Court : Madhya Pradesh
Reported in : AIR1962MP257
Shrivastava, J. 1. This judgment governs the disposal ofanother appeal (First Appeal No. 99 of 1957) inwhich similar questions of law arise for decision.2. The appellant in the, instant case is an adopted son of the Ruler of Nagod. On 7-3-1948, the Ruler granted a cash allowance of Rs. 650/- per month to the appellant for maintenance. The allowance was hereditary. On 1-5-1949 the amount was increased to Rs. 750/-. Later on 28-10-1949 the allowance was reduced to Rs. 530/- per month by the Raj Pramukh for the lifetime of the appellant only. This was confirmed by the President on 24-9-1951, The appellant brought the present suit claiming that the reduction of his allowance was illegal and ultra vires. He claimed arrears for 3 years and 2 months.3. In the connected appeal, the plaintiff is the brother of the Ruler of Kothi. He claimed that an allowance of Rs. 300/- per month was granted to him by the Ruler on 21-12-1947. The allowance was reduced to Rs. 100/- by the State of Vindhya Prade...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Madhya Pradesh
Reported in : (1962)IILLJ249MP
K.L. Pandey, J.1. This matter comes before me on a difference between Khan, J., and Shivdayal, J.2. The main question is whether Article 311(2) of the Constitution applies to the facts of this case. The petitioner was an employee of the erstwhile Gwalior State which merged on 15 April 1948. The process of integration of services of the various princely States, including Gwalior State, constituting the new State of Madhya Bharat, continued right upto 1 November 1956 when, in pursuance of the provisions of the States Reorganization Act, 1956, the new State of Madhya Pradesh came into existence. By an order of the Director of Education dated 27 December 1955, the petitioner, who was treated to have been a clerk on 15 April 1948, was directed to be Integrated as a head clerk. Being aggrieved by that order, the petitioner filed an appeal claiming that, on 15 April 1948, he was working as a camp clerk and was not a mere clerk in the office of the Director of Education. The Government of Madh...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1961)63BOMLR732
Kotval, J.1. This is an application for revision under Section 20-A(3) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. It relates to a municipal election dispute. General elections were recently held in several municipalities in the Vidarbha area. In this revision, I am concerned with the election of members from ward No. 7 of the Karanja Municipal Committee. The applicant Trikamji, son of Damaji, who moved the election petition, was one of the candidates for election from the said ward. Opponents Nos. 1 to 4 had also filed their nomination papers, but opponents Nos. 3 and 4, Kisan Kondba Jadhao and Nivritti Pandu Shende, respectively, withdrew their candidature within the time fixed. The nomination of opponent No. 2 Ramchandra Ganu Jadhao was rejected by the Supervising Officer and that rejection has not been disputed. Therefore, at the election there were only two contestants, namely, the applicant Trikamji and opponent No. 1 Bhikalal 'Wadilal Shah. Bhikalal has been declared elected...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Madhya Pradesh
Reported in : AIR1961MP261; [1961(3)FLR54]
Pandey, J.1. The petitioner, who was removed from service, has challenged the various orders passed in regard to him, on the following grounds :(i) The order of suspension dated 24 Sep-tember 1954 operating retrospectively from 30 November 1950 is bad.(ii) The penalty of removal from service is not one of the punishments prescribed by Rule 12 of the Home Guards Rules, 1947, and could not be awarded.(iii) Suspension is one of the punishment enumerated in Rule 12 of the Home Guards-Rules, 1947. The petitioner was in suspension from 30 November 1950 to 11 June 1956. Since the petitioner was already suspended as a measure of punishment, he could not be punished twice for the same fault by removing him from service.(iv) The petitioner's appeal against removal from service was pending before the Governor of Madhya Pradesh on 1 November 1956 when the States were reorganised. Since the matter related to property belonging to the Home Guards Organisation at Nagpur and Kamptee now in the State o...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Madhya Pradesh
Reported in : AIR1961MP282
Dixit, C.J.1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by a Sugar Company having its registered office at Sehore challenging the constitutionality of the Bhopal State Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1953, on the ground that it is repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.2. The petitioner-Company was incorporated in the former Bhopal State. It owns sugarcane farms located in the area which was formerly Bhopal State. In 1953 the quondam Bhopal State which was then a Part-C State, enacted the Bhopal State Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1953, 'for the imposition of a tax on agricultural income'. If extended to the whole of the Bhopal State. Section 2 of the Act defines 'agricultural income' as meaning any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes and either assessed to land revenue or is subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Government as such, and any income derived from such land by agricultur...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Rajasthan
Reported in : AIR1962Raj190
Modi J.1. This reference originally came before a learned single Judge and has in turn been made by him to a larger bench.2. The questions referred to this bench for answer are as follows:(1) Whether Section 2(i) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No. XVII of 1950) as amended by the Amending and Extending Act, 1957 (Act No. 34 of 1957) in so far as it applies to the Cantonment Area of Nasirabad and Section 2(2) of the said Act which brings into force at once Sections 1 to 4 and 27 to 31 of that Act and authorises the State of Rajasthan to extend the remaining provisions to such areas in that State and from such date as may from time to time be notified by the State Government in the official Gazette in so far as it affects the Cantonment area of Nasirabad is beyond the legislative competence of the Rajasthan State Legislature for the reason that the subject-matter covered by the said Rajastham Act is within the exclusive competence of the Union Parl...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : AIR1963Mys66
A. Narayana Pai, J.1. In these several Writ Petitions by the employees of the Mysore Government Road Transport Department impugning the validity of certain orders passed against them by an officer of the Department in disciplinary proceedings instituted against them, certain common points of law arise. Therefore, they have been heard together. The learned counsel on both sides, for the sake of convenient disposal of these cases, addressed us in the first instance on these general points of law and thereafter proceeded to deal with the facts and circumstances peculiar to individual cases. We propose to follow the same method in disposing of these cases.2. The common points fall under two categories : The first of them deals with the competency of the officer who made the orders and the second with the correctness or validity of the orders in the light of the rules and standing orders governing the procedure in respect of disciplinary action.3. The particular officer, whose competency is...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Rajasthan
Reported in : AIR1961Raj287
ORDERJagat Narayan, J.1. This is a revision application by the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of money. The suitwas dismissed by the Munsif, Sironj on 23-12-1955. An appeal was preferred in the court of District Judge, Kota on 23-1-1956. It was pending in thatcourt on 1-11-1956 when Sironj was transferred from Rajasthan to Madhya Pradesh. On 22-5-1956 the District Judge transferred the appeal for disposal to the Civil Judge Bundi who dismissed iton 16-1-1957.2. One of the grounds taken in the revision application is that the court of Civil Judge, Bundi, had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal as under Section 125 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956 it stood transferred to the court of District Judge Bhilsa in Madhya Pradesh. The relevant portion of Section 125 runs as follows :'Every proceeding pending immediately before the appointed day before a court (other than a High Court), tribunal, authority or officer in anyarea which on that day falls within a State shall, if it is a pr...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kerala
Reported in : 1962CriLJ647
ORDERT.C. Raghavan, J.1. A short but interesting question of law regarding the validity of a prosecution under Section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Central Act 37 of 1954) and the scope and effect of a notification issued by the Government of Madras under Section 20(1) of the same Act before the States Reorganisation Act comes up to adjudication in these cases. The fact, of the cases are not in dispute and they lie within a narrow compass.2. The petitioners in Cri. R.P. Nos. 194 and 348 of 1958 are dealers in tea. In the former case the two accused persons bad been prosecuted under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act for selling adulterated tea and the 1st accused had been convicted and sentenced to pay a She of Rs. 250 and the 2nd accused to pay a line of Rs. 400; in appeal the conviction and sentence had been confirmed and the 2nd accused has filed the revision petition. In the other case namely, Cri R.P. No. 348 of 1958, the two accused persons had been convict...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Wilkinson v. United States - 365 U.S. 399 (1961) U.S. Supreme Court Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961) Wilkinson v. United States No. 37 Argued November 17, 1960 Decided February 27, 1961 365 U.S. 399 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Summoned to testify before a Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, which was investigating Communist infiltration into basic industries in the South and Communist Party propaganda activities in the South, petitioner refused to answer a question as to whether he was then a member of the Communist Party. He did not claim his privilege against self-incrimination, but contended that the Subcommittee was without lawful authority to interrogate him, and that its questioning violated his rights under the First Amendment. For refusing to answer, he was convicted of a violation of 2 U.S.C. 192, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person summoned as ...
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