Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1986Supp(1)SCC554
R.S. Pathak and; Ranganath Misra, JJ.1. We understand that Writ Petition No. 16445 of 1985 has been filed by the petitioner in the High Court of Madras and is presently pending there. We are told that the writ petition is coming up for hearing and is expected to be disposed of within one month from today. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, this criminal writ petition before us raises a question which has not been raised in the aforesaid writ petition. This additional question may also be considered by the High Court, and for that purpose we direct the transfer of the records of this criminal writ petition to the High Court of Madras for disposal on the basis that it is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. We trust that it will be possible for the High Court to take up both the writ petitions at an early date and if possible to dispose them of within six weeks from today. The parties will appear before the court of the learned Chief Justice of the High Co...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1987Supp(1)SCC36
1. Special leave granted.2. Having held that retrenchment was bad and that it should be set aside, the High Court was not justified in not awarding back wages to the petitioner. We direct that the petitioner should be paid back wages within three months from today. The appeal is allowed accordingly. The petitioner is entitled to his costs which we quantify at Rs 500....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1986Supp(1)SCC530
1. We are of the view that this is a fit case in which the order dated January 27, 1986 should be reviewed because not only the High Court but also this Court proceeded on the basis that the Act applicable was the U.P. Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1978. In fact this Act was not applicable and the application for permission to discharge the respondents was made to the Basic Education Officer under Rule 15 of the U.P. Recognised Basic Schools and Junior High School (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules, 1978 framed under the Basic Education Act, 1972. We, therefore, set aside our order as also the order of the High Court on the ground that it was not the U.P. Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1978 which applied but the U.P. Recognised Basic Schools and Junior High Schools (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules, 1978 framed under the Basic Education Act, 1972...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : (1986)4SCC564
P.N. Bhagwati and; Ranganath Misra, JJ.1. Since we are not allowing the special leave petition, we would not have ordinarily said anything beyond passing the order, but there are peculiar circumstances in the present case which impel us to make a few observations. The circumstances are in fact a little bizarre. The petitioner made an application for bail before the Ranchi Bench of the High Court. The application for bail came up for hearing before Mr Justice R.C.P. Sinha who, by an order dated April 29, 1986, dismissed the application with the following observation:“The application is dismissed for the present. However, if advised, the petitioner will be at liberty to renew his prayer for bail after four months first before the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi.”2. It seems that some time thereafter the wife of the petitioner became seriously ill and she had to be removed to Vellore for treatment. The petitioner, being perturbed by this unfortunate development, made an applicat...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1987SC1347; (1987)1SCC63
ORDERO. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. In view of the circumstance that the ministerial staff of F.A. & C.A. O. department is being paid overtime at double the rate of normal wages and in view of the fact that the ministerial staff of the Rourkela Plant other than the staff of the F.A. and C.A.O. department had made a demand even in 1962 for overtime wages at double the rate of normal wages, we think that it would be fair if all the ministerial staff of Rourkela Steel Plan) apart from F.A. & C.A.O. department are paid overtime wages calculated at the rate of 13/4 of the normal rate of wages from 24th February, 1962. The balance due to the workmen will be paid within 3 months from today. For the future, overtime wages will be paid at double the rate of normal wages from today. We are not awarding overtime wages at double the rate keeping in view the fact that what is now being awarded covers a very long period, namely, the period from 1962 onwards. We think it fair and just that the workmen are ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1987SC56; JT1986(1)SC327; 1986(2)SCALE379; (1986)4SCC174; 1986(2)LC603(SC)
ORDER1. The short question that arises in these appeals by special leave is as to the validity of the imposition of a toll tax by the Municipal Board, Pilkhwa on vehicles and other conveyances, animals and laden coolies entering the municipal limits under Section 128(1)(vii)of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The High Court has upheld the levy of the toll tax relying upon the decision of this Court in The Rajasthan Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v The State of Rajasthan and Ors. 0065/1962 as being compensatory in nature. In Automobile Transport's case, the majority held that regulatory measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities do not hamper trade, commerce or intercourse, but rather facilitate them and therefore are not hit by the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Article 301 of the Constitution. The toll tax in question however cannot be treated to be a compensatory tax for the use of trading facilities. The Municipal Board provides no facilities w...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1986Supp(1)SCC569
R.S. Pathak and; Ranganath Misra, JJ.1. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at some length. The learned counsel states that the petitioner is extremely apprehensive of the consequences which will result from compliance with the order of the High Court directing admission of the two candidates and the learned counsel has strenuously contended that Respondents 2 and 3 are not qualified at all for admission. It seems to us that this is a question which is more appropriate for the consideration of the High Court itself as the writ petition is pending before it. We do not propose to interfere at this stage and, therefore, reject these special leave petitions. We make it clear, however, that the Respondents 2 and 3, whose admission has been directed by the High Court, will be admitted subject to the adjudication of their rights of admission when decided in the writ petition. Their admission at this stage will not confer any further right to continue in the institution greater th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1986SC2017; 1986(34)BLJR717; [1987]61CompCas485(SC); 1987CriLJ539; 1986(3)Crimes466(SC); 1987(11)ECC285; 1986(26)ELT292(SC); JT1986(1)SC319; 1986(2)SCALE376; (1986)4SCC1
K.N. Singh, J.1. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties we dismissed the appeal on 19.8.86 and directed that the reasons shall follow later on. Accordingly we are giving the reasons for our decision.2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court of Delhi dismissing the appellant's appeal made under Section 23EE of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Briefly facts giving rise to this appeal are that the appellant has been carrying the business of exporting goods to the various parts of the world. During the year 1966 it effected shipment of brassware goods to a foreign buyer in the United States valued at U.S. $ 5976, out of which the appellant repatriated U.S. $ 2931. 42 leaving a balance of U.S. $ 3044. 58. Since the appellant failed to repatriate the entire value of the exported goods a show cause notice was issued under Section 12(2) of the Act initiating adjudication proceedings contemplated by Sect...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1986SC2014; 1986(26)ELT193(SC); 1986(2)SCALE367; (1986)4SCC185; [1986]3SCR697; 1986(2)LC694(SC)
Oza, J.1. This appeal on special leave arises out of a Judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 4th April, 1978. The leave is granted on a limited question as regards the question of interpretation of Sub-clause (m) of Section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962 ('Act' for short). The appellants imported 27 knitting machines as the appellants owns a hosiery factory in 1972. The appellants held an import licence for import of knitting machinery.2. According to the Customs authorities the machinery was not new as the licence permitted to import, but was old reconditioned. The Customs authorities also held that the price shown by the appellant on the basis of invoice was much lower than what the price actually should be. The price shown by the appellant on the basis of invoice was Rs. 77441 whereas according to the Customs authorities the price came to Rs. 2,98,359. On this basis, a show cause notice was issued and after hearing the appellant, the Collector of Customs Bombay by order dated 29.12.7...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1987SC57a; 1986(2)SCALE371; (1986)4SCC176; [1986]3SCR687
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. Special Leave granted.2. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court quashing a resolution dated May 6, 1986 by which it was proposed to hold an Entrance Test for admission to the Degree Courses in Arts, Science and Commerce of the Allahabad University, while at the same time recording a finding that 'the entrance test for admission to Degree Courses of Arts, Science and Commerce of the University cannot be characterised as arbitrary, illegal or irrational in view of the fact that the standard of students passing Intermediate Examination or equivalent examinations thereto is deteriorating now-a-days.' The principal ground on which the High Court struck down the resolution was that there was no emergency to justify the Vice-Chancellor having recourse to the provisions of Section 13(6) of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act for the action taken by him; the legitimate thing to do was to constitute an Admissions Comm...
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