Shall, a word of slippery semantics in a rule is not decisive and the context of the statute, the purpose of the prescription, the public injury in the event of neglect of the rule and the conspectus of circumstances bearing on the importance of the condition have all to be considered before condemning a violation as fatal, State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719.
Shall, does not always mean that an act is obligatory or mandatory and it depends upon the context in which the word 'shall' occurs and the other circumstances, Ramnath Narayana Mauzo of Margoa v. Union Government of India, AIR 1968 Goa 85.
Shall, does not always mean that the enactment is obligatory or mandatory. It depends upon the context in which the word shall occurs and the other circumstances, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., (1966) (Supp) SCR 473: (1967) 1 SCJ 815.
Shall, in a statute, though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect, that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctitiously followed, the proceeding or the out-come of the proceeding would be invalid, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan Lal, AIR 1957 SC 912.
Shall, in stating the case or condition, 'where any person shall find himself aggrieved.' 'If it shall appear to the......confirms the proper language of application with that of high possession. The draftsman should restrict the use of 'shall' to expression of the will of the parties as actions, forbearance, etc., in the future in pursuance to the documents. This is a draftsman practice, he will find that his language seems to be less ambersome and clumsy and is easier to follow. He may also avoid positive errors, such as have resulted from the use of 'shall' in a will, a document written now but to take effect in future, the Elements of Drafting, by E.L. Piesse and Ji Gilchrist Smith, p. 68.
Shall, is not a decisive factor in deciding whether a provision is mandatory or directory, Graphite India Ltd. v. Durgapur Projects Ltd., (1999) 7 SCC 645.
Shall, is not conclusive of the question whether a provision is mandatory, Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233: (1955) 1 SCR 1104.
Shall, it is a settled law that even wherthe expression 'shall' is used, the same may not be held to be mandatory, Chandrakant Uttam Chodankar v. Dayanand Rayu Mandrakar, AIR 2005 SC 547.
Shall, may be remembered, does not always necessarily connote a mandatory intent on the part of the law maker, Mohammed Yamin v. Zafar Md., AIR 1968 Del 149.
Means has a duty to, Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., p. 1379.
Means in modern statutes the word shall is used as an imperative only and not as a future, Thring: Practical Legislation, p. 83.
Shall, or may is not conclusive on the question whether the particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory. But the circumstance that the legislature has used a language of compulsive force is always of great relevance and in the absence of anything contrary in the context indicating that a permissive interpretation is permissible, the statute ought to be construed as peremptory, G.C. Patel v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, (1975) 2 SCC 482: Re Panchami, (1981) LW (Cr) 112.
Shall, significance is mandatory. Unless the ordinary interpretation leads to some absurd or inconvenient results or is contrary to the intention of the legislature as envisaged in a particular statute, the ordinary interpretation of the term is normally adhered to, Het Ram v. Ram Kunwari, (1975) All LJ 171: (1975) All Cr Cas 233: (1975) Cr LJ 656.
Shall, the word 'shall' in its ordinary import is obligatory. Nevertheless, the word 'shall' need not be given that connotation in each and every case and the provisions can be interpreted as directory instead of mandatory depending upon the purpose which the legislature intended to achieve as disclosed by the object, design, purpose and scope of the statute, Rubber House v. Excellsior Needle Industries (P) Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1160 (1166): (1989) 2 SCC 413: (1989) 1 SCR 986.
(ii) Ordinarily though the word 'shall' is mandatory it can be interpreted as directory if the context and intention otherwise demands, Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1480 (1485): (1962) 1 SCR 517.
(iii) It is needless to add that the employment of the auxiliary verb 'shall' is inconclusive and similarly the mere absence of the imperative is not conclusive either. The question whether any requirement is mandatory or directory had to be decided not merely on the basis of any specific provision which, for instance, sets out the consequence of the omission to observe the requirement, but on the purpose for which the requirement has been enacted, particularly in the context of the other provisions of the Act and the general scheme thereof, Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka, AIR 1962 SC 1694 (1701): (1963) 1 SCR 98.
(iv) The use of the word 'shall' in s. 41 in connection with the action to be taken on a reference by the State Government and 'may' in connection with the action on an application by others in the same section compels the conclusion that on an application by anybody other than the State Government, the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court may also refuse to take action, Labour Commissioner v. Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1687: (1964) 7 SCR 484.
(v) The use of the word 'shall' in a statute does not always indicate that the provisions are mandatory in character, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. B.E.S.T. Workers' Union, AIR 1973 SC 883: (1973) 3 SCC 546: (1973) 2 SCR 285.
(vi) The use of 'shall' - a word of slippery semantics - in a rule is not decisive and the context of the statute, the purpose of the prescription, the public injury in the event of neglect of the rule and the conspectus of circumstances bearing on the importance of the condition have all to be considered before condemning a violation as fatal, State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, AIR 1976 SC 1177 (1178): (1976) 1 SCC 719: (1976) 2 SCR 82.
(vii) The word 'shall' in Rule 9(2) is not conclusive in deciding the mandatory nature of the rule. Also it is not the breach of every mandatory duty in performing a prescribed act that could make an action totally ineffective or void ab initio, Krishna Kumar Mediratta v. Phulchand Agarwala, AIR 1977 SC 984 (986): (1977) 2 SCC 5: (1977) 2 SCR 702.
(viii) The use of the word 'shall' is not conclusive and decisive of the matter and the Court has to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature, which is the determining factor, and that must be done by looking carefully to the whole scope, nature and design of the statute, Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1979 SC 1149 (1153): (1979) 2 SCC 196: (1979) 1 SCR 1070.
(ix) The word 'shall' in clause (c) of sub-s. (1) of s. 244 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) District Municipalities Act, 1956 in its context and setting, is directory, Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary, AIR 1979 SC 1415: (1979) 3 SCC 324: (1979) 3 SCR 802.
(x) The fact that the statute uses the word 'shall' while laying down a duty is not conclusive on the question whether it is a mandatory or directory provision. In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question has to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by noncompliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a provision of law relates to the performance of any public duty and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision causes serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted and at the same time who have no control over the performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as directory one, Sharifud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303: (1980) 1 SCC 403: (1980) 1 SCR 1177.
(xi) Ordinarily the use of the word 'shall' prima facie indicates that the provision is imperative in character. However, by a catena of decisions, it is well-established that the court while considering whether the mere use of the word 'shall' would make the provision imperative, it would ascertain the intendment of the legislature and the consequences from its own construction of the word 'shall', Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, AIR 1985 SC 964: (1985) 3 SCC 53: (1985) 3 SCR 825.
(xii) The words 'shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out' occurring in s. 17(3) have to be construed as a directory provision and not a mandatory provision as the word 'shall' has to be read as 'may', B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, AIR 1987 SC 1010 (1014): (1987) 2 SCC 407: (1987) 2 SCR 559.
(xiii) It is a well known principle that in the interpretation of statutes that where the situation and the context warrants it, the word 'shall' used in a s. or rule of a statute has to be construed as 'may', Amal Chandra Dutt v. Second Additional District Judge, AIR 1989 SC 255: (1989) 1 SCC 1.
(xiv) Ordinarily, the word 'shall' used at several places in the provision must be given the same meaning at all places. However, this is not an invariable rule and even though the word 'shall' is ordinarily mandatory but in the context or if the intention is otherwise it may be construed to be merely directory. Owners and Parties interested in M.V., 'Vali Pero' v. Fernandeo Lopez, AIR 1989 SC 2206: (1989) 4 SCC 671: (1989) Supp 1 SCR 187.
(xv) 'Market fee, which shall be payable'. The use of the word 'shall' in the said clause means that where the selling trader realises the fee from the purchasing trader, he is bound to make it over to the Committee. But where the selling trader does not realise it from the purchaser, he is under no obligation to pay the market fee to the Committee, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Indian Wood Products Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 1251: (1996) 3 SCC 321.
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