Full Judgment
The appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Quebec (Montréal), Number 500-10-004943-112, 2013 QCCA 671 (Can LII), 2013 QCCA 671, dated April 11, 2013, was heard on January 21, 2014, and the Court on that day delivered the following judgment orally:
[translation]
The Chief Justice”
We all agree, essentially for the reasons given by Doyon J.A. of the Quebec Court of Appeal, that this appeal should be dismissed. However, we would also like to stress the extraordinary and unique nature of the circumstances faced by Brunton J. of the Superior Court as a result of the proceedings brought against the accused by the Crown.
The cumulative effects of those circumstances justified Brunton J.s significant intervention in matters usually left to the discretion of the prosecution, namely the selection of the charges and the prioritization of the order in which they would proceed. The direct indictment before the judge at first instance set out 29 counts involving more than 150 accused. It also contained a number of counts that could not lawfully be included in it. This direct indictment, as preferred by the Crown, did not lend itself to a trial, and it gave rise to serious challenges with respect to disclosure of the evidence to the accused. Furthermore, the prosecution did not have a realistic plan for taking those charges to trial and conducting the trial within a reasonable time.As Doyon J.A. mentioned at paragraph 60 of his reasons, Brunton J. had observed that [translation] œthe prosecution had been making things up as it went along and had shown a flagrant lack of preparation, analysis and foresight in managing the case? 2013 QCCA 671 (Can LII), (2013 QCCA 671, [2013] R.J.Q. 608). The unique nature of these extraordinary circumstances satisfies us that the approach taken by the trial judge was the right one in this case. In light of these circumstances, and of the ones referred to by Brunton J. in his reasons and by the majority of the Court of Appeal in theirs, we agree with the latter that Brunton J. did not err in exercising his discretion in this case. He exercised it to protect the rights of the accused guaranteed by the Charter, and to further the publics interest in avoiding the total collapse of the prosecution that could have been caused by unreasonable delays.