Us Supreme Court Court February 1986 Judgments
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Connolly Vs. Pbgc
Court: US Supreme Court
Decided on: Feb-26-1986
Connolly v. PBGC - 475 U.S. 211 (1986) U.S. Supreme Court Connolly v. PBGC, 475 U.S. 211 (1986) Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation No. 84-1555 Argued December 2, 1985 Decided February 26, 1986 * 475 U.S. 211 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Syllabus The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), enacted in 1974, established a pension plan termination insurance program whereby the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a wholly owned Government corporation, collects insurance premiums from covered private retirement plans and provides benefits to participants if their plan terminates with insufficient assets to support the guaranteed benefits. The program covers both single-employer and multiemployer pension plans. With respect to the latter plans, ERISA delayed mandatory payment of guaranteed benefits until January 1, 1978, prior to which date the PBGC had discretionary authority to pay benefits u...
Wis. Dept. of Indus. Vs. Gould, Inc.
Court: US Supreme Court
Decided on: Feb-26-1986
Wis. Dept. of Indus. v. Gould, Inc. - 475 U.S. 282 (1986) U.S. Supreme Court Wis. Dept. of Indus. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986) Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc. No. 84-1484 Argued December 9, 1985 Decided February 26, 1986 475 U.S. 282 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Syllabus A Wisconsin statute debars persons or firms who have violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) three times within a 5-year period from doing business with the State. The debarment lasts for three years. After appellee was debarred in 1982, it filed an action for injunctive and declaratory relief in Federal District Court, claiming, inter alia, that the Wisconsin statute was preempted by the NLRA. T he court agreed and granted summary judgment for appellee. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The NLRA preempts the Wisconsin debarment statute. Pp. 475 U. S. 286 -291. (a) States are prevented not only fr...
Fisher Vs. City of Berkeley
Court: US Supreme Court
Decided on: Feb-26-1986
Fisher v. City of Berkeley - 475 U.S. 260 (1986) U.S. Supreme Court Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) Fisher v. City of Berkeley No. 84-1538 Argued November 12, 1985 Decided February 26, 1986 475 U.S. 260 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA Syllabus A Berkeley, California, ordinance, enacted pursuant to popular initiative, imposes rent ceilings on residential real property in the city. The rent ceilings are under the control of a Rent Stabilization Board. Appellant landlords brought suit in California Superior Court challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance on Fourteenth Amendment grounds and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Superior Court upheld the ordinance, but was reversed by the California Court of Appeal. In the meantime, based on the intervening decision in Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 , the question arose as to whether the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was preempted by the Sherman A...
Nlrb Vs. Financial Inst. Employees
Court: US Supreme Court
Decided on: Feb-26-1986
NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees - 475 U.S. 192 (1986) U.S. Supreme Court NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees, 475 U.S. 192 (1986) National Labor Relations Board v. Financial Institution Employees of America, Local 1182, Chartered by United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO No. 84-1493 Argued December 4, 1985 Decided February 26, 1986 * 475 U.S. 192 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In 1970, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) certified the Firstbank Independent Employees Association (Firstbank) as the collective bargaining representative of a bargaining unit consisting of the employees of Seattle-First National Bank (SeaFirst), and successive collective bargaining agreements were negotiated. In 1978, in an election in which only union members were allowed to vote, Firstbank voted to affiliate with an international union and changed its name to the Financial Institution Employees of America, Local 1...
Morris Vs. Mathews
Court: US Supreme Court
Decided on: Feb-26-1986
Morris v. Mathews - 475 U.S. 237 (1986) U.S. Supreme Court Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986) Morris v. Mathews No. 84-1636 Argued November 4, 1985 Decided February 26, 1986 475 U.S. 237 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent and another man (Daugherty) robbed a bank in Ohio. After an automobile chase, the police surrounded the two men when they stopped at a farmhouse. Thereafter, the police heard shots fired inside the house, and respondent emerged from the house and surrendered. The police then entered the house and found Daugherty dead. Based on the Coroner's opinion that Daugherty had committed suicide, the State did not charge respondent with Daugherty's death, but with aggravated robbery. Respondent pleaded guilty, but two days later admitted having shot Daugherty. Respondent was then indicted for aggravated murder based on the bank robbery. The state trial court denied his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictme...
Texas Vs. Mccullough
Court: US Supreme Court
Decided on: Feb-26-1986
Texas v. McCullough - 475 U.S. 134 (1986) U.S. Supreme Court Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986) Texas v. McCullough No. 84-1198 Argued December 10, 1985 Decided February 26, 1986 475 U.S. 134 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS Syllabus Respondent was tried before a jury in a Texas District Court and convicted of murder. He elected to be sentenced by the jury, as was his right under Texas law, and the jury imposed a 20-year sentence. The trial judge then granted respondent's motion for a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. Respondent was retried before a jury, with the same trial judge presiding, and again was found guilty. This time he elected to have the judge fix his sentence, and she imposed a 50-year sentence. To justify the longer sentence, the judge entered the following findings of fact: the testimony of two state witnesses who had not testified at the first trial added to the credibility of the State's key witness and detracted...
Ake Vs. Oklahoma
Court: US Supreme Court
Decided on: Feb-26-1986
Ake v. Oklahoma - 470 U.S. 68 (1986) U.S. Supreme Court Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) Ake v. Oklahoma No. 83-5424 Argued November 7, 1984 Decided February 26, 1986 470 U.S. 68 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA Syllabus Petitioner, an indigent, was charged with first-degree murder and shooting with intent to kill. At his arraignment in an Oklahoma trial court, his behavior was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered him to be examined by a psychiatrist. Shortly thereafter, the examining psychiatrist found petitioner to be incompetent to stand trial, and suggested that he be committed. But six weeks later, after being committed to the state mental hospital, petitioner was found to be competent on the condition that he continue to be sedated within an antipsychotic drug. The State then resumed proceedings, and, at a pretrial conference, petitioner's attorney informed the court that he would raise an insanity defense, and requested a p...
Nix Vs. Whiteside
Court: US Supreme Court
Decided on: Feb-26-1986
Nix v. Whiteside - 475 U.S. 157 (1986) U.S. Supreme Court Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) Nix v. Whiteside No. 84-1321 Argued November 5, 1985 Decided February 26, 1986 475 U.S. 157 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In preparing for his Iowa state court trial on a murder charge, respondent consistently told his attorney that, although he had not actually seen a gun in the victim's hand when he stabbed the victim, he was convinced that the victim had a gun. Respondent's companions who were present during the stabbing told counsel that they had not seen a gun, and no gun was found. Counsel advised respondent that the existence of a gun was not necessary to establish a claim of self-defense, and that only a reasonable belief that the victim had a gun nearby was necessary, even though no gun was actually present. However, during preparation for direct examination shortly before trial, respondent for the first time told counse...
New York Vs. Class
Court: US Supreme Court
Decided on: Feb-25-1986
New York v. Class - 475 U.S. 106 (1986) U.S. Supreme Court New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) New York v. Class No. 84-1181 Argued November 4, 1985 Decided February 25, 1986 475 U.S. 106 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK Syllabus When two New York City police officers observed respondent driving above the speed limit in a car with a cracked windshield, both traffic violations under New York law, they stopped him. He then emerged from the car and approached one of the officers. The other officer opened the car door to look for the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), which is located on the left doorjamb in pre-1969 automobiles. When the officer did not find the VIN on the doorjamb, he reached into the car's interior to move some papers obscuring the area of the dashboard where the VIN is located on later model automobiles. In doing so, the officer saw the handle of a gun protruding from underneath the driver's seat and seized the gun. Respondent was then arr...
United States Vs. Maine
Court: US Supreme Court
Decided on: Feb-25-1986
United States v. Maine - 475 U.S. 89 (1986) U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89 (1986) United States v. Maine No. 35, Orig. Argued December 12, 1985 Decided February 25, 1986 475 U.S. 89 ON EXCEPTION TO REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER Syllabus This case, which was instituted by the United States to quiet title to the seabed along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, presents the question whether Nantucket Sound qualifies as "internal waters" of Massachusetts rather than partly territorial sea and partly high seas as the United States contends. Massachusetts has excepted to the portion of the Special Master's report that concludes that Nantucket Sound is not a part of Massachusetts' inland waters under the doctrine of "ancient title." Massachusetts contends that, under such doctrine, the English Crown acquired title to Nantucket Sound as a result of discovery and occupation by colonists in the early 17th century, and that Massachusetts has succeeded to the Crown's tit...
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