Full Judgment
$-6 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI DECIDED ON :
20. h FEBRUARY, 2014 + CRL.A. 1285/2012 MOHD. SAHID ..... Appellant Through : Mr.Sunil Upadhyay, Advocate. versus THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI Through : ..... Respondent Mr.M.N.Dudeja, APP. Complainant in person. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P.GARG S.P.Garg, J.
(Open Court) 1. Mohd. Sahid (the appellant) was convicted under Section 307 IPC by a judgment dated 27.09.2012 of learned Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No.77/11 arising out of FIR No.35/11 PS Ranjit Nagar registered under Section 307 IPC. By an order dated 28.09.2012 he was sentenced to undergo RI for seven years with fine ` 50,000/-.
2. During the course of hearing of the appeal, the appellant gave up challenge to the findings on conviction and prayed to modify the sentence order. It was pointed out by the appellant’s counsel that the victim has settled the dispute with the appellant and he has no objection to release him for the period already undergone. Earlier Crl.M.A.No.8086/2013 was moved under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the proceedings. Since the offence under Section 307 IPC was noncompoundable the application was dismissed by an order dated 20.05.2013 with the observation that the factum of settlement will be considered at the time of disposal of the appeal on merits and to consider the quantum of sentence (if any). On 21.01.2014, the Investigating Officer was directed to verify if the matter has been settled by the complainant with his free consent. He was also directed to ensure the presence of the complainant before this Court. Today, the complainant has appeared and informed that he has settled the dispute with the appellant without any fear or pressure. He prays to release the appellant. On being specifically asked if he desired compensation to be paid by the appellant, he categorically stated that he did not need any compensation particularly when the appellant suffering from various ailments was physically incapable to generate any income. Learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has given no objection to modify the sentence order in view of the peculiar features of the case where the matter has been settled under Section 307 IPC.
3. Both the parties are closely related to each other. The appellant who is the nephew of the victim inflicted injuries to his maternal uncle. The injuries were opined ‘simple’ in nature. Nominal roll dated 14.02.2014 reveals that the appellant has undergone sentence for one year, six months and twenty days besides remission for four months and twenty one days as on 14.02.2014. He has clean antecedents and is not involved in any other criminal case. His jail conduct is satisfactory. The appellant was aged about 25 years on the day of incident. He is yet to marry and his mother is dependent upon him. The parties are residing in the same vicinity. He was granted bail during pendency of the trial after he remained in custody at the initial stage of investigation.
4. This Court in ‘Shahzad vs. State’, Crl.A. 358/2012, decided on 22.02.2013 observed :
“4. The offence punishable under Section 307 IPC in case hurt is caused to any person is punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment which may extend to ten years and fine. The Appellant has been sentenced to undergo RI for a period of five years and to pay fine of `1,000/- or in default to undergo SI for three months. As per the nominal roll received on 15.04.2012 the Appellant had already served imprisonment for five months and 22 days and had earned remission of one month and ten days. The period of another ten months has passed. Thus, inclusive of remission, the Appellant has been in custody for a period of about 17-18 months.
5. In Gian Singh v State of Punjab & Anr. 2012 (9) SCALE257 the three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of quashing of FIR in non compoundable offences. The Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for non compoundable offences can be quashed in appropriate cases except in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Para 57 of the report is extracted hereunder:
“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
6. In Ishwarsingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 15 SCC667 the question of compounding of offence under Section 307 IPC fell for consideration before the Supreme Court after the conviction of the accused by the Trial Court. The Supreme Court laid down that although the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC is non compoundable but, at the same time, the fact may be taken into consideration for the purpose of reduction of sentence. Paras 12, 13 and 16 of the report are 12. Now, it cannot be gainsaid that an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC is not a compoundable offence. Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 expressly states that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. At the same time, however, while dealing with such matters, this Court may take into account a relevant and important consideration about compromise between the parties for the purpose of reduction of sentence.
13. In Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2006) 9 SCC255 Murugesan v. Ganapathy Velar (2001) 10 SCC504and Ishwarlal v. State of M.P. (2008) 15 SCC671this Court, while taking into account the fact of compromise between the parties, reduced sentence imposed on the appellant-accused to already undergone, though the offences were not compoundable. But it was also stated that in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1990 Supp SCC681such offence was ordered to be compounded. x x x x x x x x x 16. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be partly allowed and is accordingly allowed by maintaining the conviction recorded by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court but by reducing the sentence already undergone by the appellant. The sentence of payment of fine is not disturbed. If the appellant has not paid the amount of fine, he will pay such amount within four weeks from today.”
7. Thus, relying on three Judge Bench decision in Gian Singh and the report in Ishwarsingh, I alter the sentence imposed upon the Appellant to the period already undergone by him. The fine imposed, if not, deposited shall be done so within two weeks.”
5. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence order is modified and the appellant is awarded RI for two years with fine ` 10,000/- and failing to pay the fine to undergo SI for one month.
6. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. Trial Court record be sent back forthwith. Copy of the order be sent to the Superintendent Jail for information. (S.P.GARG) JUDGE FEBRUARY20 2014 /tr