Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1500; 1980CriLJ828; (1979)0GLR840; (1979)3SCC299; 1979(11)LC492(SC)
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.1. In this appeal by special leave, the appellant has been convicted under Section 66(1)(b) read with Section 181 of the Bombay Prohibition Act. The prosecution case has been fully detailed in the judgment of the courts below and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same all over again. The appellant was a Rikshaw driver who had carried the accused No. 2 in his Rikshaw. On search of the Rikshaw some balloons kept in a bag containing illicit liquor were found. Apart from the passenger who was the owner of these articles the appellant was also convicted as having conscious knowledge of the fact that the bag contained prohibited articles. It is true that both the courts below have held that the accused had conscious knowledge of the fact that the articles contained illicit liquor. This inference appears to have been based largely on the information which the Police derived from its sources which indicated that the appellant in collusion with the second accused ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC2046; (1980)4SCC679; 1979(11)LC413(SC)
N.L. Untwalia, J.1. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties for some time we feel that on the special facts and circumstances of this case justice requires that some limited kind of relief should be given to the appellant by us and that will be only to the extent as indicated in our order below :We set aside the order of the High Court as also of the Board of Revenue passed in Second Appeals Nos. 58 PBR/68, 59 PBR/69, 60PBR/69, 61 PBR/68, 62PBR/68 on 26 9 1969 and send back the case to the Board for a fresh disposal of those appeals. In order to enable the Board to a reconsider the matter in regard to the assessments in question which were the subject matter of the appeals aforesaid, it is necessary that the appellant should be given an opportunity of inspecting her account books which were seized by the Income Tax Department as also by the Sales Tax Department. She should also have an opportunity of inspecting the report of the Sales Tax Inspector made to the Sales Tax Officer, ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1497; 1979CriLJ1129; (1979)3SCC457; 1979(11)LC438(SC)
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.1. In this appeal by special leave, the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The entire case rests on the dying declaration made by the deceased Sukhu and the evidence of PWs 1 to 7, 11 and 15. Out of these witnesses, PW 2 and 3 are near relations who have been clearly mentioned in the FIR The fact that the deceased made an oral dying declaration, is also mentioned in the FIR. After having gone through the judgment of the courts below, we do not find any error of law in warrant any interference in this appeal. It is concluded by findings of facts. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1507; 1980CriLJ830; (1979)3SCC429; 1979(11)LC490(SC)
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.1. In this appeal by special leave, the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the judgment of the courts below. We do not find any merit so as to warrant our interference. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. R.K. Garg, argued two points before us. In the first place, the submitted that as the Sessions Judge has disbelieved the main witness PW 2, Smt. Kaushalya with respect to the other three accused, Hanuman, Baldeo and Sukhdeo, her evidence should cot have been accepted with respect to the appellant. We have gone through the evidence of Mst. Kausbalya and we are not in a position to agree with Mr. Garg that she should have been completely disbelieved, by the courts below. So far as the appellant is concerned, she grappled with the appellant and had received injuries at the hands of the appellant apart from the injuries which the appellant caused...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1010; 1979CriLJ888; (1979)2SCC178; [1979]3SCR428; 1979(11)LC493(SC)
Fazal Ali, J.1. In this appeal under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction), Act, the appellant was convicted along with other accused by the Sessions Judge under Section 304 Pt. 1 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to five years R.I. The State filed an appeal to the High Court against the acquittal of the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. and other accused. The High Court while allowing the appeal of other accused also allowed the appeal of the State against the appellant Jagdish and set aside his acquittal under Section 302 I.P.C. and convicted him under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced him to life imprisonment. We have gone through the judgment of the High Court which has given cogent reasons for holding that the Trial Court Judge was absolutely wrong in acquitting the appellant of the charge under Section 302 I.P.C. The injuries found on the deceased were very severe which resulted in fracture of the scalp on the left perietal bone and als...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1532; 1979CriLJ1135; (1979)3SCC318; 1979(11)LC491(SC)
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.1. ln this appeal under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 IPC and has been sentenced to imprisonment for life and is directed against the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. We have perused the judgment of the High Court. So far as the prosecution case is concerned, we are satisfied that the case has been fully proved by the prosecution. The main witnesses relied upon are PW 2 and 4. We have perused the evidence of these witnesses and we do not find any reason to disbelieve their evidence.2. The only point which merits consideration is, as to what is the exact nature of the offence committed by the appellant. On the prosecution case itself, the occurrence took place suddenly without any premeditation while the deceased alongwith the accused and others had just finished their meals. In the circumstances, therefore, we do not think that the appellan...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC1534; 1980Supp(1)SCC161; 1979(11)LC421(SC)
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.1. In this appeal by special leave, the appellant has been convicted under Sections 304/149, 323/149, 324/149, 325/149 and 147 IPC and has been sentenced to 10 years R.I. and various other terms. The prosecution case has been fully described in the judgment of the Courts below and it is not necessary for us to reiterate the same. The High Court has disbelieved the entire prosecution case and acquitted all the accused and convicted the appellant mainly because he appears to have substained some injuries in the course of occurrence. In this connection the High Court's finding is as follows :This clearly shows that all the prosecution witnesses who have been examined as eye witnesses went out of their way to support the prosecution case by trying to prove in the court of session that Dharmnath was mentioned as Kalapnath by mistake in the first information report. None of the prosecution witnesses, is a reliable witness and it is apparent that the prosecution tried ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1504; 1980CriLJ829; 1980Supp(1)SCC159; [1966]Supp1SCR453; 1979(11)LC441(SC)
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.1. In this appeal by special leave, the learned Counsel for the appellant has pressed the appellant only on the question of the applicability of Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC to the appellants other than Ramakant Rai. It was urged that according to the findings of the Court below, the occurrence took place in the disputed field which was claimed by both the parties. According to the prosecution case, the field in question was in the possession of the deceased Janardan and PW 1 and they had sown Arhar crop and come to harvest the same. At that time the accused in a body arrived at the scene variously armed, with a view to dispossess the prosecution party by force. There was exchange of brickbets and utimately one of the accused Ram Sewak who was armed with a gun, fired a shot which hit the right eye of Janardan as a result of which he fell down and died instantansousiy. The Appellant Ramakant Rai is said to have provided a cartridge to Ram Sewak before he...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1104; [1979]118ITR50(SC); (1979)3SCC96; [1979]3SCR419; 1979(11)LC454(SC)
Kailasam, J.1. This appeal is by the State of U.P. by special leave granted by this Court against the Judgment and order of the High Court at Allahabad in Special Appeal No. 978 of 1962.2. Two companies, the Raza Sugar Co. Ltd. and the Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., were incorporated under the Rampur State Companies Act, 1932. Messrs. Govan Brothers (Rampur) Ltd. were the common managing agents of the two companies. On 10th May, 1933 the Raza Ltd. and on 11th December, 1934, the Buland Ltd. entered into agreements with the erstwhile State of Rampur. The agreements provided that the Rampur State should grant to the companies leases of the agricultural land with adequate irrigation facilities suitable for cultivation of sugar-cane. The companies were required to pay fair and equitable land revenue which was to be agreed upon by the companies and the Rampur State. On 5th May, 1935, a partnership deed was a executed by the Raza Ltd. and the Buland Ltd. constituting a partnership firm of the two co...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1979(0)BLJR600; (1980)1SCC93; [1979]3SCR393; 1979(11)LC775(SC)
ORDERBhagwati, J.1. The Government of Bihar has filed before us a note containing the proposed clarification of paragraph 2(e) of the Government Order dated 9th February, 1979, pursuant to the suggestion made by us in our order dated 19th February, 1979. This clarification states in paragraph one that where the police investigation in a case has been delayed by over two years, the Superintendent of Police will see to it that the investigation is completed expeditiously and final report or charge-sheet is submitted by the police as quickly as possible and the responsibility to ensure this has been laid personally on the Superintendent of Police. We are glad to note that the State Government has responded to our suggestion but we are not at all sure whether it is enough merely to provide that the investigation would be completed expeditiously and the final report or charge-sheet submitted as quickly as possible. We are of the view that a reasonable time limit should be set by the State G...
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