Court : House of Lords
Decided on : Jul-09-2008
LORD HOFFMANN My Lords, 1. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead. For the reasons he gives, with which I agree, I too would allow this appeal. LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD My Lords, 2. This case raises important questions about the interaction between provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 (“DPA 1998”) on the one hand and provisions of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (“FOISA 2002”) on the other. The corresponding provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA 2000”), which extends to the whole of the United Kingdom and applies to UK public authorities located in Scotland, are not engaged directly. The appellant, the Common Services Agency (“the Agency”), is a special Health Board the regulation of whose functions is a matter for the Scottish Parliament: see FOIA 2000, section 80. But much of the wording of section 38 of FOISA 2002, which address...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Decided on : Jul-09-2008
LORD HOFFMANN My Lords, 1. Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc, a Canadian company, and the University of British Columbia are joint proprietors of European patent 0 706 376 which claims, among other things, a stent coated with taxol for “treating or preventing recurrent stenosis". For convenience I shall call the patentees Angiotech. Conor Medsystems Inc (Conor), an American competitor, applied in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for revocation of the patent on the ground that the claimed invention was obvious. In the United Kingdom, before Pumfrey J and the Court of Appeal (Mummery, Tuckey and Jacob LJJ), it succeeded. In the Netherlands, before the District Court of The Hague (Robert van Peursem, Edgar Brinkman and Walter van Straalen) it failed. Angiotech appeals to your Lordships’ House and says that the Dutch court was right and that the patent should be declared valid. 2. Since the decision of the Court of Appeal, Angiotech and Conor have reached a settlement. C...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Decided on : Jul-30-2008
LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD My Lords, 1. The question in this case is whether a local authority can obtain a summary order for possession against an occupier of a site which it owns and has been used for many years as a gipsy and travellers’ caravan site. His licence to occupy the site has come to an end. He has no enforceable right to remain there under English property law. But he claims that his removal would violate his rights under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The facts 2. The local authority, the respondent, is the freeholder of the site which is known as the Travellers’ Site, Tameside Drive, Castle Vale, Birmingham. The site comprises 16 concrete stands for caravans and four ablution blocks. The appellant was granted a licence by the respondent to station a caravan on plot 12 in September 1987. His licence was extended to include plot 14 in November 1998. He and his family had been resident on the site for about 17 years when on 4 March 2004 the ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Decided on : Jul-30-2008
LORD HOFFMANN My Lords, 1. This appeal concerns the assessability for non-domestic rating of a group of buildings belonging to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (commonly known as the Mormon Church) in the Borough of Chorley in Lancashire. The largest and most imposing is the Temple, which stands 48m high and has 6306m2 of internal floor space on five floors. It is fully air conditioned and is fitted and finished both externally and internally to the highest standards. In addition, in proximity to the Temple, there are (i) the Stake Centre, a single storey building containing a space of 1227m2 divided by a moveable partition into a chapel and a multi-purpose hall, together with a number of small meeting rooms, an office and a baptistery (ii) the Missionary Training Centre, a three storey building containing class rooms, dormitory rooms, cafeteria and ancillary rooms, as well as the President’s flat, which is subject to council tax (iii) the Patrons’ Services B...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Decided on : Jul-30-2008
LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL My Lords, 1. In these two appeals, heard together, there is a common underlying problem: if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances? 2. The two appeals arise on different facts and in a different way: (1) In the first (Van Colle) case the threat was made by a man known in the case as Daniel Brougham against Giles Van Colle (“Giles”) and culminated in the murder of Giles by Brougham. In the second (Smith) case, the threat was made against the respondent (Stephen Paul Smith) by his former partner (Gareth Jeffrey) and culminated in the infliction of serious injury on Mr Smith by Jeffrey. (2) In the Van Colle case the claimants are Giles’ parents, suing on behalf of his estate and on their own behalf. In the S...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Decided on : Jul-30-2008
LORD HOFFMANN My Lords, 1. For the reasons given by Patten J and Collins LJ, as well as those of my noble and learned friends Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe and Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, I would allow this appeal. LORD SCOTT OF FOSCOTE My Lords, 2. This appeal raises a very short point of construction of section 18(2) of the Capital Allowances Act 1990. Since my opinion on the point differs from that of a majority of your Lordships it will suffice for me to explain the reasons for my dissent quite shortly. I am enabled to do so because I have had the advantage of reading in draft the opinions of my noble and learned friends Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe and Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, who, with my noble and learned friend Lord Hoffmann, constitute the majority, and can gratefully adopt their description of the facts and relevant statutory background. 3. The issue is whether the warehouse in which the respondent, Maco, stores the stock that it purchases from its Austrian parent, Maye...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Decided on : Jul-30-2008
LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL My Lords, 1. Mr Caldarelli challenges a decision of the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court (Laws LJ and Tomlinson J: [2007] EWHC 1624 (Admin), [2008] 1 WLR 31) upholding an order that he be surrendered pursuant to a European arrest warrant issued on 6 October 2006 by the Court of Naples. He complains that the warrant is bad because it seeks his surrender as an accused person and not (as he claims to be) a convicted person. The Divisional Court has neatly expressed the point to be decided in its certified question: “Where a fugitive has been convicted and sentenced in his absence in the requesting state, but the conviction and sentence are neither final nor enforceable, may his case be treated as an accusation case even though he does not enjoy an unqualified right to a retrial on the merits?” 2. The appellant is said to have been party to the unlawful smuggling of drugs into a Naples prison in which he was incarcerated at the time. On 6 October 20...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Decided on : Jul-30-2008
LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD My Lords, 1. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the opinion of my noble and learned friend Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. I agree with it, and for the reasons he gives I would allow the appeal and make the order that he proposes. 2. The exercise which is contemplated by para 4 of Schedule 1 to the Rent Officers (Housing Benefit Functions) Order 1997 (1997 SI/1984), as amended by the Rent Officers (Housing Benefit Functions) (Amendment) Order 2001 (2001 SI/3561), leaves much to the judgment of the rent officer. But, as its rather complex formula indicates, the area within which that judgment is to be exercised is not unlimited. It follows that, if his decision is challenged, the rent officer must be in a position to show that he has conducted the exercise in the way that is required by the paragraph. 3. The principle of valuation which the rent officer is asked to apply requires him to make an assessment based on a comparison with the rents payable for dw...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Decided on : Jul-30-2008
LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL My Lords, 1. I have had the benefit of reading in draft the opinion of my noble and learned friend Baroness Hale of Richmond. I am in complete agreement with it, and would, for the reasons which she gives, allow the Council’s appeal. LORD SCOTT OF FOSCOTE My Lords, 2. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the opinion of my noble and learned friend Baroness Hale of Richmond and, for the reasons she gives, with which I am in full agreement, I too would allow this appeal. BARONESS HALE OF RICHMOND My Lords, 3. The issue before us is whether a local social services authority is obliged, under section 21(1)(a) of the National Assistance Act 1948, to arrange (and pay for) residential accommodation for a person subject to immigration control who is HIV positive but whose only needs, other than for a home and subsistence, are for medication prescribed by his doctor and a refrigerator in which to keep it. The answer to that issue turns on the meaning of the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Decided on : Jul-30-2008
LORD HOFFMANN My Lords, 1. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Scott of Foscote. For the reasons he gives, with which I agree, I too would allow this appeal. LORD SCOTT OF FOSCOTE My Lords, Introduction 2. The essence of the problem to be resolved in this case can be quite shortly stated. A is the owner of land with potential for residential development and enters into negotiations with B for the sale of the land to B. They reach an oral “agreement in principle” on the core terms of the sale but no written contract, or even a draft contract for discussion, is produced. There remain some terms still to be agreed. The structure of the agreement in principle that A and B have reached is that B, at his own expense, will make and prosecute an application for the desired residential development and that, if the desired planning permission is obtained, A will sell the land to B, or more probably to a company nominated by B, ...
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