Court : House of Lords
EARL OF HALSBURY L.C. My Lords, in this case we have had a long and learned argument by the two learned counsel who have appeared for the appellants. I am not certain that I quite understand the conflict between the two propositions, or that I quite understand on what principle one is supposed to decide these cases apart from the facts of each particular case. One principle, I think, has been established from the earliest period of the law down to the present time, namely, that if something has been made part of the house it must necessarily go to the heir, because the house goes to the heir and it is part of the house. That seems logical enough. Another principle appears to be equally clear, namely, that where it is something which, although it may be attached in some form or another (I will say a word in a moment about the degree of attachment) to the walls of the house, yet, having regard to the nature of the thing itself, and the purpose of its being placed there, is not intended ...
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LORD MACNAGHTEN. My Lords, this appeal raises in a slightly different form and with some difference of circumstance the question which this House had to consider in the recent case of Noakes v. Rice.(1) Your Lordships, I think, have nothing to do now but to determine whether the distinction between the present case and the case of Noakes v. Rice(1), as finally decided, is or is not a solid and substantial difference leading to a different result. Other points, no doubt, were discussed at the bar, but the only effect of the discussion (1) [1902] A. C. 24. was to incumber and embarrass the argument on the one point which was really arguable. In my view, all these other points were and are immaterial, and I pass them by altogether. The distinction between Noakes v. Rice(1) and the case under review is brought out very clearly in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which was delivered by Stirling L.J. It is, I need not say, a most careful judgment, to which little or nothing could be adde...
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EARL OF HALSBURY L.C. My Lords, in this case, which was tried before Joyce J., the learned judge gave judgment for the defendant upon the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to prove any actionable wrong although he found that the erection of the buildings of which the plaintiffs complained had appreciably diminished the light which the plaintiffs had previously enjoyed. The Court of Appeal, as I understand their judgment, thought this was wrong, and ordered a mandatory injunction to pull the premises down, so as to restore all the light that had been previously enjoyed. If this principle should be sanctioned by your Lordships it would be for the first time that, in this House at all events, such a principle had been determined. I do not deny that authorities may be found for it, some of which have been cited at the bar, but I do not think that the exact question which is now in debate has ever been brought before this House until now. The question may be very simply stated thus: aft...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Lord Chancellor.— This is a case in which a party to an agreement has admittedly broken it, and an action was brought for the purpose of enforcing the payment of a sum of money which, by the agreement between the parties, was fixed as that which the defenders were to pay in the event that has happened. Two objections have been made to the enforcement of that payment. The first objection is one which appears upon the face of the instrument itself, namely, that it is a penalty, and not, therefore, recoverable as a pactional arrangement of the amount of damages resulting from the breach of contract. It cannot, I think, be denied—indeed, I think it has been frankly admitted by the learned counsel—that not much reliance can be placed upon the mere use of certain words. Both in England and in Scotland it has been pointed out that the Court must proceed according to what is the real nature of the transaction, and that the mere use of the word “penalty” on the one...
Tag this Judgment!Court : House of Lords
Lord Chancellor. When one examines these two appeals, I think it is impossible to say that any different question arises in the one from that which arises in the other. The same judgment is applicable to both. When one examines with care the different allegations made in the condescendences and the answers, I do not think any question arises as to the confidential nature of the employment between patient and medical man. I do not propose to express any opinion upon what would be the legal determination of that question if it arose. It may be that it raises very serious and difficult questions, and I certainly am not disposed to express an opinion either way in respect of questions which upon other grounds have no difficulty at all in their solution. The broad proposition I entertain no doubt about, and it seems to me to be the only question that properly arises here; as to the immunity of a witness for evidence given in a Court of justice, it is too late to argue that as if it were dou...
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LORD LOREBURN L.C. My Lords, in my opinion the judgment of the Court of Appeal ought to be affirmed. I can find no right of action in the wife of the tenant against the landlord either for letting the premises in a dangerous state or for failing to repair them according to his promise. The husband has sued successfully for breach of contract, but the wife was not party to any contract. Accordingly the appeal fails. LORD MACNAGHTEN . My Lords, notwithstanding the opinion of Mathew L.J., and the able argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, I am of opinion that the judgment of the Master of the Rolls and Romer L.J. must be upheld. The facts are not in dispute. The law laid down by the Court of Common Pleas in the passage quoted by the Master of the Rolls from the judgment of Erle C.J. in Robbins v. Jones(1) is beyond question: "A landlord who lets a house in a dangerous state is not liable to the tenant's customers or guests for accidents happening during the term: for, fraud a...
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Lord Chancellor. I think this appeal fails, though the reasons which have led me to this conclusion are somewhat different from those which are relied upon by the Scottish Courts. The late Mr Hunter was injured in a railway accident on 28th December 1906, and died the next day. He had insured with the appellant Company, the defenders in this action, and the questions were whether the risk under the contract with the defenders was a subsisting risk on 28th December 1906, and whether claim was made under the insurance contract within twelve months of the registration of Mr Hunter's name by the defenders, whatever “registration” may mean. In view of these controversies it is necessary first to ascertain what the insurance was. The defenders inserted in Letts's Diary what they called a coupon insurance policy, announcing that they would pay 1000 to any person killed in a railway accident (or under other circumstances immaterial to this case) on certain conditions, one of which ...
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LORD LOREBURN L.C. My Lords, this is a most unfortunate litigation, in which the costs must far exceed any sum there may be at stake. A little common sense would have settled all these differences in a few minutes. The plaintiff was employed by the defendants as manager of their business at Calcutta at 15 l. per week as salary, and a commission on the trade done. He could be dismissed by six months' notice. In October, 1905, the defendants gave him six months' notice, but at the same time they appointed Mr. Gilpin to act as his successor, and took steps to prevent the plaintiff from acting any longer as manager. In December, 1905, the plaintiff came back to England. The plaintiff brought this action in 1906, claiming an account and damages for breach of contract. That there was a breach of contract is quite clear. If what happened in October, 1905, did not amount to a wrongful dismissal, it was, at all events, a breach of the plaintiff's right to act as manager during the six months an...
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Lord Chancellor. Your Lordships are asked to decide whether a clause in a lease, dated 1884, has been superseded by the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act, 1908. The clause runs as follows:—John Stewart hereby binds and obliges himself “at the expiry of this lease to leave the sheep stock on the farm to the proprietors or incoming tenant according to the valuation of men mutually chosen, with power to name an oversman.” Is this superseded by the words of section 11? (His Lordship read the material part of the section.) If this were an English case the authorities decided on the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, draw a marked distinction between arbitration and valuation. It is one thing to refer a dispute to the decision of an arbitrator who has to hear parties and witnesses as in a Court of law. It is another thing to say that a third person shall value the subject of sale, as when an incoming tenant agrees to buy fixtures at a valuation. But we are...
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Lord Atkinson. It is not disputed in this case that on 1st September 1909 the appellants, on behalf of the respondent and as his brokers, purchased 200 Globe and Phœnix mining shares for a sum, including brokerage and contract stamp and transfer and registration fee, of 865. Neither is it disputed that the respondent, by his letter of 13th September 1909, repudiated that transaction and refused to carry it out. It is conceded that, if the respondent was not entitled thus to put an end to the contract, the appellants were entitled to sell those shares against him and recover any loss they sustained on the resale. The appellants resold the shares, and, in my opinion, the whole trial proceeded on the assumption that on that resale and by means of it the appellants had lost 50, 2s. That is absolutely plain, and is, I think, found as a fact by the Lord Ordinary. The respondent justified his repudiation of his contract on the ground that he had not only instructed the appellants on 9th ...
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