (DHCLSC) with respondent in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
JUDGMENT
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.
1. In this appeal filed under Section 378 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Cr.P.C.), the respondent/State in
Sessions Case No. 556 of 2009 on the file of the Metropolitan
Magistrate, North East District, Karkardooma Court, Delhi, assails
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the judgment dated 05.10.2013 as per which the sole accused has
been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 279 and
304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
2. The prosecution case is that on 04.12.1995 at 09:00 PM
at G.T Road, Opposite Gurudwara New Seelampur, the accused
drove truck bearing registration no. UP-15D-9150 in a rash and
negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal safety
and knocked down one Pawan Kumar Jaiswal who was riding a
two-wheeler. When the rider fell on the road, the accused is
alleged to have caused his death by running the truck over his
head. Hence, as per the charge-sheet/final report, the accused was
alleged to have committed the offences punishable under Sections
279, 304A IPC and Section 134 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
(the MV Act).
3. On the basis of Ext. PW3/A FIS/FIR of PW3, given on
04.12.1998, crime no. 709/1999, Seelampur Police Station, was
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registered for commission of offences punishable under Sections
299 and 304A IPC by Kamal Kishore, Sub-Inspector (SI). The
said SI, conducted investigation into the crime and on completion
of the same, filed the charge-sheet/final report alleging the
commission of the offences punishable under the aforementioned
Sections.
4. When the accused was produced before the trial court,
all the copies of the prosecution records were furnished to him, as
contemplated under Section 207 Cr.P.C. The particulars of the
offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A IPC as
contemplated under Section 251 Cr.P.C., was read over and
explained to the accused, to which he pleaded not guilty.
5. On behalf of the prosecution, PWs. 1 to 6 were
examined and Exts. PW2/A-D, PW3/A-E, PW4/A-C, PW6/A-B,
and Mark X were marked in support of the case.
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6. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused
was questioned under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. regarding the
incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence
of the prosecution. The accused denied all those circumstances and
maintained his innocence.
7. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced by the
accused.
8. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary
evidence on record, and after hearing both sides, the trial court,
vide the impugned judgement dated 05.10.2015, acquitted the
accused under Section 255(1) Cr.P.C. of the offences punishable
under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. Aggrieved, the
respondent/State has come up in appeal.
9. It was submitted by the learned Additional Public
Prosecutor that the impugned judgment is contrary to the facts and
circumstances of the case. The incident took place in a crowded
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area, which clearly indicates that the accused was under a duty to
exercise a high degree of caution while driving. However, the
materials on record show that the vehicle was being driven in a
rash and negligent manner. It is further submitted that even after
realising that the truck had hit the scooter, the accused failed to
stop the vehicle, which led to the victim being run over by the
truck. Therefore, he submitted that the impugned judgment of
acquittal be set aside, and the accused be convicted in accordance
with the law.
10. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent/accused that there is no infirmity in the impugned
judgment calling for an interference by this Court.
11. Heard both sides and perused the records.
12. The only point that arises for consideration in the
present appeal is whether there is any infirmity in the impugned
judgment calling for an interference by this Court.
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13. I make a brief reference to the oral and documentary
evidence relied on by the prosecution in support of the case. Ext.
3/A, the FIS/FIR of PW3 reads thus “…Today, I was standing at
the Seelampur Bus Stand opposite Gurudwara waiting for a bus.
At around 9:00 PM, a truck (dumper) bearing registration no. UP-
15 D-9150 came from the direction of Shastri Park, being driven
by its driver in a very negligent and high-speed manner. On G.T.
Road, opposite the Gurudwara, the truck hit a scooter bearing
registration number DEB-2618. The scooter rider fell down along
with his scooter. The truck driver then ran the front left wheel of
the truck over the scooter rider's chest. The scooter rider died on
the spot. The truck driver stopped the truck near the bus stand, got
out, and fled the scene. When I looked at the deceased, I realised
he was my cousin (maternal aunt's son), Pawan Kumar son oflate
Shri Ramphal, a resident of Maujpur. Someone called the PCR. I
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can identify the truck driver if brought before me. Legal action be
taken against the truck driver…”
14. PW3, when examined, deposed that the incident took
place on 04.12.1999. On the said day, he was returning home from
his office in a bus. He deboarded the bus at the Seelampur bus
stand to change the bus for going to Yamuna Vihar. While he was
waiting for the bus at the Seelampur bus stop, a truck bearing
registration number UP-9150 came at a very high speed. He was
unable to recall the registration number of the vehicle. A scooter
bearing registration number 2618, driven by his brother Pawan
Kumar, was moving ahead of the truck. The left side of the truck
hit the scooter, as a result of which his brother fell onto the road
and was crushed under the back tyre of the said truck. The truck
driver fled from the spot. Someone from the public called the
police. The police arrived at the spot, and the injured was taken to
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the hospital. His brother thereafter succumbed to the injuries
sustained.
14.1. During the examination-in-chief of PW3, the
prosecutor is seen to have requested permission of the trial court to
“cross-examine” him. The permission is seen to have been granted
by the trial court. On further examination by the prosecutor, PW3
deposed that the accused was driving the truck roughly and at high
speed. On being asked by the Court as to what he meant by “rough
manner,” PW3answeredthat the truck was being driven at a very
high speed. According to PW3, the registration number of the
truck driven by the accused is UP-15D-9150.
14.2. PW3 in his cross-examination deposed that the
deceased was wearing a helmet that broke in the accident. The
police officials informed him that his brother had expired on the
spot and therefore, he did not accompany his brother to the
hospital. The accident had taken place at about 10:30 PM. He had
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seen the truck from a distance of about 15 to 20 meters. There was
no fog on the date of the incident. He denied the suggestion that
construction of a flyover was underway at the scene of the
accident. PW3 admitted that several jhuggies, tea shops, and an
auto stand were there near the scene of the accident. PW3 denied
the suggestion that he was not present at the spot of the accident
and had merely visited the police station, and that, on the
instructions of the police officials, has falsely implicated the
accused.
15. PW2, the registered owner of truck no. UP15D-8150,
deposed that Ext. PW2/A notice under Section 133 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (the MV Act)was served on him by the police,
to which he replied that it was the accused who was driving the
truck at the relevant time.
16. Section 279 IPC deals with the offence of rash driving
or riding on a public way. It says that whoever drives or rides any
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vehicle on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to
endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any
person, commits the offence under this Section.
17. The offence under Section 304A IPC is attracted when
death of any person is caused by doing any rash or negligent act
not amounting to culpable homicide. To bring a case of homicide
under Section 304A IPC, the following conditions must exist,
namely, (i) there must be death of the person in question; (ii) the
accused must have caused such death; and (iii) that such act of the
accused was rash or negligent and that it does not amount to
culpable homicide. The section deals with homicidal death by rash
or negligent act.
18. In Naresh Giri v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 1
SCC 791, it has been held that Section 304A IPC applies to cases
where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that
the act done in all probability will cause death. The provision is
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directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC.
Section 304A IPC applies only to such acts which are rash and
negligent and are directly the cause of the death of another person.
Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section
304A IPC.
19. The criminality as far as rash acts are concerned, lies in
running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or
indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence occurs
when there is gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise the
required care and precaution to guard against injury, either to the
public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having
regard to all the circumstances, was the imperative duty of the
accused person to have adopted. In other words, negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon
the considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
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affairs, would do, or, the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.
20. Coming to the facts of the case on hand, PW3, the
eyewitness, deposed that the accused was driving the truck in a
rough manner. On being asked the meaning of rough manner, PW3
answered that the truck was being driven at a very high speed. As
held in State of Karnataka v. Satish (1998) 8 SCC 493, there can
be no doubt that vehicles are intended to be driven in speed.
Merely because the vehicle is being driven at a high speed does not
show that the driver was rash or negligent by itself. “High speed”
or “over speed” as it is often referred to, is a relative term. It is for
the prosecution to bring on record materials to establish as to what
is meant by “high speed” in the facts and circumstances of the
case. In a criminal trial, the burden of proving everything essential
to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests
on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in
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favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is
not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions.
In the absence of any material-on-record, no presumption of
“rashness” or “negligence” could be drawn against the accused by
invoking the maxim “res ipsa loquitur”.
21. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted
that both the vehicles were proceeding in the same direction from
west to east, and the truck while trying to overtake the scooter
driven by the deceased, knocked down the scooter as a result of
which the deceased fell down and the back tyre of the truck ran
over his head causing instant death. There is absolutely no
materials on record such as the width of the road or whether the
road at the time of the incident was crowded or not. Ext. Mark X
site plan refers to point ‘A’ as to the place where the incident took
place. However, the site plan is silent regarding the width of the
road, the position of the vehicles at the time of the incident,
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whether the accused was on the wrong side, what was the amount
of traffic at the relevant time. Therefore, evidence is lacking to
prove rashness or negligence as contemplated under Sections 279
and 304A IPC.
22. Further, the prosecution relies on the reply, that is, Ext.
PW2/A given by PW2 in reply to the notice given by the police
under Section 133 of the MV Act. This is apparently a statement
given in writing by PW2, a witness, during the course of
investigation to the police and hence a statement under Section 161
Cr.P.C and so the bar under the proviso to Section 162 Cr.P.C. is
applicable. It is true that PW3 has identified the accused as the
driver of the offending vehicle. But as stated earlier, even
accepting the prosecution case of the accused having driven the
truck, the materials on record are not sufficient to bring home his
guilt for the offences charged against him.
23. In the result, the appeal sans merit is dismissed.
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24. Application(s), if any, pending, shall stand closed.
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
(JUDGE)
MAY 04, 2026
kd/p’ma/rs
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