Court : Kolkata
Reported in : 45Ind.Cas.113
Barnes Peacock, C.J.1. An advertisement publislied in a newspaper for a demonstration against a Judge for acts done in Court may be a contempt of Court as well as defamation, although it cannot be said that in every case a demonstration got up in order to obtain an expression of public opinion concerning the acts of a Judge would bo a contempt, [p. 125, col. 1.]2. If anonymous letters are sent to the press containing false statements), the press is responsible for them if the name of the author is not given up. [p. 144, col. 2.]3. To say that a sentence is 'cruel' may be a con-tempt of Court, though it would be no contempt if the remark is merely that, the sentence is a severe one. [p. 142, col 2; p. 143, col. 1.]4. Per Macpherson, J.--The High Court has power to proceed by way of contempt oven when the contempt is not committed in Court or during the pendency of a suit. [p. 145, col. 2.]5. Per Curiam.--The fact of his making an apology does not entitle the person charged with contempt...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1877)ILR1Bom23
Michael Westropp, C.J.1. The facts of this case are very clearly stated in the judgment of the Court below by Green, J., and we agree with him in his decision on those facts. We must consider that several matters combine to make up a cause of action, and that, in such a case as the present, the dishonour of a bill or hundi by the drawee is a part of the cause of action of the holder against the indorser. It has been held that notice of dishonour is a material part of the cause of action against an indorser, and that being so it seems to us to follow as a matter of course that the dishonour itself must also be a material part of that cause of action.2. We also consider that the custom sworn to by the plaintiff's witnesses is a reasonable one, and in accordance with the law merchant. We must regard the plaintiff as holder for value of the hundi sued on. It appears that there was a large balance due to him from Popsang and on receipt of the hundi, viz., on the 3rd June, he entered the amo...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1876)ILR1Cal432
Markby, J.1. This, it will be observed, is not an application in the form required by Act VI of 1874, and it has been stated that the petition was so drawn expressly in order to raise the question whether the provisions of that Act were binding.2. I may say at once that no case for granting special leave to appeal has been made out.3. An attempt was also made to obtain, upon this petition, a certificate under Act VI of 1874, that a substantial question of law was involved in the case; and I was asked to grant this certificate, should I think that Act to be binding. But it was subsequently admitted that upon this petition, this alternative course could not be pursued.4. The question therefore which remains is, whether the petitioners in spite of Act VI of 1874 have a right of appeal, simply upon the ground that the property is above the value of Rs. 10,000. There is no doubt that the petitioners would have had that right prior to the passing of Act VI of 1874, and the petitioners conten...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1878)ILR3Cal806
J.W. Colvile, J.1. This is an appeal against a decree of the High Court of Calcutta, sitting as a Court of Appeal, which, on the 23rd August 1875, affirmed the judgment of Mr. Justice Phear, who, in the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction of the same Court, had, on the 22nd April 1875, dismissed the appellant's suit with costs.2. The suit was instituted in December 1872 by the appellant, suing as executor of one Dianut-ut-Dowlah, against Khajah Moheeooddeen, who died after leave to appeal had been given in India, and is represented by the present respondents. The case was tried in India upon only the first and preliminary issue, viz., whether or not a good cause of action was disclosed in the plaint. It is, however, conceded that the statements in the plaint may be taken to be supplemented by, and to include, any fact stated, or to be inferred by necessary implication from the written statement of the plaintiff, or the documents annexed to and filed with either that or the plai...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1881)ILR6Cal794
Wilson, J.1. The main question in this case is a pure question of law,---namely, whether, by the law in force in Calcutta, the widow of an Armenian, married before the Dower Act (XXIX of 1839), is entitled to dower out of lands which her husband held during the marriage for an estate of inheritance, as against a Hindu purchaser for value from the husband during his life.2. There is, so far as I can find, no express authority upon the question. It must, therefore, be dealt with upon consideration of principle.3. The plaintiff's claim is founded upon two propositions,---1st, that, by the law of England, a widow would, under like circumstances, be entitled to-dower; 2nd, that the law of England governs the present case.4. The first of these propositions is no doubt correct. The question is as to-the second. It is often said that the law administered by this Court is,--- except in certain matters affecting Hindus and Mahomedans, and except so far as statutory provisions have modified it,--...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1881)ILR7Cal523
Cunningham, J.1. This case comes before us in the exercise of our powers of criminal revision.2. The facts, as set out in the petition of Hursee Mahapatro, are asfollows :A complaint was preferred to the Raja of Mohurbhunj, charging the petitioner and two others with libel. Thereupon the Raja issued summonses and warrants through the Magistrate of Midnapore for the attendance of the accused, who are residents of that district. The accused petitioned Mr. Price, the Magistrate of Midnapore, that the case should not be tried by the Raja. The Magistrate forwarded the petition, on the 30th June 1880, to the Superintendent of the Tributary Mehals (a post occupied by the Commissioner of Cuttack); and on the 12th July 1880, he addressed the Raja, requesting him to make over the papers of the case to the Magistrate of Midnapore; 'who,' it was observed, 'has the powers of an assistant to the Superintendent of the Tributary Mehals.' This officer, under his usual official seal, summoned two of the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1889)ILR13Bom449
Bardwood, J.1. The decision of this appeal turns upon the construction to be put upon Clause 3 of Section 34 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1879, in reference to a promissory note not stamped at the time of its execution, in respect of which the Court, in which a suit has been brought upon such note, has levied the proper stamp duty under the Act together with a penalty of ten times the amount of the proper duty. The question is whether, after a Subordinate Judge has so admitted the note in evidence, he or his successor in office can, in a later stage of the same suit, question the propriety of such admission and treat the instrument as inadmissible.2. The present suit was brought on three promissory notes, all of which were unstamped when the plaint was filed. At the time when the issues were settled, the Subordinate Judge levied what he understood to be the proper duties on the notes, which he regarded as bonds within the meaning of the Act, together with ten times the amount of those duti...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1889)ILR13Bom404
Charles Sargent, C.J.1. We think this Court has no jurisdiction, and the order appealed from must be confirmed. The object of this suit, as set forth in the plaint, is to have the accounts taken of the Zanzibar business. The defendant, who was manager there, is charged with misappropriating money. Reliance is placed upon the fact that certain sums of money, which form part of the total amount with which he is charged, were misappropriated by him by means of certain misrepresentations made or directions given in Bombay. We do not think that that is sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction. The mere fact that the fraud in connection with certain items in the account was effected in Bombay would not justify a change of venue. It is possible that the case would be tried here in a manner more satisfactory to the plaintiff than it can be elsewhere: but that is not a matter for our consideration. The simple question is, whether such a material part of the cause of action has arisen in Bomba...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1891)ILR14Mad406
1. It is contended for the respondent that the order appealed against is not a final order and that no appeal lies under Section 15 of the Letters Patent. We do not consider that this contention can be supported. The effect to be given to the word ' Judgment' in Section 15 was considered by Mr. Justice BITTLESTON in Desouza v. Coles 3 M.H.C.R. 386 and it was held that the word has the general meaning of any decision or determination, whether final or preliminary, affecting the rights or the interest of any suitor or applicant. It was also pointed out that that meaning is suggested by the language of the Charter in Clauses 15, 39 and 40. Though the order now before us called for a report from the Subordinate Judge, yet it contained the preliminary adjudication that the appellant was not entitled to recover any rent for the village of Koonur, and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge must be reversed so far as it related to that village.2. On the merits, we are unable to support the o...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1896)ILR19Mad21
Parker, J.1. I find myself unable to reconcile the decision of the learned Judge with the decision in Periyanayagam Piliai v. Virappa Naikan 7 M.H.C.R. 51 and that in Easwara Doss v. Subbaraya Naicken Civil Revision Petition No. 136 of 1891 (unreported), to which Mr. Justice Muttusami Ayyar was a party. These decisions do not appear to have been brought to his notice. It is stated that plaintiff's father had tendered pattas for the fasli years for which the rent is now claimed. Having done so he was in a position, under Section 71 of the Rent Recovery Act, to sue for the rent notwithstanding that a suit to determine the terms of the tenancy was pending. The pendency of that suit did not prevent the accrual of the cause of action, though the determination of the suit for rent might have to await the decision in the suit brought to determine the terms of the patta. The period of limitation began to run on the dates on which the rent fell due and the obligation arose on the tender of the ...
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