Full Judgment
INTHEHIGHCOURTOFJHARKHANDATRANCHI W.P.(S)No.502of2013 RakeshKumarGoswami Petitioner Versus 1.TheStateofJharkhand 2.Director,PrimaryEducation,Deptt.of HRD, GovernmentofJharkhand,Ranchi 3.Director,SecondaryEducation,Deptt.of HRD, Govt.ofJharkhand,Ranchi 4.DeputyCommissioner,Godda 5.DistrictSuperintendentofEducation,Godda 6.DistrictEducationOfficer,Godda 7.InChargeHeadMaster,HighSchool,Sarotia, Godda,Jharkhand Respondents CORAM :HON'BLEMR.JUSTICESHREECHANDRASHEKHAR ForthePetitioner :Mr.PradeepKumarVerma,Advocate FortheRespondents :M/s.AparajitaBhardwaj& AshishKr.Shekhar,J.C.toG.P.VI 4/18.07.2013 In the writ petition the petitioner has made the followingprayer: (i) Foradirectiontosetasidetheletterno.677(Law) dated 27/29.09.2012 issued by the Director, Primary Education whereby and whereunder she rejected the claim of the petitioner for officiating allowanceanddeputationallowance; (ii) for direction upon the respondents to pay the Officiatingallowancebecausepetitionerworkedas a High School Teacher instead of Primary School Teacher during the period 10.09.2005 to 06.09.2010 as per the lawful direction of the DistrictSuperintendentofEducation,Godda;& (iii) fordirectiontosetasidetherelievingorderdated 06.09.2010 issued by the Incharge Head Master, HighSchoolSarotiabecauseithasbeenissuedin 2 violation of direction issued vide letter no. 917 dated01.09.2010bytheDistrictEducationOfficer, Godda.
2. Thebrieffactsasstatedinthewritpetitionarethat,the petitioner was appointed as a Primary School Teacher. On 10.09.2005 in compliance of order dated 10.06.2005, the petitioner gave his joining in the High School, Sarotia. The petitionercontinuedtoworktheretillbyorderdated01.09.2010, hewasrelievedtojoinhisparentschool.Thepetitionermovedthis CourtinW.P.(S)No.2916of2012seekingadirectionuponthe respondentsforgrantofofficiatingallowancewhichwasdisposed ofwithadirectiontotherespondentstotreatthewritpetitionas representationofthepetitionerandtodecidetherepresentationby affordingopportunityofhearingtothepetitioner.Incomplianceof directiondated15.06.2012ofthisCourt,therepresentationofthe petitionerhasbeendecidedbyorderdated27/29.09.2012which has been impugned by the petitioner in the present writ proceeding.
3. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perusedthedocumentsonrecord. 4.. Mr.PradeepKumarVerma,learnedcounselappearing for the petitioner has raised a contention that order dated 10.06.2005 whereby, it has been ordered that the teachers who havebeenpostedondeputationintheHighSchoolwouldnotbe entitled for grant of deputation allowance, does not curtail the entitlement for officiating allowance. He submits that there is a distinction between officiating allowance and deputation allowance. Whathasbeenorderedinorderdated10.06.2005is that,thedeputationallowancewouldnotbepaidtotheteachers who have been posted on deputation as a High School Teacher however,ithasnotbeenprovidedinletterdated10.06.2005that such person would not be entitled for grant of any officiating allowance. Hesubmitsthatsincethepetitionerwaspostedona 3 higherpost,i.e.,astheteacherinaHighSchool,hewasholdinga higherpost,andtherefore,hewasentitledforgrantofofficiating allowanceintermsofRule90ofJharkhandServiceCode.Relying ontheprovisionascontainedinRule32oftheJharkhandService Code,hesubmitsthatthepetitionerinpursuanceoforderdated 10.06.2005was,infact,directedtoofficiateonahigherpost,and therefore,heiscoveredundertheprovisionascontainedinRule 32oftheJharkhandServiceCode.Hefurthersubmitsthatinany event, order dated 10.06.2005 is an executive instruction and it would not override the provisions as contained in Jharkhand Service Code which is statutory in nature. He relies on the decisions of theHon'ble SupremeCourt in the casesreported in (2004) 2 SCC 297.(2007) 2 SCC 491.(2009) 4 SCC 34.and (2009)13SCC90.
5. Percontra,Ms.AparajitaBhardwaj,learnedJ.C.toG.P. VI appearing for the respondents submits that the order dated 10.06.2005isspecificandithasbeenprovidedthattheteachers who would be posted on the vacant post in the High Schools, wouldnotbepaiddeputationallowance.Thepetitionerjoinedthe postintheHighSchoolon10.06.2005however,hefailedtoraise theclaimforofficiatingallowanceforaperiodofmorethan7years andforthefirsttimehemovedthisCourtinW.P.(S)No.2916of 2012 raising a claim for payment of subsistence allowance and therefore,hisclaimisbarredbyacquiescence. Shehassubmitted thatthepetitionerdoesnotfallunderthecategoryasmentionedin Rule 32 of the Jharkhand Service Code as, the order issued on 10.06.2005isnotanorderissuedbytheappointingauthorityof thepetitioner. ShehasfurthercontendedthatevenRule103of the Jharkhand Service Code is not attracted in the case of the petitioner, for the simple reason that for claiming subsistence allowance, a person is required to hold two posts, either substantivelyoronatemporarybasiswhichisnotthecasehere. ShereliesonthedecisionofHon'bleSupremeCourtinthecases 4 reportedin AIR 1967SC1910 and (1992)Supp.(1)SCC150, to contendthatsincethereisnoprovisionforpaymentofdeputation allowance in Jharkhand Service Code, the executive instruction issued under order dated 10.06.2005 would regulate the entitlementforgrantofdeputationallowanceinthepresentcase anditcannotbeheldillegal.Shehaspointedoutthatinfactthe provisioncontainedinBiharStateNationalisedElementarySchool Teacher(TransferandDisciplinaryAction)Rule,1994clearlybars theclaimofthepetitioner.
6. A perusal of the documents particularly order dated 10.06.2005wouldclearlyindicatethatsincetherewasshortageof High School Teachers, the persons such as petitioner who were workinginPrimaryandMiddleSchoolsweredirectedtobeplaced ondeputationanditwasspecificallymentionedintheorderdated 10.06.2005thattheteacherssoplacedondeputationwouldnotbe entitledforgrantofdeputationallowance. Itisalsoamatterof record that after 10.06.2005, the petitioner did not raise any grievanceforgrantofofficiatingallowance till, hefiledthewrit petitionbeforethisCourt.Byorderdated29.09.2012,theclaimof thepetitionerhasbeenrejectedrelyingontheprovisioncontained in BiharState NationalisedElementary School Teacher(Transfer and Disciplinary Action) Rule, 1994, which also provides that duringtheperiodofdeputationanemployeewouldnotbeentitled forgrantofdeputationallowanceoranyotherallowances.
7. Adverting to the contention raised on behalf of the learnedcounselforthepetitionerthat,eventhoughthepaymentof deputation allowance has been prohibited by order dated 10.06.2005, the petitioner, who was posted on deputation as a HighSchoolTeacherwhichisahigherpost,cannotbedeniedthe benefitofsubsistenceallowance,Iamoftheopinionthatforbeing entitledforpaymentofofficiatingallowance,thepetitionermust first come within the purview of Rule 32 of Jharkhand Service 5 Code. Rule32,Rule90andRule103oftheJharkhandService Codeareextractedbelow: Rule32. OfficiateAGovernmentservantofficiatesina postwhenheperformsthedutiesofaposton which another person holds a lien. A Government servant may, however, be appointedtoofficiateinavacantpostonwhich no other person holds a lien by the authority competent to make a substantive appointment tothevacantpost. A Government servant may be appointed to officiateinapostthoughnotactuallyperformingthe dutiesthereof,asinthecasescitedbelow: (i) whileplacedundertrainingorundergoing acourseofinstruction(videRule101) (ii) whentransferredtoforeignservice(vide Rule270). Rule90. Subject to the provisions of Rules 85 (c), 89 and92,aGovernmentservantofficiatingina postwilldrawthepresumptivepayofthatpost, providedthatexceptinthecaseofaGovernment servantwhoseappointmenttothepostinwhich heisofficiatingwasmadeonhisownrequest underRule56(a),ifthepresumptivepayofthe permanent post on which he holds a lien or would hold a lien had his lien not been suspended,shouldatanytimebegreaterthan the presumptive pay of the post in which he officiates,hewilldrawthepresumptivepayof thepermanentpost. Rule103. ThepayofaGovernmentservantappointedby theStateGovernmenttoholdsubstantively,asa temporary measure, or to officiate in, two or more independent post at one time shall be regulatedasfollows: (a) the highest pay to which he would be entitledifhisappointmenttooneofthe posts stood alone, may be drawn on accountofhistenureofthatpost; (b) for each other post he may draw such reasonablepay,innocaseexceedinghalf the presumptive pay (excluding overseas pay)ofthepost,astheStateGovernment mayfix;and 6 (c) if a compensatory allowance is attached tooneormoreofthepostshemaydraw suchcompensatoryallowanceastheState Government may fix provided that such allowanceshallnotexceedthetotalofthe compensatory allowance attached to all theposts.
8. A perusal of Rule 32 of the Jharkhand Service Code wouldindicatethat,apersonissaidtoofficiateinapostwhenhe performsdutyonthepostonwhichanotherpersonholdsalien.A personcanbeappointedtoofficiateinavacantpostalso,onwhich no other person holds a lien, however, the order of officiation shouldhavebeenpassedbyanauthoritywhoiscompetenttomake substantiveappointmentonsuchvacantpost.Inthepresentcase, admittedly,thepetitionerwasnotaskedtoofficiateontheposton whichanotherpersonheldalien. Theorderdated10.06.2005is not an order issued by the person who is competent to make substantive appointment on the post of a High School Teacher. Further,byorderdated10.06.2005,thePrimarySchoolTeachers and Middle School Teachers were posted on deputation in the vacantpostofHighSchoolTeachersandorderdated10.06.2005is notanorderofappointmenttoofficiateinavacantpost.Itisalso clearfromorderdated10.06.2005thatthepetitionerandothers were directed to be posted in a vacant post of a High School Teacherasatemporarymeasureandtheorderdated10.06.2005is notanorderappointingthepetitionerasaHighSchoolTeacher. ThisorderisplainlyanorderofdeputationofthePrimarySchool Teachers and Middle School Teachers in a vacant post in High Schools,andtherefore,byorderdated10.06.2005thestatusofthe petitioner as a Primary School Teacher cannot be said to have changedorconvertedintothestatusofaHighSchoolTeacher.
9. Beforedealingwiththerivalcontentionswithrespect tooperationofexecutiveinstructionandstatutoryRule;itwould 7 beusefultonoticetheauthoritiescitedbythelearnedcounselfor boththeparties.InHarminderKaurVs.UnionofIndiareported in (2009) 13 SCC 90.the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under; 19. In Punjab Water Supply & Sewerage Boardv.RanjodhSinghthisCourtheld:(SCCp. 501,para19) 19. Intheinstantcase,theHighCourtdidnot issue a writ of mandamus on arriving at a findingthattherespondentshadalegalrightin relationtotheirclaimforregularisation,which itwasobligatedtodo.Itproceededtoissuethe directions only on the basis of the purported policydecisionadoptedbytheState.Itfailedto noticethatapolicydecisioncannotbeadopted by means of a circular letter and, as noticed hereinbefore,evenapolicydecisionadoptedin termsofArticle162oftheConstitutionofIndia inthatbehalfwouldbevoid.Anydepartmental letter or executive instruction cannot prevail over statutory rule and constitutional provisions. Any appointment, thus, made withoutfollowingtheprocedurewouldbeultra vires.
10. InPunjabWaterSupply&SewerageBoardVs.Ranjodh Singh reportedin (2007)2 SCC491,theHon'bleSupremeCourt hasheldasunder; 19. Intheinstantcase,theHighCourtdid notissueawritofmandamusonarrivingata findingthattherespondentshadalegalrightin relationtotheirclaimforregularisation,which itwasobligatedtodo.Itproceededtoissuethe directions only on the basis of the purported policydecisionadoptedbytheState.Itfailedto noticethatapolicydecisioncannotbeadopted by means of a circular letter and, as noticed hereinbefore,evenapolicydecisionadoptedin termsofArticle162oftheConstitutionofIndia inthatbehalfwouldbevoid.Anydepartmental letter or executive instruction cannot prevail over statutory rule and constitutional provisions. Any appointment, thus, made 8 withoutfollowingtheprocedurewouldbeultra vires.
11. InDDAVs.JoginderS.Monga reportedin (2004) 2 SCC297,theHon'bleSupremeCourthasheldasunder; 30. It is not a case where a conflict has arisenbetweenastatuteorastatutoryruleon theonehandandanexecutiveinstruction,on theother.Onlyinacasewhereaconflictarises betweenastatuteandanexecutiveinstruction, indisputably, the former will prevail over the latter.Thelessorunderthedeedofleaseistofix the market value. It could do it areawise or plotwise.Onceitdoesitareawisewhichbeing finalandbinding,itcannotresiletherefromat a later stage and take a stand that in a particularcaseitwillfixthemarketvalueon thebasisofthepricedisclosedintheagreement ofsale.
12. TheHon'bleSupremeCourtin SantRamSharmaVs. StateofRajasthanandothers,reportedin AIR 1967 SC1910,has heldasunder:
7. We proceed to consider the next contentionofMr.N.C.Chatterjeethatinthe absence of any statutory rules governing promotions to selection grade posts the Government cannot issue administrative instructions and such administrative instructionscannotimposeanyrestrictionsnot found it the Rules already framed. We are unabletoacceptthisargumentascorrect.Itis true that there is no specific provision in the Ruleslayingdowntheprincipleofpromotionof juniororseniorgradeofficerstoselectiongrade posts.Butthatdoesnotmeanthattillstatutory rulesareframedinthisbehalftheGovernment cannot issue administrative instructions regarding the principle to be followed in promotionsoftheofficersconcernedtoselection gradeposts.ItistruethatGovernmentcannot amend or supersede statutory Rules by administrativeinstructionsbutiftherulesare silentonanyparticularpointGovernmentcan fillupthegapsandsupplementtherulesand 9 issueinstructionsnotinconsistentwiththerules alreadyframed.
13. In State of M.P. Vs. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills, reportedin1992 Supp (1)SCC150,theHon'bleSupremeCourt hasheldasunder:
19. ThesecondgroundonwhichtheFullBench hassoughttoinvoketheinstructionsisalsonot correct.Executiveinstructionscansupplementa statuteorcoverareastowhichthestatutedoes not extend. But they cannot run contrary to statutoryprovisionsorwhittledowntheireffect. TheFullBenchseemstothinkthat,unlessthe instructions are brought in, the notifications wouldhavebeenindangerofabuseforwantof properguidelinesastothegrantofexemption certificates.Itissuggestedthatthenotification contemplatesrulestobeissuedforthepurpose and that, since no rules had been issued, Directors of Industries were left with no parameters for the issue of exemption certificates and might act capriciously or arbitrarily in granting or refusing certificates. Theinstructions,itissaid,havebeenissuedto fillinthislacunaandarehencevalid.........
14. Resisting the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that order dated 10.06.2005 would not override the statutoryprovisionascontainedintheJharkhandServiceCode,the learnedcounselfortherespondentshasrightlysubmittedthatsince the provision as contained in Rule 90 of the Jharkhand Service Codedoesnotdealwiththedeputationallowance,theinstructions contained in order dated 10.06.2005 would be operative in the presentcase.
15. In Bimlesh Tanwar Vs. State of Haryana & others, reportedin(2003)5SCC604,theHon'bleSupremeCourthasheld asunder:
47. Itisalsowellsettledthatintheabsence ofrulesgoverningseniorityanexecutiveorder maybeissuedtofillupthegap. Onlyinthe absenceofaruleorexecutiveinstructions,the courtmayhavetoevolveafairandjust 10 principlewhichcouldbeappliedinthefactsand circumstancesofthecase.
16. InAccountantGeneral,StateofM.P.Vs.S.K.Dubey& Another, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 578.the Hon'ble Supreme Courthasheldasunder:
32. InSantRamSharmathisCourtnegated the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant therein that in the absence of any statutory rules governing promotions to selection grade posts the Government cannot issue administrative instructions and such administrative instructions cannot impose any restrictions not found in the rules already framed.TheCourtstated:(AIRp.1914,para7) 7.ItistruethattheGovernmentcannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrativeinstructions,butiftherulesare silenton anyparticularpointtheGovernment can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules andissueinstructionsnotinconsistentwiththe rulesalreadyframed. Theabovelegalpositionhasbeenfollowed andreiteratedbythisCourttimeandagain.
33. The Constitution Bench of this Court in LalitMohanDebsaid:(SCCp.867,para9) 9.Itistruethattherearenostatutory rulesregulatingtheselectionofassistantstothe selectiongrade.Buttheabsenceofsuchrulesis nobartotheadministrationgivinginstructions regardingpromotiontothehighergradeaslong as such instructions are not inconsistent with anyruleonthesubject. In Union of India v. Central Electrical & MechanicalEngg.Service(CE&MES)GroupA (DirectRecruits)Assn.,CPWD,thisCourtheld thattheexecutiveinstructionscouldfillingaps not covered by the rules but such instructions cannotbeinderogationofthestatutoryrules.
17. Intheresult,Ifindsubstantialforceinthesubmissions madebythelearnedcounselfortherespondents.Shehasrightly contentedthatthepetitionerisnotcoveredbyRule32andheis 11 notentitledforsubsistenceallowanceintermsofRule90or103of theJharkhandServiceCode.
18. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion thattheorderimpugnedinthisproceedingdoesnotsufferfrom any illegality and the petitioner is not entitled for grant of officiating allowance as claimed by him. The learned counsel appearingforthepetitionerhasnotpressedtheotherprayersmade inthewritpetition.
19. Thiswritpetitionlacksmeritandisherebydismissed. (ShreeChandrashekhar,J.) R.ShekharCp2/A.F.R.