Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1986Supp(1)SCC573
P.N. Bhagwati, C.J; R.S. Pathak,; Sabyasachi Mukharji; V. Khalid, JJ.1. After hearing learned counsel for the parties we direct that the petitioners may be put back in the post of teachers as were occupied by them in Government Basic Schools until proper selection in accordance with the rule is made afresh. It will be open to the petitioners to appear at such selection. We may observe that the Selection Committee may take into account the experience already gained by the petitioners in the posts held by them in the past and consider the relaxation of age limits in their case where such age limit is exceeded as laid down by the rules. It will be open to the State Government to proceed to take up the selection of such teachers as expeditiously as possible. The petitioners shall be taken back in service on the date they present themselves before the District Superintendent of Education. The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1987SC116; 1986(2)SCALE587; (1986)4SCC504; [1986]3SCR1002; 1987(1)LC10(SC)
ORDER1. Since this petition is filed against an interim order we do not propose to interfere with the order of the High Court. The Petition is dismissed.2. We, however, deprecate the practice of granting of temporary permits repeatedly to ply stage carriages for short periods even when it is made out that there is a grave need for increasing the number of regular services on the routes in question in public interest. In many cases this practice has led to undesirable results. In all such cases the proper action to be taken by the Regional Transport Authorities is to grant regular permits in accordance with law either by inviting applications for grant of permits or on the applications made by intending operators suo motu under Section 57(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. We hope that the Regional Transport Authorities will take necessary steps in accordance with law in respect of all the routes to alleviate the suffering of the travelling public....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1988SC83; 1988CriLJ188; 1986Supp(1)SCC555
ORDERA.P. Sen, J.1. We have, with the above assistance of Shri M. Qamaruddin, learned Counsel for the appellant have gone through the judgment of the High Court. The High Court on a careful consideration of the evidence adduced in the case has come to a definite conclusion that the appellant was guilty for culpable homicide hot amounting to murder punishable under Section 304-I of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.2. The learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that the finding of the High Court that the head injury No. 1 was the cause of the death of deceased cannot be sustained inasmuch as the death has been caused due to the cumulative effect of six other injuries on the person of the deceased. It was also contended in this connection by the learned Counsel that the evidence of Dr. Jagadananda Negi, P.W. 9 who performed the post-mortem on the body of the deceased to the effect that injury No. 1 was fatal should not be accepted. We are afraid that we cannot accept this contention pu...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1986SC2086; JT1986(1)SC597; (1987)ILLJ214SC; 1986(2)SCALE561; (1986)4SCC531; [1986]3SCR993; 1987(1)SLJ221(SC); 1987(1)LC223(SC)
E.S. Venkataramiah, J.1. Some of the officials who had been directly appointed as Assistants in the Intelligence Bureau of the Government of India in the year 1957 filed a writ petition in the year 1976 in Civil Writ Petition No. 638 of 1976 on the file of the High Court of Delhi questioning the validity of the appointments of certain other Assistants in the Intelligence Bureau of whom some had been appointed prior to 1.2.1954 and the remaining had been appointed or absorbed as Assistants prior to the induction of the writ petitioners into service as Assistants and also the assignment of seniority to them over and above the petitioners in the Writ Petition. The said Writ Petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge, the petitioners in the writ petition filed an appeal in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 6 of 1978 before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the learn...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : (1986)57CTR(SC)25; [1986]162ITR373(SC); 1986(2)SCALE573; (1986)4SCC689; [1986]3SCR980
R. S. Pathak, J.1. This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Calcutta is directed against a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court confirming on appeal the dismissal of the appellant's writ petition.2. The appellant, Brooke Bond & Company Ltd., now known as Brooke Bond Leibig Limited, is a sterling company carrying on business in tea with its Head Office in the United Kingdom. The appellant has invested in the shares of other tea companies in different parts of the world, and has a hundred per cent share holding in an Indian subsidiary, Brooke Bond (India) Limited.3. The appellant is assessed under the Indian Income Tax Act, and the relevant financial year is the previous year in relation to the corresponding assessment year. For the assessment year 1955-56 the appellant was assessed on its total world income by an assessment order dated July 16, 1957 on the basis of provisional figures of its business loss including depreciation, and its income from dividends. ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1987SC107; (1986)57CTR(SC)31; [1986]162ITR286(SC); 1986(2)SCALE558; (1986)4SCC352; [1986]3SCR973
R.S. Pathak, J.1. These appeals have been preferred by the Revenue against the common judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh answering the following questions in favour of the assessee :(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the incomes arising from the Reserve Fund and the Expenses Account of the Nizam's Family Trust Deed dated 10.5.1950 can be aggregated in a single assessment for each of the assessment years 1960-61 to 1965-66?(2) If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, whether the assessments made under Section 148 of the Act for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62 were legal and valid?2. By a Deed of Trust dated May 10, 1950 the Nizam of Hyderabad created a Family Trust. A corpus of nine crores in Government securities was transferred to the trustees under that Deed. The corpus was notionally divided into 175 equal units. Five units were to constitute a fund called the 'Reserve Fund', and 3 1/2 units were to constitute the 'Fa...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1987SC535; (1987)89BOMLR21; 1986CriLJ1975; 1986MhLJ994(SC); 1986(2)SCALE605; (1986)4SCC436; [1986]3SCR1004
M.P. Thakkar, J.1. 'Right', or 'wrong', 'guilty' or 'not guilty', is not the question. Whether the learned Single Judge had the 'right' to hear and decide the appeal and hold that the appellants were guilty whilst setting aside their acquittal by the Judgment under appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1983 decided by the High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) on June 13, 1986 resulting in the present appeal by special leave.) is the question which has surfaced in the context of a judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge which according to the relevant rules of the High Court was required to be heard and decided by a Division Bench.2. The State of Maharashtra (respondent herein) preferred an appeal to the High Court of Bombay in order to challenge the order of acquittal rendered by the lower Court in favour of the present appellants. The acquittal was in respect of an offence under Section 7(1) read with Sections 16 and 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954. The offence wa...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1988SC93; 1988CriLJ189; 1986Supp(1)SCC531
ORDERA.P. Sen, J.1. We fail to appreciate the occasion for filing such a petition. The maintenance of law and order is a function of the District Magistrate and we have every reason to believe that the District Magistrate of Lucknow with a view to avoid any possible breach of peace would take the necessary steps well in advance for the purpose of maintaining public order which would be in the larger interests of the society. The exercise of fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is not an absolute right but must yield or give way to maintenance of public order as laid down by this Court in Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 1981CriLJ1835 . The principles are well settled and it is but for the District Magistrate to exercise his powers in consonance with the provisions of Section 144 of the Criminal P.C. 1973. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution appears to be wholly misconceived.2. The petition is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner shall b...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1986Supp(1)SCC566
A.P. Sen and; B.C. Ray, JJ.1. The contention that the petitioner having been released under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, the disqualification attaching to his conviction for having committed an offence punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 stood removed by Section 12 of the Act, cannot prevail. The matter is concluded by the recent decision of this Court in Shankar Dass v. Union of India1. In that case the court has laid down that conviction on a criminal charge was not a disqualification falling within the purview of Section 12 of the Act. It also referred to clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution which confers a power on the government to dismiss a person “on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge”. It cannot therefore be said that the State Bank of India could not take recourse to Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 in directing the re...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1988SC335; 1988LabIC906; 1987Supp(1)SCC53
ORDER1. We find no basis for the finding recorded by the High Court that the University did not commit any error in denying to the appellant the benefit of the grade of the Lecturer (Senior Scale) under the scheme framed by the University Grants Commission and accepted by the Central Government by not taking into account the experience of University teaching in colleges affiliated to the Calcutta University. The High Court failed to appreciate that while framing the criteria for the placement in senior scale, the University itself used the words 'Experience of University teaching up to degree classes for a period of five years'. The High Court obviously fell into an error in assuming that the length of service within the University was the basis. We find it difficult to subscribe to this view on the criteria framed by the University for the purpose of Lecturer (Senior Scale) which reads : A Lecturer shall hold at least a Master's Degree not lower than a Second Class with an experience ...
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